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Abstract 
 
The proliferation in improvised performance of chance strategies, game-like scores, 
playful exercises, one-off collaborations, prepared, new and hacked instruments 
suggests a ubiquitous commitment to excavate unforeseen creative possibilities that 
exist beyond the edge of consciousness. Such strategies are deployed to resist mastery 
and bring forth the possibility for collision out of which fractures emanate allowing the 
unfamiliar to flow forth. In this research project I draw upon my experience of site-
sufficient extradisciplinary performance to unpack the mechanisms at work in these 
strategies.  
 
The proceeding theoretical discourse initially draws upon the interrelated notions of 
habitus and norm-circles to illuminate the manner in which dispositions to act are 
inculcated in the individual and conditioned by the socio-cultural environment to which 
they are exposed. The aesthetics of liminal phenomena reveal the theatre as a site in 
which to interrogate these habitual behaviours. This discourse is shown to be too narrow 
to account for embodied disciplinary-specific performance vocabularies, however, 
further insights are gained from contemporary cognitive science. The theory of 
autopoiesis specifies that the individual is fundamentally embodied, bringing forth 
meaning in the world through perceptually guided action. We see that the body 
permeates cognition, conditioning our understanding of the world. The notions of 
external scaffolding and epistemic action are introduced and express the way in which 
the environment is manipulated to empower the individual. The theory of affordances is 
subsequently deployed to articulate the perceptual and actional fields available to the 
individual with respect to their environment. Subsequently this discourse enriches our 
understanding of the way in which environments constitute networks of empowerment.   
 
This theoretical discourse is exemplified in the practical experiments conducted during 
this research project. Performance technologies associated with electronic music are 
deployed to create environments for collaborative performance – sites that empower the 
individual as an extradisciplinary performer. 
 
 
 
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
For Pearl Dunham and Iris Wormald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
 
 
 
 
Funded by the CETL Postvernacular Music Scholarship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
Contents 
Abstract	   ii	  
DVD	  Track	  Listing	   vii	  
List	  of	  Figures	   viii	  
How	  to	  View	  the	  Documentation	   ix	  
Introduction	   1	  0.1	  Site-­‐Sufficient	  Improvisation	  On	  The	  Cinder	  Path	   2	  0.2	  Situating	  the	  Practice	   7	  
Chapter	  1.	  Habitual	  Behaviour	  and	  Antistructure	   12	  1.1	  Ontology	  of	  Dispositions	   14	  1.2	  The	  Cop	  in	  the	  Head:	  Theatre,	  Crisis	  and	  Anti-­‐Structure	   19	  
Chapter	  2.	  Embodiment,	  Enaction	  and	  Empowerment	  Networks	   26	  2.1	  The	  Fundamental	  Principles	  Of	  Autopoiesis	   28	  2.2	  Structural	  Determinism	   31	  2.3	  Self-­‐Awareness	  and	  Embodiment	   33	  2.4	  Enactive	  Cognition	   40	  2.5	  Forsythe’s	  Improvisation	  Technologies	   49	  2.6	  Empowerment	  Networks	   53	  2.7	  Affordances	   61	  2.8	  Three	  Examples	  of	  Empowerment	  Networks	   66	  2.8.1	  Playgrounds	  and	  Climbing	  Frames	   66	  2.8.2	  Parkour	  and	  Free	  Running	   67	  2.8.3	  Site-­‐Sufficient	  Improvisation:	  The	  Cinder	  Path	   68	  2.9	  Closing	  Remarks	   69	  
Chapter	  3.	  Reel	  Experiments,	  Terrain	  and	  SynSite	   71	  3.1	  Reel	  Experiments	   71	  3.2	  Terrain	   83	  3.3	  SynSite	   91	  3.3.1	  Phase	  1:	  Motion	  Tracking	  and	  the	  Trigger-­‐Regions	  Experiment	   92	  3.3.2	  Phase	  2:	  Procedural	  Audio,	  Spatialisation	  and	  the	  Locator	   96	  3.3.3	  Phase	  3:	  The	  Heart	   106	  3.4	  Closing	  Remarks	   108	  3.4.1	  Practice	  As	  Metaphor,	  Theory	  In	  Practice	   108	  3.4.2	  Electronic	  Music	  and	  Extradisciplinary	  Performance	   111	  
  vi 
Conclusion	   114	  
Bibliography	   119	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
DVD Track Listing 
 
Documentation DVD 1 
1. CP1: theybreakinpieces Improvisation on the Cinder Path  
2. RE1: Reel Experiments Sonic Improvisation  
3. RE2: Reel Experiments Solo and Collaborative Investigation 
4. T1: Terrain Performance Extracts 
5. T2: Terrain Final Configuration 
 
Documentation DVD 2 
1. SS1: SynSite Trigger-Regions Experiment 
2. SS2: SynSite Grain-Clouds Experiment  
3. SS3: SynSite Mesh Demonstration 
4. SS4: SynSite Swing-Ball Demonstration 
5. SS5: SynSite Locator Sound Demonstration 
6. SS6: SynSite Heart Demonstration 
7. SS7: SynSite Final Configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  viii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 theybreakinpieces perform on the Cinder Path. 
Figure 3.1 Reel-to-reel tabletop performance ecology. 
Figure 3.2 Solo movement experiments with the reel-to-reel tape recorder. 
Figure 3.3 Collaborative experiments with the reel-to-reel tape recorder. 
Figure 3.4 Experiments with The Cube. 
Figure 3.5 Terrain at The Cluny. 
Figure 3.6 Large presentation window in the auto-sampler application. 
Figure 3.7 Blob Tracking in Isadora. 
Figure 3.8 Motion tracking the dancer from above. 
Figure 3.9 Screenshot of the Max/MSP patch created for SynSite (the ‘heart’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ix 
How to View the Documentation 
It is my intention that this research project should address the way in which an 
electronic music-making practice can be reconciled with insights gained from my site-
specific performance practice. As such, I have not aimed to create finished artworks per 
se, but rather to conduct a practice-led inquiry that is driven by questions and problems 
that arise through practical experiments whilst investigating this topic. As will become 
clear the experiments that I have conducted have been both technical and performative 
in equal measure yet, regardless of their nature, are always pressed into the service of 
the aim stated above. As such, the performance outputs that I have created throughout 
this project are to be considered as experiments that give rise to additional problems and 
insights and in doing so propel the project forward. I have, therefore, here used video 
documentation to present as concise a record as possible of the numerous and varied 
experiments that I have conducted. Whilst the audiences that were present at 
performances were not informed of the experimental nature of the work and the 
questions that I was seeking to answer (for reasons that I shall state explicitly in the 
conclusion to this thesis), I ask that the performances and indeed all of the events 
recorded in the video documentation be assessed according to their function with regard 
to the aims of the research project and not necessarily on their success or failure as 
artworks. To state this more explicitly: I consider the success or failure of performance 
outputs as artworks secondary to the insights gained through their creation and 
presentation. 
 
Cross-References to the DVD Documentation Within the Written Thesis 
I have given each of the films included on the DVD documentation a reference code. 
References made in the written thesis to specific moments of interest in the video 
documentation are indicated by square brackets and give the reference code of the film 
followed by a specific time-code (where appropriate). For example, a reference to the 
film Reel Experiments Solo and Collaborative Investigation is presented in the text as 
follows: [RE2, 00m12s – 00m46s]. 
 
The reference code for each film is stated in the DVD track listings above (page vii). 
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Introduction 
 
The proliferation in improvised performance of chance strategies, game-like scores, 
playful exercises, one-off collaborations, prepared, new, and hacked instruments, props, 
and objects suggests a ubiquitous commitment to excavate unforeseen creative 
possibilities that exist beyond the edge of consciousness. One may state that these 
strategies are deployed to resist mastery and bring forth the possibility for collision and 
dissonance from out of which fractures emanate allowing the unfamiliar to flow forth, 
there to be encountered for the first time. 
 
Another such strategy is site-specificity, a method that is occurs throughout my practice 
(particularly prominent in my work with Mona McCarthy and Paul Stapleton in the 
group theybreakinpieces, from 2004 to 2007). Together with likeminded artists who 
seek to exchange specialist disciplinary knowledge with one another through the 
creative act of improvisation, theybreakinpieces chose to perform in non-traditional 
performance sites – swimming baths, factories, car parks, nature reserves, derelict 
buildings and ruins. Each site is chosen for a topography that proffers the opportunity to 
interrogate those actions and behaviours consistent with specialist disciplines and, most 
importantly, to potentialise the possibility for multi-modal interactions through which 
one may observe, mimic, learn, and experiment to reveal new behaviours outside of the 
boundary of one’s own specialist vocabulary.  
 
Following a number of these site-specific performances it became apparent that whilst 
each location offered many unusual and unique opportunities for sonic and kinetic 
action, the finer nuances of these sites were being overlooked as a consequence of the 
equipment, materials, instruments and objects that the performers were importing into 
the site. These non-native materials (for example, public address systems, laptop 
computers with bespoke audio software, plastic sheets, synthetic surfaces on which to 
move, home-made instruments) provided familiar modes of interaction within the site 
that proved very hard to resist, subsequently drawing the performer’s attention from 
unfamiliar nuances in the environment to more familiar areas in their established 
practice. As such, theybreakinpieces recognised an opportunity to modify the site-
specific strategy so that the relation between the performers and their environment 
could be intensified. 
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A new site-sufficient strategy was devised. This is a strategy that encompasses site-
specificity and also requires the performers to utilise only those materials indigenous to 
a chosen location. Site-sufficiency thus demands that the performers excavate all the 
creative possibilities that they can from the site itself and, in doing so, maximises their 
exposure to the nuances of the environment. Site-sufficiency thus foregrounds 
resourceful, explorative interactions and, further, increases the potential for unusual 
encounters and revelations in the form of emergent provisional knowledge that may be 
revisited in the future. By way of an example, I shall proceed with an account of 
theybreakinpieces’ site-sufficient improvised performance on the Cinder Path, created 
during a residency at Cuerden Valley Park in 2005. 
 
0.1 Site-Sufficient Improvisation On The Cinder Path1 
 
 
Figure 1.1 theybreakinpieces perform on the Cinder Path. 
 
In the first instance, the four performers agreed upon a score2: progress from one end of 
the path to the other. This simple instruction is typical of the many scores that 
                                                
1 Please view the film theybreakinpieces Improvisation on the Cinder Path [CP1]. 
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theybreakinpieces employ to initiate collaborative improvisations in unfamiliar sites. 
The score used on the Cinder Path has a few notable characteristics: 1) It draws upon 
the original function of the site to move from point A to point B and instructs the group 
to travel, thus implying a linearity of direction that evokes progress and resists return. 2) 
No duration is specified in the score, therefore the improvisation lasts, simply, as long 
as it takes. 3) The score is primarily one of movement: this is not to say that sonic 
exploration does not occur, rather, it locates precedence of the kinetic over the sonic 
(implications such as this tend to characterise the consequent improvisation).  
 
The Cinder Path runs along the length of the western side of Cuerden Valley Hall. It is 
unusually long, narrow and straight with imposing stone walls on either side. During the 
improvisation, the loose gravel surface of the path made every step uneasy, sliding the 
foot and twisting the ankle in unforeseen ways. The sliding foot, gaining momentum, 
would be brought unexpectedly to the wall where it was pressed into stillness. The walls 
themselves, up to seven feet high and barely an arm-span apart, formed a tight stone-
corridor within which to move. This corridor constrained the size of each step and 
curtailed free flowing movement, imposing stillness on the dancing body. The 
prominent sound of the gravel path, rustling and grinding underfoot quickly instigated a 
tangible sonic accompaniment, punctuated by the outward breath of the performers as 
they moved. Moments of stillness were thus also moments of silence, however, the 
drone of the distant motorway drew one’s senses outward, beyond the confines of the 
path before being enclosed once again into the tightness of the stone corridor and the 
confined-body in movement. These sonic and physical properties of the site imposed a 
tangible rhythm upon the improvisation. This rhythm emerged and permeated the group 
so that events began to occur in unison – in sympathy with one another - and as 
functions of an emergent counterpoint. Consequently, this sympathetic movement was 
maintained throughout the improvisation and determined the duration of the piece. 
 
Lasting over sixty minutes, this was a physically demanding performance for all of the 
performers. However, the duration of the piece alone did not account for the physical 
demands made on the performer. The score’s impetus on progression along the length 
                                                                                                                                          
2 theybreakinpieces (Mona McCarthy (dancer), Paul Stapleton (musician) and Nick 
Williams (musician)) worked with associate artists throughout the residency at Cuerden 
Valley Park. Jon Aveyard, a musician and long-term collaborator of the company, was 
the associate artist working with us to create the performance on the Cinder Path.  
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of the path revealed subtle variations in the physicality of the site so that the path was 
felt to expand and contract unpredictably as the improvisation progressed. The cinder 
floor inclined, rising and falling under foot, and the textures of each surface shifted, 
seemingly sharpening and smoothing, upon touch. The drone of the traffic swelled and 
swirled through the path with the wind in sharp contrast with the intermittent 
immediacy of the gravel underfoot. Amongst all of this, one had to negotiate the 
presence of three other bodies and the sounds that they made, finding gaps through 
which to act. At the end of the improvisation our bodies were covered in dirt and moss 
from the walls, we had cobwebs in our hair, and our hands and arms were scratched, 
grazed and raw. Our clothes were torn and stretched. This was a performance that was 
more physically demanding than any that we had previously created.  
 
The physicality of the site permeated the improvisation. The site seemed to resist one’s 
body; a quality that was transposed to the interactions between the performers 
themselves who, in their actions, interjected and obstructed one another’s actions. This 
quality was in stark contrast to the entrenched mode of response that had evolved 
amongst our group in previous collaborations. Traditionally we were sympathetic to one 
another, taking each others weight, lifting, and supporting each other, harmonizing with 
each other, creating a free flowing performance vocabulary. In contrast, during the 
performance on the Cinder Path we began to push and pull one another, removing 
support and purposefully colliding with each other. This resistance revealed new 
configurations of the body and brought fresh uncertainty into the group’s performing-
together that marked a new phase in our improvisational practice. Resistance emerged 
as a generative force capable of disturbing habitual response and moving improvisation 
once again into the unknown.  
 
I shall return to this account of the performance on The Cinder Path in a moment, but 
first I will introduce the theoretical notion of extradisciplinarity, a concept that 
articulates the pedagogic impetus underpinning much of the theybreakinpieces’ 
experimentation.  
 
theybreakinpieces’ notion of extradisciplinary performance, was collectively defined in 
2005 for the Collision Symposium for Interarts and Interdisciplinary Performance as 
follows: 
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Literally: beyond disciplinary distinctions. A mode of collaborating that 
does not limit performers to their predetermined disciplinary roles (i.e. a 
dancer no longer only dances, and a musician does more than make 
sound). This is a term that is more specific than the notion of 
interdisciplinarity, which allows for different disciplines to collaborate 
without losing their distinct identities. Extradisciplinarity implies a lack 
of boundaries, but does not imply a leveling process where specialist 
knowledge is lost. Rather, the extradisciplinary performer is required to 
exchange knowledge with practitioners outside of his/her discipline and 
apply this knowledge in performance.3 
 
Extradisciplinarity is, therefore, innately pedagogic and so it is prerequisite that 
performers participate with this in mind. As is implied in the above quote, the aim of 
extradisciplinarity is not to impart a broad and standardised skillset in each of the 
performers but is rather to instantiate an economy of knowledge in which individual 
virtuosity is honoured whilst also providing an opportunity for both development and 
the acquisition of disciplinary specific skills outside of one’s own specialist field. 
Improvisation is deployed as an appropriate mechanism that enables the exchange and 
acquisition of the tacit knowledge that is characteristically constituent of disciplines in 
the performing arts. The subsequent performances therefore potentialise heuristic 
exploration and, in doing so, afford manifold simultaneous modes of knowledge 
acquisition and exchange. To return to the performance on the Cinder Path for an 
example: whilst Mona McCarthy (a specialist in dance) used the unique physicality of 
the environment to reveal new movement qualities and to extend her existing 
vocabulary, I explored my own limited movement vocabulary by observing and 
mimicking her actions to guide me into unfamiliar terrain. Simultaneously, our moving-
together, affected by the site itself, brought to the foreground a quality of movement 
(one of resistance and aggressive interjection) entirely new to both of us and revealed a 
lexicon of dance that has informed our moving-together ever since. This exemplifies the 
emergence of provisional knowledge in extradisciplinary performance, a phenomenon 
that reveals new creative possibilities for action and future exploration. One may state 
then that extradisciplinarity aims to overcome predetermined disciplinary boundaries 
yet maintains and embraces individual virtuosity whilst generating provisional 
knowledge that reveals new possibilities for creative action. 
                                                
3 theybreakinpieces, ‘Extradisciplinary’, Collision Interarts-Interdisciplinary-
International Symposium Programme, University Of Victoria, Canada (2005), 50. 
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Whilst the site-sufficient strategy has proven effective for instantiating extradisciplinary 
modes of performance in many respects, it is not flawless and is the catalyst for an 
anxiety that has since motivated this present research project. As an artist who 
specialises in electronic music I am acutely aware that site-sufficiency necessarily 
prohibits the majority of actions that are consistent with my specialist performance 
vocabulary. Therefore, whilst I may benefit from the economy of knowledge that is 
instantiated in such performances, the lack of facilities that are constitutive of electronic 
music (for example, laptop computers, audio interfaces, power supplies) consequently 
marginalises my native vocabulary and limits the degree to which I may contribute to 
this economy. This, I propose, is symptomatic of any technologically mediated 
vocabulary in the context of site-sufficient performance.  
 
From the outset of this research project it has been my intention to reconcile 
extradisciplinary performance with electronic music-making practice. I had hoped to 
unpack site-sufficiency to reveal the mechanisms in place that empower individuals as 
extradisciplinary performers and, further, use this knowledge to inform experiments 
with those performance technologies that are constitutive of electronic music practice. 
In doing so, I had hoped, ultimately, to further understand my own performance practice 
(a practice that, until now, had evolved primarily by way of intuition and informal 
discussions with my peers) so that it may continue to progress. I am an artist and this is 
an artist’s research project, therefore, whilst my journey through, for example sociology 
or cognitive psychology may be unconventional, it is informed by many years of 
practical work. As such, I spent a lot of time, particularly in the early stages of this 
research project, reflecting upon past performances, trying to understand what exactly 
had been taking place. For this reason I have been drawn to those theories and 
discussions that resonate most closely with my own experiences, often finding texts that 
articulate phenomena for which I could never suitably find the words. Just as my 
practice is unique, so too is the proceeding milieu of theories and ideas: this was, 
perhaps, inevitable. However, I am confident that the discussion which follows will 
offer unique insights to anyone who is concerned with the nature of collaboration and, 
in particular, the environments in which collaboration occurs. 
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0.2 Situating the Practice 
 
To situate my creative practice within one field or discipline is, perhaps, to deny its very 
nature. I approach the arts as something of a nomadic inquisitor, moving between 
projects, technologies and disciplines, and producing numerous forms of output such as 
audiovisual recordings, text, film, live performance, presentations, lectures, installations 
and software. Themes, ideas, problems and questions arise from within the practice and 
provoke appropriate methodologies for further inquiry. As such, associations with any 
one arts movement or performance community are elusive. However, as I reflect upon 
the development of my practice I can identify two lines of inquiry that have been 
consistent throughout and, furthermore, a number of practices and practitioners who 
have at one time or another been a significant influence or resource from which to gain 
insight. 
 
The first of these lines of inquiry is in the field of interdisciplinary methods of 
collaboration. My work with theybreakinpieces has provided the main vehicle with 
which to gain insights in this field, indeed, the company was formed as a consequence 
of a collective dissatisfaction at the methods of collaboration we had each experienced 
in past projects. These projects, primarily consisting in collaborations between dancers 
and musicians whilst at the University of Central Lancashire (1998-2001), consistently 
specified the roles of each individual and confined their activity to these roles. As a 
company we identified an opportunity to instantiate collaborations in which a rich 
economy of knowledge could exist by enabling the artists to dismantle pre-conceived 
disciplinary distinctions and to share knowledge in the moment of creation and 
performance. Hence, following a long period of experimentation and gestation, the 
notion of extradisciplinarity in the terms outlined above came to fruition.  
 
The history of twentieth century art and design is rife with practitioners who shared a 
similar desire to re-imagine disciplinary boundaries so that the artists and artforms may 
be freed from the shackles that they imposed. Perhaps the most violent example can be 
found in the writing of F.T. Marinetti and the principles he extolled in ‘The Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism’ in which he states: 
 
We affirm that the world’s magnificence has been enriched by a new 
beauty: the beauty of speed. A racing car whose hood is adorned with 
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great pipes, like serpents of explosive breath – a roaring car that seems to 
ride on grapeshot is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace.4 
 
Marinetti and his Italian Futurists sought to reinvigorate the arts by embracing the 
power and vitality of the industrial age. Whilst, on the one hand, I admire the vigour 
with which the Futurists proceeded to reconstitute disciplinary vocabularies by weaving 
the language of speed, power and industry into the fabric of their respective artforms, I 
find their uncompromising and violent rejection of established techniques, virtuosity 
and mastery in the arts disconcerting. Marinetti states: 
 
In truth I tell you that daily visits to museums, libraries, and academies 
(cemeteries of empty exertion, Calvaries of crucified dreams, registries 
of aborted beginnings!) are, for artists, as damaging as the prolonged 
supervision by parents of certain young people drunk with their talent 
and their ambitious wills. When the future is barred to them, the 
admirable past may be a solace for the ills of the moribund, the sickly, 
the prisoner… But we want no part of it, the past, we the young and 
strong Futurists!5 
 
Such a rejection of the past is not consistent with the principle of extradisciplinarity that 
seeks not to set aside the individual’s existing knowledge but instead to nurture it and 
press it into the service of the collaborative creative process. In this regard, I find a 
more satisfactory alignment with the principles of the Weimar Bauhaus under the 
direction of Walter Gropius who, in his ‘Bauhaus Manifesto and Program’, states: 
 
Architects, painters, and sculptors must recognize anew and learn to 
grasp the composite character of a building as an entity… Art is not a 
“profession.” There is no essential difference between the artist and the 
craftsman… Together let us desire, conceive, and create the new 
structure of the future, which will embrace architecture and sculpture and 
painting in one unity and which will one day rise toward heaven from the 
hands of a million workers like the crystal symbol of a new faith.6 
                                                
4 F.T.Marinetti, ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’, Italianfuturism.org, 1909, 
http://www.italianfuturism.org/manifestos/foundingmanifesto/ (4th March 2013). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Walter Gropius, ‘Bauhaus Manifesto and Program’, Thelearninglab.nl, 1919, 
http://www.thelearninglab.nl/resources/Bauhaus-manifesto.pdf (3rd March, 2013), 1. 
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By redrawing the boundary between the arts and crafts and uniting the students and 
masters under one roof where traditionally they had existed in disparate departments, 
Gropius hoped to instigate a rich exchange of knowledge that would see the arts and 
creativity excel in new directions. However, what is most interesting and relevant with 
regard to my practice is the way in which Gropius conceived of the role of the Bauhaus 
masters and the way in which the student’s should learn their art, he states: 
 
Starting the Bauhaus as its responsible Director, I had come to the 
conclusion that an autocratic, subjective approach must block the innate 
budding expression of differently-gifted students, as the teacher, even 
with the best intention, imposes the results of his own thought and work 
on him. I convinced myself that a good teacher must abstain from 
handing out his personal vocabulary to his student, but should rather let 
him find his own way even via detours; that he should encourage the 
growth of independence in the student, and vigorously destroy his 
imitative reactions, or at least make him aware that he tries to harvest on 
foreign soil.7  
 
The sentiment expressed in Gropius’ words resonates with the method deployed by 
theybreakinpieces in which artists share specialist knowledge yet, whenever possible, 
do not prescribe its use. Instead, the individual is encouraged to explore new knowledge 
in terms that are meaningful to them through experimentation and exploration in 
performance. As a practitioner, therefore, my practice has become increasingly 
concerned with strategies for instantiating economies of knowledge between artists and 
creating performance environments (including appropriate scores, rules, and sites) in 
which heuristic experimentation can take place. In the description of theybreakinpieces 
site-sufficient strategy for performance I have shown one methodology for instantiating 
a space in which artists are free to interrogate knowledge and explore further 
possibilities in this way. This should indicate the manner in which improvisation 
became a central tenet of my practice; improvisation is a functional strategy within my 
practice, it is a vehicle for the emergence of provisional and tacit knowledge between 
individuals from disparate performance disciplines and is therefore appropriate for 
extradisciplinary performance. 
 
                                                
7 Walter Gropius, and Howard Dearstyne, ‘The Bauhaus Contribution’, Journal of 
Architectural Eduction (1947-1974), 18/1 (1963), 14-16. 
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The second line of inquiry that is consistent throughout my practice is a necessary 
continuation of the need to create suitable environments in which to facilitate 
extradisciplinary performance. I am interested in the many ways in which one’s 
behavior is affected by both the environment and the objects we encounter. This work 
exists within a community of inquiry consisting in artists and designers who all 
manipulate the environment to potentialise new modes of behavior and insight through 
creative exploration and interaction.  One such artist is James Turrell whose 
extraordinary lightworks bring forth to consciousness the viewer’s own perceptual 
apparatus. In 2006 I experienced an exhibition of Turrell’s work in Yorkshire Sculpture 
Park’s Underground Galleries: One enters a gallery space in pitch darkness; as one’s 
eyes adapt to the darkness a coloured oblong appears on a wall. This oblong appears to 
have structure and mass yet, upon approaching the image one becomes aware that the 
plain of colour is not solid. One may reach out and breach the surface and, in doing so, 
cross an infinite abyss revealing a depth that is contrary to the information one has 
perceived visually. This mis-perception creates a cognitive dissonance; a powerful 
moment of insight that illuminates the limitations of the perceptual apparatus of the 
body; an insight revealed through interaction and experience. Of his work, Turrell 
states: ‘My art deals with light itself, not as the bearer of revelation, but as revelation 
itself’,8 
 
The capacity to gain insight through encounters with the environment is central to my 
work. Much of my practice both as an improvising musician and in interdisciplinary 
collaborations is focused upon the instantiation of ambiguous environments and 
unfamiliar objects and instruments that must be creatively negotiated in live 
performance. The performances themselves are offerings to audiences who are invited 
to witness the tense negotiation between performers as they interrogate their 
environment. As such, my role is often to establish rich and chaotic sites or to create 
instruments that resist mastery. In this respect, my work resonates strongly with design 
practitioners who seek to press their discipline into the service of playful interrogation 
rather than making work more efficient. One such designer is Bill Gaver who states:  
 
                                                
8 James Turrell, 2013. Available: http://www.ysp.co.uk/exhibitions/james-turrell (3rd 
March, 2013) 
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Designing for Homo Ludens requires a new focus that seeks intrigue and 
delight at all levels of design, from the aesthetics of form and interaction, 
to functionality, to conceptual implications at psychological, social and 
cultural levels. Not only should technologies reinforce pleasures that 
people know, but should suggest new ones. The designer’s role in this is 
not like that of a doctor, prescribing cures for people’s ills; nor is the 
designer a kind of servant, developing technologies that people know 
they want. Instead, designers should be provocateurs, seeking out new 
possibilities for play and crafting technologies that entice people to 
explore them. In the end, designers themselves need to be Homo Ludens. 
They need to recognize that they are playful creatures, and that their 
work depends on their play.9 
 
The notion that one’s environment may provoke new behavior is quite common 
amongst artists within the improvisation community but is probably best articulated by 
the musician, technologist and designer John Bowers who has written extensively on 
the subject (I shall return to Bowers in the third chapter of this thesis). In a similar vein, 
Kristina Nierdderer is a designer who extolls the potential to instigate mindful social 
interaction through the use of carefully crafted ‘performative objects’,10 stating 
‘Mindfulness as a state or awareness or consciousness implies my presence to the 
moment, where I look at my experience, rather than through it’.11 Nierdderer continues: 
 
[We] need to break through established patterns of perception and 
experience (i.e., preconceptions) in order to achieve mindfulness in new 
situations. This raises the further question of how to break open 
established patterns or perception. The answer is that, whether 
deliberately or accidentally, this breakthrough to mindfulness usually 
seems facilitated through an external agent, and that this external agent 
must be capable of disrupting consciousness in order to break open 
common patterns of experience and preconceptions.12 
 
In chapters two and three of this thesis I will attempt my own formulation of a theory of 
objects, environment and interaction. This ongoing research is located within the 
community of inquiry shared by Gaver, Bowers and Nierdderer as should be clear once 
you, the reader, reach the end of this document. 
                                                
9 Bill Gaver, ‘Designing for Homo Ludens, Gold.ac.uk, 2002, 
http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/46gaver-ludens-still.pdf (3rd March, 2013), 4. 
10 Kristina Niedderer, ‘Designing Mindful Interaction: The category of performative 
Object’, Designing Issues, 23/1 (2007), 3-17, 3. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Ibid., 8. 
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Chapter 1. Habitual Behaviour and Antistructure 
 
theybreakinpieces’ site-sufficient strategy for performance evidently empowers 
individuals to interrogate and modify entrenched modes of behaviour. In order to 
understand the mechanisms in place that enable this to happen we must first consider 
the ways in which behaviours become entrenched in the first place. Only then can we 
begin to conceive of ways in which such behaviours may be interrogated and re-
configured. To this end I shall first briefly consider the individual performance 
vocabulary of Mona McCarthy, my collaborator throughout the practical research 
conducted for this project (as shall be seen later in this thesis). I will then discuss the 
formation of such a vocabulary in the terms proposed by David Elder-Vass in his book 
The Causal Power of Social Structures.13 
 
Mona McCarthy is a dancer and an aerial artist. At the core of her movement practice is 
the release-technique. That is to say that through her training in contemporary dance at 
particular institutions and with particular teachers she has learnt a discipline that allows 
her to “release” her body in accordance with its natural alignment and the flow of 
momentum through the limbs. This practice uses breathing to aid the generation and 
trajection of momentum from the body core to its extremities (exhalation) and vice 
versa (inhalation). Momentum tends to be carried from limb to limb in continuous 
circular trajectories. These trajectories may orbit the body, extending the limbs outward, 
or may be passed through the torso, legs, soles of the feet and top of the head. In 
training, much emphasis is placed upon developing core strength so that momentum 
may traverse the body smoothly without loss of balance.  
 
“Release Technique”, therefore, is not a lexicon of prescribed gestures or even a single 
technique but rather an aggregation of techniques that instantiate the desired free-
flowing movement quality. In addition to this aggregation of techniques one may also 
include the associated terminology (for example core strength, momentum, extension, 
alignment), jargon (for example ‘grounding’, ‘flow’, ‘energy’), key practitioners and 
performances, and training exercises as formative constituents of the concept of release-
technique. One can see then that taxonomies such as this prescribe a boundary that 
                                                
13 David Elder-Vass, The Causal Power Of Social Structures (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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enfolds a milieu of multi-modal elements. Therefore, one might say that McCarthy has, 
during the formative stages of her movement practice, subscribed to the multi-modal 
elements associated with release-technique and that this has subsequently informed her 
approach to and realisation of movement in performance ever since.  
 
It is apparent to me that the acquisition of such disciplinary specific knowledge 
invariably occurs within a hierarchical social structure in which the role of teacher or 
master is either institutionally ordained (as is the case, for example, in the behaviourist 
model of teaching and learning propagated by B.F.Skinner in which the teacher is 
dominant, teaching only what she chooses at the bequest of a higher authority, and less 
totalitarian models such as that of Jean Piaget in which the teacher’s role is as an 
enabler, instantiating challenging environments for the student to explore14) or bestowed 
by the learner themselves upon the authors of texts as is the case in self-guided study. 
Therefore, whilst the method of knowledge acquisition may vary greatly, the evaluation 
of knowledge acquired is undertaken with reference to an authoritatively prescribed 
lexicon; Phil Graham invokes the implications of such a notion: 
 
… the purpose of having a defined discipline is that basic evaluative 
assumptions of the discipline go unquestioned so that the disciple can 
gain the same worldview as the master. Here we find the essence of 
disciplinarity: the disciple is disciplined not to think beyond the 
evaluative scope of the discipline. The discipline thus hides its own 
evaluative biases from its disciples by inculcating them as 
presuppositions and raising the discipline’s significance above all 
others.15 
 
The individual may relate to such socially structured registers of experience with a 
degree of ambivalence: they at once aspire to internalise the disciplinary vocabulary to 
which they subscribe, whether that be release-technique, playing a violin or driving a 
vehicle - whilst simultaneously seeking creative possibilities, including responding to 
                                                
14 For an overview of these (and other) models please see Peter Sutherland, Cognitive 
Development Today: Piaget And His Critics (London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., 
1992). 
15 Phil Graham, ‘Critical discourse analysis and evaluative meaning: Interdisciplinarity 
as a critical turn’ in Weiss, Gilbert and Wodak, Ruth (eds.), Critical Discourse 
Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 123. 
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the contingencies of any situation - that exist outside of the boundary that such a 
subscription prescribes.  
 
One may think that this ambivalence should be easy to reconcile simply by doing things 
outside of the boundary of ones chosen vocabulary. Yet when presented with such an 
opportunity, for example, when an individual participates in an improvisation with other 
performers, it is common for that individual to implement actions that fall within a 
familiar prescribed boundary (unable to exceed the evaluative scope of the discipline as 
Graham suggests (above)). Such experiences manifest ‘safe’ performances during 
which the individual fails to leave their ‘comfort zone’. Elder-Vass presents an 
ontological framework for such behavioural phenomena. This ontology accounts for the 
social mechanism that engenders internalised behavioural boundaries and, further, the 
causal power that such boundaries exert upon the individual as an agent who can act. 
 
1.1 Ontology of Dispositions  
 
Elder-Vass proposes a theory of the way in which the individual develops dispositions 
that determine their behaviour. He adopts an emergentist perspective that enables him to 
consolidate two previously polarised theories of the role of action and agency in the 
social world. On the one hand, the structurationists (most prominently Anthony Giddens 
and Pierre Bourdieu) ‘see structure as something that resides at least in part within 
human individuals’.16 Bourdieu’s influential notion of habitus portrays the individual as 
one whose agency is subjugated to the social environment to which they are exposed. 
Habitus is the set of dispositions inculcated in each by the conditioning that follows 
from the opportunities, roles, and necessities inherent in our social position. This, he 
argues, tends to ‘generate dispositions objectively compatible with these conditions and 
in a sense pre-adapted to their demands’.17 
 
Initially it seems that Bourdieu’s argument supports Graham’s notion of disciplinarity 
as a socially prescribed boundary that mandates behaviour within an acceptable register 
of specified action. It is as though by subscribing to a discipline such as, for example, 
release-technique, the individual becomes the subject of a non-conscious conditioning 
                                                
16 Elder-Vass, Causal, 4. 
17 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 54. 
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that internalises the institution of the discipline (its milieu of associated elements) and 
manifests dispositions toward particular behaviours consistent with this institution. This 
is clearly a difficult position to sustain because the individual, in Bourdieu’s theory, is 
rendered as something akin to an automaton, non-consciously acquiring dispositions to 
act according to the social structures to which they are exposed. However, Bourdieu 
does, to some extent, acknowledge the role of conscious deliberation in determining 
behaviour although this is reserved only for those moments of crisis in the operation of 
the habitus when the outcome of behaviour does not match the expected or desired 
effect.18 Nevertheless, the role of conscious deliberation and awareness in Bourdieu’s 
formulation remains unclear, as Elder-Vass states: 
 
In the absence of a clear explanation of how dispositions produce 
practices, it is understandable that there is confusion about the apparent 
conflict between Bourdieu’s stress on the unconscious operation of 
habitus and his insistence that it operates through active, creative, 
invention and improvisation.19 
 
On the other hand, situated in opposition to the structurationist theory of habitus, are the 
post-structurationists  (most prominently Nicos Mouzelis and Margaret Archer) who 
propose that structure and agency ‘must be understood as analytically distinct: that 
structure exists outside individuals in some sense’.20 This position locates conscious 
reflexive deliberation as the formative mechanism for the development of a personal 
and social identity that subsequently determines one’s disposition to act. Regarding 
Archer’s position Elder-Vass states:  
 
Such reflexivity, she argues, is a precursor to the development of a 
personal identity and a social identity. These senses of our identity – of 
who we are – depend upon us delineating what we care about (this 
defining our personal identity) and then relating this to our social context 
to develop projects based upon our ultimate concerns; projects that we 
use to guide the conduct of our lives (this defining our social identity).21  
 
                                                
18 c.f. Elder-Vass, Causal, 101. 
19 Ibid., 102. 
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 102. 
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Elder-Vass observes that Archer ‘rejects the implication that one’s social position fully 
determines one’s subjectivity or behaviour’,22 and yet she acknowledges that social 
structures and cultural systems maintain a causal power that ‘rebounds upon us 
affecting the person we become’.23 
 
Elder-Vass’ own emergentist theory reframes the contrary views proposed by both 
structurationist and post-structurationist theoreticians and assimilates them into a 
cohesive unity whilst aligning them also with biological theories of cognition that 
acknowledge the role of neurological systems as equally constitutive in the 
determination of dispositions24. The subsequent middle ground that he establishes 
reconciles these positions in a manner that is arguably more productive for representing 
my experiences of extradisciplinary performance practice. 
 
For Elder-Vass, the individual’s disposition to act in a particular manner is a result of 
the constant dialogue between these modes of structure formation and agency. The 
resulting dual process (non-conscious and conscious) model of the determination of 
human behaviour is expressed in the following series of steps: 
 
1.experience: as a result of our experience we develop beliefs and also 
sometimes unconsciously acquire dispositions to act in certain ways, 
which are implemented at the neural level as neural networks; 
2. decision making: we possess the power to think consciously about our 
plans, beliefs and dispositions, and make decisions, which are co-
determined causally by our thinking powers and the network of beliefs 
that they work upon; 
3. decision storage: having made decisions, these are stored in our neural 
networks as new or modified dispositions (note that there may be 
multiple loops back to step 2 before an action actually occurs, including 
the ‘last-minute’ conscious review of some of our decisions); and 
                                                
22 Ibid., 103. 
23 Ibid., 103. 
24 Elder-Vass’ perspective of biological cognition is consistent with that of Jean Piaget’s 
theory of development in which concepts are stored neurologically for future reference 
(schemata) and Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco Varela’s theory of autopoiesis in 
which the living organism is structurally coupled to its environment, a relation that 
determines recurrent formations of neurons and subsequent biological mode of 
cognition (ontogenesis). We shall revisit these theories in some detail in Chapter 2. 
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4. action implementation: our actions are determined directly and 
immediately by non-conscious brain processes that use our beliefs, 
previous decisions and skills as inputs.25 
 
This framework accounts for the non-conscious development of habitus (step 1) and the 
individual’s capacity for conscious reflexive deliberation (step 2) that modifies the 
unconscious set of dispositions and beliefs. Dispositions are thus emergent phenomena 
consequent of the innate causal power of each of these mechanisms and these 
dispositions determine the behaviour to be actuated at the moment of action 
implementation. Elder-Vass agrees with Bourdieu that ‘it is possible that some parts of 
our action may be determined more or less unconsciously’26 and that conscious, rational 
decision making is invoked in moments of crisis when our neurally embedded 
dispositions do not adequately translate into behaviour suitable for the present situation. 
Nevertheless he states that these moments of conscious deliberation are ‘radically more 
frequent than Bourdieu believed’27 and also include moments when complex decisions 
need to be made (such as ‘when we need to decide which way to turn en route to a place 
we have never visited before’).28 During a recent radio interview, Professor Daniel 
Kahneman (psychologist and Nobel Laureate) provides a concise example of such a 
phenomenon: 
 
Every one of us has that experience that there are some thoughts that just 
come to mind, so if I say “what’s two plus two” something comes to 
your mind. And then there are thoughts that you’ve got to produce 
laboriously, so if I say “seventeen times twenty four”, well, nothing 
comes to mind. You’ve got to produce that number by a set of rules, it 
takes effort and it takes time. And so there are really those two kinds of 
thinking. Then there are many blends of the two.29 
 
Elder-Vass’ theory sets forth a reasonable framework for the way in which the 
individual’s dispositions to act are formulated. However, this does not yet account for 
                                                
25 Ibid., 97. 
26 Ibid., 109. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
28 Ibid., 109. 
29 All In The Mind. Podcast. ‘Daniel Kahneman & Conjoined twins with linked brains’, 
BBC.CO.UK, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/medmatters (15th November, 
2011). 2:15-2:38. 
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the difficulty that individuals experience when they wish to extend the boundary of their 
behavioural vocabulary. Such a problematic would not exist if it were possible for the 
individual to freely modify their habitus, yet this is not the case. The beliefs, skills, and 
attitudes inculcated in the individual are persistent and durable and, as stated by Elder-
Vass in step 2 of the above quote, co-determine the conscious decisions that one is able 
to make including those that act upon ones habitus. In this sense habitus is self-
regulating. This reveals a theoretical foundation to underpin Graham’s anxiety that the 
“the disciple is disciplined not to think beyond the evaluative scope of the discipline.” 
Graham’s choice of terminology is not insignificant, indeed Elder-Vass proposes that 
discipline is a core constituent of norm circles; common social structures characterised 
by the relations between a group of individuals that share a commitment to endorse and 
enforce a practice with each other.30 This social structure produces normative social 
practices that are ‘regularized practices encouraged by dispositions or beliefs about 
appropriate ways of behaving that are shared by a group of people’.31 
 
I suggest that by subscribing to a discipline such as, for example, release-technique, the 
individual commits to the multi-modal taxonomy that constitutes its institution. In doing 
so the individual becomes a member of norm circle, a community of individuals who 
share a commitment to a common institution. The propagation of beliefs, skills, and 
knowledge consistent with the institution are inculcated in the individual (manifest as 
habitus) and, as such, produce normative social practices (for example, moving with the 
desired free-flowing quality of release-technique). Norm circles are self-regulated 
through the enforcement and endorsement of practices that specify the scope of 
behaviour acceptable within the discipline, Elder-Vass states: 
 
Normative compliance is not physically forced compliance but voluntary 
compliance; and hence it is directly caused, not by the existence in the 
present of normative pressures from the community, but by the 
individual’s internalization of past pressures in the form of beliefs or 
dispositions. The effect of social institutions on behaviour is therefore a 
two-stage causal process – in the first stage the norm circle has a 
(downward) causal impact on the individual’s motivations and in the 
second these motivations affect their behaviour.32 
 
                                                
30 c.f. Elder-Vass, Causal, 123. 
31 Ibid., 116. 
32 Ibid., 125. 
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The limitation that the causal powers of norm circles have upon the individual’s ability 
to act resonates with Freud’s notion of the Superego, the source of conscientiousness 
that mediates the will of the individual and enforces that of the authority figure (for 
example, father, teacher, government). The superego constrains the individual’s 
disposition to act so that only those behaviours consistent with the embodied and 
internalised belief system may be executed, in spite of all of the alternative possibilities 
for action available. Augusto Boal (theatre director and originator of the Theatre of the 
Oppressed) conceived of a similar idea, the ‘Cop in the Head’33 and, of significance to 
the present discussion, devised a method to interrogate the Cop. 
 
1.2 The Cop in the Head: Theatre, Crisis and Anti-Structure 
“The Cop in the Head,” part of a more general concept within the 
framework of the theatre of the oppressed, concerns those oppressions 
that have been internalized. 
We usually work on the boundaries of politics, using theatre of the 
oppressed techniques to study specific events such as how to organize a 
strike. There are many people who dare not participate in a strike or 
other political actions. Why: Because they have cops in their heads. They 
have internalized their oppressions.34 
 
In his book The Rainbow of Desire, Boal proposes that theatre exists when the human 
being realises that it can observe itself, and in this act ‘it can see itself – see itself in situ: 
see itself seeing’,35 he states:  
 
Observing itself, the human being perceives what it is, discovers what it 
is not and imagines what it could become. It perceives where it is and 
where it is not, and imagines where it could go. A triad comes into being. 
The observing-I, the I-in-situ, and the not-I, that is, the other. The human 
being alone possesses this faculty for self–observation in an imaginary 
mirror… The ‘aesthetic space’…offers this imaginary mirror.36 
 
                                                
33 Augusto Boal, The Rainbow of Desire (London: Routledge, 1995). 
34 Augusto Boal and Susana Epstein, ‘The cop in the head: Three hypotheses’, TDR 
(1988-), 34/3 (1990), 35.  
35 Boal, Rainbow, 13. 
36 Ibid., 13. 
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Theatre, for Boal, is an aesthetic space in which all combinations are possible, a space 
with the plasticity of dreams in which night becomes day, time is elastic, physical 
dimensions are re-imagined and social structures are re-configured.37 In this space the 
everyday can be interrogated without immediate consequence in the real world yet the 
knowledge that emerges from observing oneself in this oneiric dimension may be 
carried forth into the reality of quotidian life. As such, Boal famously deploys theatre as 
a therapeutic tool and invites participants to re-enact problematic moments that are 
transposed from their real-lives into this dis-located environment. The spectators of this 
exercise are invited to intervene in the re-enacted scenes, sometimes even replacing the 
protagonist on stage so that they may experience alternative modes of behaviour that 
may change the course of the re-imagined real-life event. The protagonists’ entrenched 
modes of behaviour – their habitus – is thrown into crisis, they observe the I-in-situ and 
the not-I, and unforeseen possibilities for action are both revealed to, and lived by them. 
In this way the unconscious moderator – The Cop in the Head – is brought to the 
foreground of consciousness for interrogation. 
 
On stage, we continue to see the world as we have always seen it, but 
now we also see it as others see it: we see ourselves as we see ourselves, 
and we see ourselves as we are seen… In daily life we see the situation; 
on stage, we see ourselves and we see the situation we are in.38 
 
Boal’s method, expressed in the Theatre of the Oppressed, deploys theatre to instantiate 
an aesthetic site in which the subject may, for the first time, perceive the cop in their 
head. This revelation catalyzes change; it illuminates the mechanism that has been 
unknowingly mediating the subject’s behaviour and, in doing so, allows them access to 
ways of thinking about a situation that have previously remained hidden. In this way the 
Theatre of the Oppressed invokes the crisis that Bourdieu recognised as the Achilles 
heel of the individual’s entrenched ways of behaving in the world. 
 
Boal’s Cop in the Head method aligns closely with Victor Turner’s notion of liminal 
phenomena, a theory that he himself emphatically associates with the aesthetics of 
theatre. What is perhaps most useful about Turner’s anthropological perspective for the 
present discussion is that it articulates the underlying sociological causal power of 
                                                
37 c.f. Boal, Rainbow, 20. 
38 Boal, Rainbow, 26. 
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liminal phenomena rather than outlining a methodology for its enactment. Therefore, 
Turner’s theory is more portable than Boal’s and provides a vocabulary with which to 
talk about such phenomena. 
 
Turner’s discussion is posited from a position that may be very closely aligned with 
Bourdieu’s notion of socially conditioned habitus and Elder-Vass’ norm circles. He 
states: 
 
In people’s social structural relationships they are by various abstract 
processes generalized and segmentalized into roles, statuses, classes, 
cultural sexes, conventional age-divisions, ethnic affiliations, etc. In 
different types of social situations they have been conditioned to play 
specific social roles. It does not matter how well or badly as long as they 
“make like” they are obedient to the norm-sets that control different 
compartments of the complex model known as the “social 
structure.”…And, to some extent, the authentic human essence gets 
involved here, for every role-definition takes into account some basic 
human attribute or capacity, and willy-nilly, human beings play their 
roles in human ways. But full human capacity is locked out of these 
somewhat narrow, stuffy rooms.39 
 
In this quote Turner alludes to the causal power of norm circles to condition the 
individual’s disposition to act (habitus) according to normative patterns of behaviour. 
Normative socialised behaviour is thus a play in masks that hides “full human capacity” 
from view. Here, again, we may align this play within masks with the superego or the 
Cop in the Head. Similarly, Turner shows that it takes moments of crisis in which 
normative conditions are suspended to remove these masks so that the individual may 
reveal and interact with their whole being. These fractures in quotidian life – margins of 
limen – have the capacity to instigate change. To clarify the true character of liminality 
it is useful to join Turner’s discussion as he reflects upon Arnold van Gennep’s Rites de 
Passage, published in 1908, in which he identifies liminality as a ubiquitous 
phenomenon occurring - albeit, in varying degrees - in all tribal and agrarian rituals. 
Such rites of passage are characterised by three phases: 
 
                                                
39 Turner, Victor, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: 
PAJ Publications, 1982), 46. 
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Separation: in which sacred space and time is clearly demarcated from 
profane, quotidian space and time 
Transition: during which the subjects of the rite ‘pass through a period 
and area of ambiguity’.40 
Incorporation: in which the subject, through symbolic action, is returned, 
in some way transformed, to profane space and time.  
 
Turner locates liminality within the transitional phase, in which the normative elements 
of quotidian life – identity, status, social order, rights and obligations, etc. – are 
suspended, inverted, and re-configured by, amongst other things, ‘subversive and ludic 
(or playful) events’.41 He adds,  ‘to my mind it is the analysis of culture into factors and 
their free or “ludic” recombination in any or every possible pattern, however weird, that 
is of the essence of liminality, liminality par excellence’.42  
 
It is the intrusion of form elements43 upon liminal phenomena that necessitates Turner 
to bind the term liminal only to rites of passage within tribal, agrarian, preliterate 
civilisations, civilisations in which the ‘…rules underlying the generation of cultural 
patterns tend to seek out the binary ”yin-yang” forms suggested by simple “natural” 
oppositions…. sky/earth, male /female, plenty/scarcity’.44 Further, that the main cultural 
and social structures in these civilisations ‘tend to become modeled on these and similar 
cosmological principals’.45 These implicit principals intrude upon liminality: ‘Thus the 
symbols found in rites of passage in these societies, though subject to permutations and 
transformations of their relationships, are only involved in these within relatively stable, 
cyclical, and repetitive systems’.46 Here, then, play is curtailed, ‘pressed into the service 
of the ultimate aim of the ritual’.47 
 
                                                
40 Ibid., 24. 
41 Ibid., 20. 
42 Ibid., 28. 
43 George Seward describes the function of form elements as ‘Reducing the number of 
possible activities which are permissible; limiting the number of situations that can 
possibly arise; allowing the character of the situation to be foreseen so that methods for 
dealing with them can be decided in advance of their occurrence; and regulating the 
choice of means to deal with a situation.’ George Seward, ‘Play as art’, The Journal Of 
Philosophy, 41/7 (1944), 183. 
44 Turner, Ritual, 29. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 29. 
47 Ibid., 32. 
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In post-industrial, modern civilisations cosmological principals no longer maintain a 
grip on liminal phenomena. Turner talks of the many freedoms afforded by leisure time 
- clearly distinct from work time and arbitrarily demarcated according to technological 
and bureaucratic organisation - including ‘freedom from institutional obligations; 
forced, chronologically regulated rhythms of factory and office; freedom to generate 
new symbolic worlds; and freedom to transcend social structural limitations, freedom to 
play’.48 He therefore draws a distinction between the liminal phenomena of pre-
industrial, tribal civilisations in which freedom to play is curtailed and pressed into the 
service of broader quotidian narratives, and the liminoid phenomena of post-industrial 
society that has the capacity for free-play, or play without masks. Turner illustrates the 
implications of such free-play as follows: 
 
Sociocultural systems drive so steadily towards consistency that human 
individuals only get off these normative hooks in rare situations in small-
scale societies, and not too frequently in large-scale ones. Nevertheless, 
the exigencies of structuration itself, the process of containing new 
growth in orderly patterns or schemata, has an Achilles heel. This is the 
fact that when persons, groups, sets of ideas, etc., move from one level or 
style of organization or regulation of the interdependence of their parts or 
elements to another level, there has to be an interfacial region or, to 
change the metaphor, an interval, however brief, or margin or limen, 
when the past is momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the 
future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality when everything, 
as it were, trembles in the balance.49 
 
It is in these margins that individuals may engage with one another in wholly unique 
way: thus Turner brings to the fore the notion of communitas: 
 
“[A] direct, immediate and total confrontation of human identities,” a 
deep rather than intense style of personal interaction. “It has something 
‘magical’ about it. Subjectively there is in it a feeling of endless power.” 
Is there any of us who has not known this moment when compatible 
people – friends, congeners – obtain a flash of lucid mutual 
understanding on the existential level, when they feel that all problems, 
not just their problems, could be resolved, whether emotional or 
                                                
48 Ibid., 37. 
49 Ibid., 44. 
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cognitive, if only the group which is felt (in the first person) as 
“essentially us” could sustain its intersubjective illumination.50  
 
Turner thus reveals both the full potential of this margin of limen and yet talks of the 
difficulty in sustaining such phenomena. The liminoid is antistructural, an aesthetic site 
in which normative quotidian structures, roles, modes of behaviour are turned on their 
head, re-configured, interrogated and recombined, changes actuated by the emergence 
of communitas in which individuals are capable of interacting without masks or 
obligation to one another. Yet the desire to retain such experiences instigates 
structuration, norm circles once again emerge that endorse and enforce form elements to 
condition behaviour and normalise action; as Turner states: 
 
We thus encounter the paradox that the experience of communitas 
becomes the memory of communitas, with the result that communitas 
itself in striving to replicate itself historically develops a social structure, 
in which initially free and innovative relationships between individuals 
are converted into norm-governed relationships between social 
personae.51 
 
At this stage we can clarify and surmise the discussion so far. The problem that I 
introduce at the beginning of this chapter is that the individual artist is faced with a 
paradox founded upon their ambivalence toward gaining mastery over specific 
disciplinary vocabularies. These vocabularies are voluntarily subscribed to, yet 
specified according to authoritatively prescribed multi-modal elements. The individual 
thus subscribes to a norm circle that communally endorses and enforces normative 
modes of behaviour according to what is deemed consistent with the vocabulary. This 
social pressure conditions the individual and re-enforces a Cop in the Head or Superego 
that mediates their behaviour, regardless of all of the other possibilities for action 
available to them. This may be un-problematic for those individuals that do not aspire to 
experiment and discover further possibilities. For those who do, however, there are 
mechanisms in place to instantiate margins of limen, aesthetic sites within which the 
individual may set aside momentarily their societal masks and overcome the Cop in the 
Head. This margin is antistructural, a fracture in the normality of quotidian life, and 
potentialises change by revealing new configurations and re-combinations of the 
                                                
50 Ibid., 47-48. (Quoting himself). 
51 Ibid., 47. 
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everyday. However this antistructural phenomenon is susceptible to structuration once 
again, with communities forming around these new structures, endorsing and enforcing 
their conditions once again, conditioning behaviour accordingly. 
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Chapter 2. Embodiment, Enaction and Empowerment Networks 
 
In the previous chapter I have discussed the way in which the socio-cultural 
environment affects behaviour. We saw that norm circles manifest regularised practices 
by endorsing and enforcing beliefs and attitudes that are shared by a group of people. 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus was shown to express the way in which the individual 
inculcates these normalised beliefs and attitudes, and Elder-Vass’ dual-process model of 
action illustrated the way in which this manifest dispositions that directly specify 
behaviour. The aesthetics of liminoid phenomena were subsequently introduced and 
shown to potentialise a space in which the socio-cultural structures that govern 
quotidian life can be reconfigured thus empowering the individual to interrogate their 
entrenched beliefs, attitudes and, ultimately, behaviour. Finally, I deployed Boal’s 
Theatre of the Oppressed as an example of the way in which liminoid phenomena may 
be instantiated in practical terms to empower individuals to overcome the constraints 
imposed by their real-world social status and role.  
 
However, to return our attention to the aim of this research project, it is my intention to 
explore the possible ways in which electronic music and its technologies may be 
deployed to empower individuals as extradisciplinary performers or, to state it more 
explicitly, to instantiate a space in which artists may interact with, and learn from each 
other in such a way that they are exposed to skills, techniques and knowledge that may 
be applied and explored in performance. It is clear that a score may be deployed to 
instantiate a space that is distinct from quotidian life, indeed it is fair to state that Boal’s 
method of the Theatre of the Oppressed is itself a set of form elements that could be 
understood in terms of a score, for example, the roles of objects and individuals may be 
specified by the chosen protagonist; the action proceeds according to the experience of 
the protagonist and may be interrupted by the observers; alternative narratives and 
behaviours may be instigated to explore alternative outcomes; the Theatre of the 
Oppressed will take place in a private space. These rules, I would argue, constitute a 
score and instantiate a space in which the behaviour of participants has no immediate 
consequence in the real world (it demonstrates liminoid phenomena) and therefore 
functions to interrogate real world problems. However, it is clear that other performance 
strategies such as prepared instruments and site-sufficiency only partially rely upon a 
score in the sense that whilst individuals may commit to certain rules that create a space 
for experimental behaviour such as, for example, “we shall perform together in ‘X’ 
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space at ‘X’ time”, the mechanisms that afford such experimental behaviour are the 
prepared instruments or physicality of the chosen site. I postulate, then, that to empower 
individuals as extradisciplinary performers one can manipulate both the socio-cultural 
and physical environment.  
 
Such a claim is not contentious. We are all aware that our physical environment affects 
our behaviour, for example, if pieces of metal are inserted between the strings of a 
violin the player will no longer execute standard practices but instead will respond to 
the contingencies that emerge from such a configuration. Yet the role of the material in 
action is commonly overlooked, perhaps precisely because it appears to require no 
further analysis. However, my research in this area reveals a body of work that clearly 
defines the role that the physical world has for both the way in which we perceive the 
world and the formation of dispositions that, as we have seen, determine the way in 
which we act. In short, this body of research shows precisely how the physical world 
affects agency. This research trajectory may initially appear superfluous yet the insights 
that emerge from this discussion have significant practical applications both in terms of 
the way in which the environment may be manipulated at socio-cultural and material 
levels, and the way in which one might analyze and articulate the environment in terms 
of the perceptual and actional fields available to agents.  
 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the practical research undertaken as part of this research 
project explores the ways in which performance technologies may be employed to 
create synthesised environments. The three phases of practical research, Reel 
Experiments, Terrain and SynSite each demonstrate many ways in which to manipulate 
the perceptual and actional fields available to the performer. Reel Experiments and 
Terrain use audiotape to create a physical boundary around the performers and also 
provokes behaviour through the resistant force that the tape creates against the body. 
SynSite, on the other hand, utilises motion tracking technologies and virtual physical 
models to create an environment that provokes action through the resistant behaviour of 
the digital system. The proceeding discussion provides a thorough theoretical 
framework and a lexicon with which to analyze this practical research. Further, this 
theoretical framework is portable and prescribes a lens through which any performance, 
event, indeed, any interaction may be considered in terms of agency. 
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This discussion begins with an exegesis of Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. 
Varela’s theory of autopoiesis. The reasons for this are manifold: firstly, autopoiesis 
expresses agency at a biological level and shows it to be the fundamental characteristic 
that distinguishes living systems from all other types of system. Maturana and Varela 
demonstrate that all higher forms of agency, for example, at the level of the self-aware 
living system, emerge consequent to this fundamental biological phenomenon, in short, 
that human beings are embodied. We will see that this embodiment is inextricably 
linked to the way in which we perceive and act in the world and that autopoiesis 
therefore provides empirical evidence to support the notions of the lived body and 
operational intentionality that arise in the work of the phenomenologists Drew Leder 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Secondly, autopoiesis explicitly demonstrates the way in 
which living systems interact with the environment (both socio-cultural and physical) 
and therefore embellishes our understanding of the development and function of habitus 
(introduced in Chapter 1). Thirdly, autopoiesis clearly specifies the principles that 
govern the way in which living systems may interact and, in doing so, sets forth a path 
for an analysis of the way in which the environment may empower/disempower the 
individual. 
 
2.1 The Fundamental Principles Of Autopoiesis 
 
Maturana and Varela set out to discover the fundamental characteristics that distinguish 
living systems from all other types of system. To begin they recognised that a living 
entity is a self-contained autonomous unity made up of component parts. They posit that 
it is the relations between the components of a unity that specify its identity as a system 
of a particular class. Maturana and Varela refer to this domain of relations as the 
system’s organisation, to be differentiated from the systems structure as follows: 
 
[Organization] refers to the relations between components that define 
and specify a system as a composite unity of a particular class, and 
determine its properties as such a unity… by specifying a domain in 
which it can interact as an unanalyzable whole endowed with 
constitutive properties. 
[Structure] refers to the actual components and the actual relations that 
these must satisfy in their participation in the constitution of a given 
composite unity that can be perturbed through the interactions of its 
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components, but the structure does not determine its properties as a 
unity.52 
 
One may consider the system’s structure to be the physical embodiment of its 
organisation. By making the distinction between organisation and structure, Maturana 
and Varela show us that a single class of organisation can be realised in many different 
structural configurations. To provide an example: the organisation of the human being is 
constituted by the essential digestive, respiratory, cardiovascular, urogenital and 
endocrine systems in addition to the motor and sensory surfaces, nervous system, 
skeleton and membrane (skin). The spatial configuration of the external features may 
vary; indeed, we are all familiar with the extent of structural mutation that may occur. 
Yet, regardless of the infinite structural variations of the human form, the essential 
organisation remains and is identifiable as human. To further this example, consider an 
individual who has had a leg removed, we would never say that this amputee was not 
human.  
 
The term autopoiesis (literally: self-producing) reflects that living systems are self-
referential with a circular operation. That is to say that the only project of the 
autopoietic system is to synthesise and/or maintain the security of the components and 
their relations that constitute the organisation. Failure to do so results in a catastrophic 
loss of identity and the disintegration of the system. To return to the previous example, 
the individual’s (now amputated) leg is a component that may be included in 
descriptions of the human being’s structure but cannot be included in descriptions of the 
organisation. If the leg was a component of the system’s organisation then its removal 
would constitute a catastrophic failure of the autopoietic process and the system would 
either have to be classed as something else, or cease to exist entirely. Autopoietic 
systems are, therefore, organisationally closed. John Mingers states: 
 
A system is organizationally closed if all its possible states of activity 
must always lead to or generate further activity within itself. In an 
autopoietic system, all activity must maintain the autopoiesis or else the 
                                                
52 Humberto R. Maturana, ‘Biology of Language: The Epistemology of Reality’ in 
Miller, George A., and Lenneberg, Elizabeth (eds.), Psychology and Biology of 
Language and Thought (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 32. 
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system will disintegrate. All processes are processes of self-production; 
the system’s activity closes in on itself.53 
 
This is not to say, however, that the system does not in some way interact with its 
external environment. Autopoietic systems (internal) are distinguished from their 
external environment through the production of a physical boundary such as a cell 
membrane or the skin of a human being. These boundaries are permeable and so, whilst 
the system is organisationally closed, it is materially and energetically, rather 
interactionally open.54 This permeability enables autopoietic systems to interact with 
the elements that they encounter in the environment. 
 
It is important to recognise that, whilst the system can interact with the environment, 
any changes to the system are determined by the system itself. That is to say that the 
external environment can only perturb the equilibrium of the system, the latter must 
then compensate to restore this equilibrium according to its autopoietic project. 
Paraphrasing Maturana, Mingers states: 
 
Changes occur in response both to internal dynamics and to interactions 
with external systems, but even in external interactions the resulting 
change is determined internally; it is only triggered by the environment. 
This is a very important conclusion, for it means that there can be no 
“instructive interactions.”55 
 
This principle of self-determination means that autopoietic systems demonstrate an 
innate standard for distinguishing between the values of elements in the environment 
(input values): the autopoietic system is attracted to elements that are positive with 
regard to the sustenance of its organisation and repelled by those that are not. By way of 
an example consider the single cell organism that adapts to the chemical makeup of its 
surroundings. Such an organism allows the nutritional elements that it encounters in the 
environment to permeate the cell membrane whilst keeping those that are poisonous out 
thus maintaining the equilibrium of its organisation. This adaptation is determined 
according to the chemical requirements of the cell with respect to its autopoietic project 
                                                
53 John Mingers, Self-Producing Systems: Implications and Applications of Autopoiesis 
(New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 32. 
54 cf. Ibid., 33. 
55 Ibid., 30. 
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and so the input value of external elements is specified by its internal organisation and 
not by the environment. These findings lead Maturana and Varela to conclude: 
 
A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of 
interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of 
itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or 
behaving in this domain. Living systems are cognitive systems, and living 
as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all 
organisms, with and without a nervous system.56 
 
Here, then, we arrive at the fundamental principal of Maturana and Varela’s theory: that 
the process of cognition distinguishes living systems from all other types of system. 
This biological form of agency arises from the system’s autopoietic project to maintain 
the integrity of its organisation. Henrik Bruun and Richard Langlais refer to this 
biological mode of agency as the autopoietic system’s ‘singularity’;57 this is more 
suitable than terms such as ‘perspective’ and ‘subjective’ which are reserved for higher-
level conscious phenomena. Before I proceed to show the way in which Maturana and 
Varela’s theory demonstrates the emergence of self-awareness in more complex 
autopoietic systems we must first understand a second important principle – structural 
determinism. 
 
2.2 Structural Determinism 
 
We have seen that the system’s structure is its actual components and the actual 
relations between them. Therefore, whilst the organisation of the system specifies a 
domain of interactions, these interactions are mediated by the physical structure within 
which the former is realised. Therefore the physical structure of the system determines 
what interactions the system can actually engage in. Maturana and Varela therefore 
state that autopoietic systems are structurally determined.  
 
Many autopoietic systems demonstrate structural plasticity. This plasticity allows it to 
adapt by selecting a suitable structure with which to interact with the external 
                                                
56 Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living (Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 13. 
57 Henrik Bruun, and Richard Langlais, ‘On The Embodied Nature Of Action’, Acta 
Sociologica, 46/1 (2003), 37. 
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environment so as to sustain the continuance of its autopoietic project of self-
production, Mingers states: 
 
In total, the structure at any point in time determines 
1. all possible structural changes within the system that maintain the 
current organization, as well as those that do not, and 
2. all possible states of the environment that could trigger changes of 
state and whether such changes would maintain or destroy the current 
organization.58 
 
This may at first be difficult to comprehend because, as observers of a system, it would 
appear that organisms are so well adapted to their environment that the environment 
must have led to appropriate changes in the organism. If this were true it would counter 
the ideas of operational closure and biological cognition that have been presented 
above. This problem is resolved with Maturana and Varela’s notion of structural 
coupling: 
 
[The] plastic structure exists within an environment that perturbs it and 
can trigger changes. The environment does not determine the changes, 
but it can be said to select states from among those made possible at any 
instant by the system’s structure. In an environment characterized by 
recurring states (and an actual autopoietic system will require, for 
example, a continual availability of energy), continued autopoiesis will 
lead to selection in the organism of a structure suitable for that 
environment. The organism becomes structurally coupled to its 
environment and, indeed, to other organisms within that environment. 
Structural coupling is a reformulation of the idea of adaption, but with 
the important proviso that the environment does not specify the adaptive 
changes that will occur. They either will occur, and thus maintain 
autopoiesis, or they will not, and the system will disintegrate.59 
 
The implications of structural coupling are such that elements of the environment can be 
considered along the axis of constitutive/non-constitutive. That is to say that those 
elements to which the autopoietic system becomes structurally coupled through 
recurrent interaction are recognised as crucial to the autopoietic project to sustain the 
                                                
58 Mingers, Self-Producing, 30. 
59 Ibid., 35. 
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organisation. Bruun and Langlais deploy the term ‘constitutive environment’60 to refer 
to such external elements. Constitutive environments are an essential component of 
Bruun and Langlais’ formulation of action analysis that we will return to later in this 
chapter.  
 
Up to this point I have outlined the fundamental principles of autopoiesis. This has not 
yet said anything about the living system’s fundamental embodiment, a fact that has 
significant implications for the analysis of action. In order to advance in this direction 
we must delve deeper into Maturana and Varela’s theory and examine the way in which 
higher levels of cognition emerge, specifically, that of the self-aware living system. 
 
2.3 Self-Awareness and Embodiment 
 
In human beings it is the structural complexity of the nervous system and its unique 
operation that makes possible the emergence of the observer, the self-aware living 
being. The nervous system is constituted by neurons – specialisations of ordinary cells. 
Neurons are unique, firstly, as they have extensions called dendrites that connect to 
many other, often distant, cells. This distant connection separates the sensory from the 
effector (motor) sites of the cell and makes possible the transmission of perturbations 
throughout the organism. Secondly, neurons have a generalised response – electrical 
impulses - to the sensory surfaces (as opposed to the physico-chemical response of other 
cells). Regarding the significance of this mode of response, Mingers states: 
 
This has two vital consequences: the establishment of a universal 
medium (electrical activity) into which all the differing sensory/effector 
interactions can be translated and the development of internal neurons 
which connect only to other neurons, responding to this electrical 
activity. These interneurons are particularly important as they sever the 
direct relationship between sensor and effector and vastly expand the 
realm of possible behaviors of an organism.61 
 
The neuron’s method of connection is the synapse, a point of near contact between 
dendrites and other cells through which chemicals called neurotransmitters flow. This 
                                                
60 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 38. 
61 Mingers, Self-Producing, 69. 
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flow stimulates electrical exchange between disparate cells and neurons. Each neuron 
has thousands of synapses, each contributing a small amount to the cell’s overall 
activity.62  
 
Maturana and Varela propose that the function of the nervous system is exactly as that 
of the autopoietic operation of simpler single cell organisms: the nervous system is 
operationally closed and acts to sustain or restore internal correlations between sensory 
and effector surfaces, for example: 
 
Touching a hot plate stimulates certain sensory neurons. These trigger 
motor neurons, leading to the contraction of a muscle. This in turn results 
in withdrawal of the hand and removal of the sensory stimulation. 
Internal balance is restored.63 
 
Just as the singularity of a single-celled organism is continuous and its interaction with 
the environment is structurally determined so too is that of the nervous system: its 
autopoietic function is continuous and the present state of its components determines 
the possible future state: 
 
Its possible and actual changes of state depend on its own structure at a 
point in time, not on some outside agency. At most, such an agency can 
only act as a trigger or source of perturbation. It cannot determine the 
reaction of the nervous system. This can easily be shown by recognizing 
that it is the structure itself that determines what can be a trigger for it. 
For instance, only systems with light-sensitive neurons can be affected 
by changes in light.64 
 
Likewise, the nervous system demonstrates plasticity that enables it to adapt. However, 
where a single-celled organism undergoes structural changes, adaptation in the nervous 
system occurs primarily at the level of its patterns of synaptic response. The 
interneurons, having severed the connection between the sensory and effector surfaces 
and their one-to-one relations, vastly increase the amount of possible states open to the 
organism. Therefore, when talking of adaptation in the nervous system we are referring 
                                                
62 c.f. Ibid., 69. 
63 Ibid., 70. 
64 Ibid., 70. 
  35 
to the emergent patterns of synaptic response and not physical reconfigurations. Patterns 
of synaptic response affect behaviour and therefore adaptations at this level affect 
changes of behaviour ‘including that which we call learning’.65 
 
Further, the network organisation of neurons and the severance between sensory and 
effector surfaces mean that the nervous system responds to activity at these surfaces in a 
generalised manner, responding to the relations between events rather than individual 
events themselves. Patterns of synaptic response do not only occur due to external 
interactions; the nervous system also responds according to its own relative changes of 
state, it is itself an object of interaction. Indeed, the brain is known to be far more 
responsive to it own internal structures than to external interaction at the sensory and 
effector surfaces. The complexity of the nervous system means that it can project itself 
onto itself recursively, and it is from this constant recursive interaction that the 
cognitive-self emerges:  
 
The nervous system, by expanding the domain of interactions of the 
organism, has transformed the unit of interactions and has subjected 
acting and interacting in the domain of ‘pure relations’ to the process of 
evolution. As a consequence there are organisms that include as a subset 
of their possible interactions, interactions with their own internal states 
(as states resulting from external and internal interactions) as if these 
were independent entities, generating the apparent paradox of including 
their cognitive domain within their cognitive domain. In us this paradox 
is resolved by what we call ‘abstract thinking’, another expansion of the 
cognitive domain.66 
 
We see then that the organisationally closed nervous system – a distributed network of 
interconnected neurons - gives rise to self-awareness without a top down structure or 
central controller. Rather, cognition at the level of self-awareness is governed by the 
same principles of autopoiesis – organisational closure, interactional openness, 
structural coupling, and singularity - that give rise to cognition at the lower biological 
level: ‘The cognitive self is its own implementation: its history and its actions are of one 
piece’.67 The self-aware living system, in a continuance of this operation, is capable of 
                                                
65 Ibid., 71. 
66 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis, 13. 
67 Francisco J. Varela, ‘Organism: A Meshwork Of Selfless Selves’ in Tauber, Alfred 
(ed.), Organism And The Origins Of Self (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 96. 
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interacting with its own cognitive-self recursively and so can describe himself 
describing himself describing himself ad infinitum, Mingers concludes: 
 
As with the cell…[t]he nervous system, in a body, has interactions with 
an environment through both its sensors and effectors and generates a 
similar (structural) coupling. But, equally, the cognitive self is also 
situated, and has a perspective, and thus generates a world of 
signification. It bestows meaning on the events that have significance for 
it, and environmental events and characteristics become disclosed only in 
this manner through the intentionality of the cognitive self. Thus, the 
cognitive self gains identity only through its situation within a body (its 
embodiment) interacting within an environment, and, as it does so, it 
constitutes a world of significance in respect to its own self-
continuance.68  
 
We see now the way in which Maturana and Varela specify the individual as essentially 
embodied. Further, that the significance of elements in the external environment 
(including the social environment) can only be considered in respect of this fact, 
‘perception and action are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition’.69 In this 
respect, the individual’s perception of the world and its significance to them is specified 
according to their present state and the singularity that drives them forth. Actions result 
in internal changes of state and quid pro quo changes in the significance of elements in 
the external environment.  
 
To summarise the discussion so far, autopoiesis demonstrates that living systems are 
operationally closed yet materially and energetically open. This openness allows for 
adaptation to and interaction with the external environment so that the essential 
organisational integrity of the system may be maintained. The input values of elements 
in the external environment are specified not by the environment but by the organisation 
of the system itself and this is conceptualised as the system’s fundamental agency or 
singularity. Systems that demonstrate such agency are specified as living – agency is the 
fundamental characteristic of life. Whilst the organisation of the system specifies a 
domain of interactions it is the physical embodiment of the organisation – the system’s 
structure – that determines which interactions may actually occur. The system, 
                                                
68 Mingers, Self-Producing, 197. 
69 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: 
Cognitive Science And Human Experience (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), 173. 
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therefore, is structurally determined and becomes coupled to elements in the 
environment that play a constitutive role for its autopoietic project. These fundamental 
principles apply at all levels of cognition, for example, at the level of the cognitive-self. 
The complexity of the human being’s nervous system – a distributed network of 
interneuronal connections – is also organisationally closed but allows for recurrent 
inter-system interactions from out of which self-awareness emerges. Self-awareness is 
therefore an emergent phenomenon of the fundamental physiological processes of the 
organism. In this sense self-awareness is embodied.  
 
Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis presents a significant paradigm shift from 
the traditional input-output model of cognition. This latter model posits the brain as an 
information-processing device. In such models information is a prespecified quantity 
that exists independently in the world and acts as input to the cognitive system that, in 
turn, produces an output in the form of behaviour. The body’s physiological processes 
are framed in apposition70 to the cognitive processing of input and consequent 
behavioural output. Susan Hurley refers to the input-output model of cognition as The 
Classical Sandwich and outlines its three main aspects as follows: 
 
First, perception and action are seen as separate from each other and as 
peripheral. 
Second, thought or cognition is seen as the central core of the mind. The 
mind decomposes vertically into modules: cognition interfaces between 
perception and action. Perception and action are not just separate from 
one another, but also separate from the higher processes of cognition. 
The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling. 
Third, not only is cognition central and distinct from peripheral 
sensorimotor processes, but the center is classical ‘at the right level of 
description’. A cluster of related properties of cognition – 
compositionality, systematicity, productivity, binding, etc. – are to be 
explained classically: in terms of processes involving symbols and 
recombinant syntactic structure. The subpersonal processes that explain 
the conceptual structure of thought mirror that structure syntactically.71 
                                                
70 “Apposition”: ‘The placing of things in close superficial contact; the putting of 
distinct things side by side in close proximity’ (“Apposition, n.” The Oxford English 
Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989, http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/9765 (1st 
April, 2012). 
71 Susan Hurley, ‘Perception and Action: Alternative Views’, Bristol.ac.uk, 2001, 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/hurley/papers/pa.pdf (1st March, 2012), 1. 
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Varela, Thompson and Rosch recognise that this model is consistent with 
representationist thinking that specifies that ‘(1) the world is pregiven; (2) our cognition 
is of this world – even if only to a partial extent, and (3) the way in which we cognise 
this pregiven world is to represent its features and then act on the basis of these 
representations’.72 The mind, for the representationist, is therefore a mirror of the world. 
Viewed in these terms, the agent is, in a sense, endowed with a map and learns how to 
act on the basis of this map. In contrast, we have seen that autopoiesis specifies living 
systems as organisationally closed yet materially and energetically open (interactionally 
open). The external environment can only perturb the system that in turn responds to its 
own internal states so that it may return to equilibrium. The living system, therefore, is 
not subject to instrumental interaction from the external environment but instead acts 
according to the values that it discerns in the external world with regard to its 
autopoietic project of survival. Varela and his colleagues conclude: 
 
The key point is that such systems do not operate by representation. 
Instead of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a 
domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure embodied by 
the cognitive system.73 
 
This is not to deny the existence of an objective world by stating that the external world 
does not exist in the absence of a living system. Rather, the external world is a 
background noise from which the living system brings forth – enacts - meaning with 
respect to the latter’s singularity and structural determinism. In this regard 
representation is neither used to recover what is outer (realism), nor project some inner 
model of the world (idealism).  
 
Through the evolutionary process our bodies have developed an extraordinary array of 
apparatus that has given us the capacity to couple to the environment in numerous 
complex ways so that we can, for example, discriminate between the frequencies of 
electromagnetic radiation in the environment that enables meaningful vision. What is 
perhaps even more astonishing is the way in which this apparatus recedes into the 
background. The physiological processes – our visceral motility - that are internal to the 
                                                
72 Varela et al., Embodied, 135. 
73 Ibid., 140. 
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process of enacting a world are normally absent from consciousness, only appearing in 
awareness when there is pain, discomfort or malfunction. Therefore, whilst our bodies 
are inextricably bound to the process by which we enact a world, they remain hidden 
from consciousness so that we can exceed the boundary of our body and project forth 
into the world with a sense that we are prepared for, or attuned to our environment. 
Maturana and Varela’s assertion that our cognitive domain is stratified provides 
empirical evidence for the way in which the body recedes into the background and thus 
provides empirical evidence for the notion of the absent body that has arisen in 
phenomenological discourse. The absent body is not entirely removed from experience, 
rather it presents itself indirectly by ‘making the experience of being both physically 
and existentially situated in the world’.74 Drew Leder expresses the sense of projecting 
outward from an embodied situatedness with the term ecstasis: 
 
[Ecstasis] describes the operation of the lived body. The body always has 
a determinate stance – it is that whereby we are located and defined. But 
the very nature of the body is to project outward from its place of 
standing. From the ‘here’ arises a perceptual world of near and far 
distances. From the ‘now’ we inhabit a meaningful past and a futural 
realm of projects and goals.75 
 
Likewise, Maurice Merleau-Ponty expresses a similar idea with the notion of operative 
intentionality. Operative intentionality touches upon the singularity implied by 
Maturana and Varela’s description of embodiment stating that embodied living is to be 
‘carried forward by lines of intentionality at least the style of what is to come’,76 Bruun 
and Langlais state: 
 
In the human case, operative intentionality	 brings the world forth as	 
perceptual and actional fields – as indeterminate	 horizons of experience 
and as actional projections into the future: the things, shades, forms, etc. 
that we can see with our eyes and the futures we can grasp with our 
limbs.77 
 
                                                
74 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 34. 
75 Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1990), 21-22. 
76 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (C. Smith,Trans.) (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 416. 
77 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 35. 
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We see then that our embodiment generates the ‘I can’ of the body, a combination of 
our preparedness for the activities and interactions that we attend to in the world, and 
our embodied situatedness from which we project – our embodied perspective. It is 
worth taking a closer look at the process of enaction – the bringing forth of meaning in 
the world – to reveal the way in which it generates lasting cognitive content. In doing so 
we shall reveal the way in which our embodiment permeates our perceptions and 
actions, the mechanism that allows our body to recede into the background, and, most 
significantly, the validation for embodied cognition’s greatest claim: that being 
involved is essential to acquiring the concepts in activity. 
 
2.4 Enactive Cognition 
 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch state that enactive cognition consists in two principles: 
 
1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and 
2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns 
that enable action to be perceptually guided.78 
 
The first principle foregrounds the autopoietic embodiment of the perceiver and the 
very fact that this cannot be overlooked when considering the way in which perceptions 
of the external environment are formed. This first principle is best expressed in the 
visionary writing (as it was authored some thirty years prior to Varela and his 
colleagues’ research in the field) by Maurice Merleau-Ponty:  
 
The organism cannot properly be compared to a keyboard on which the 
external stimuli would play and in which their proper form would be 
delineated for the simple reason that the organism contributes to the 
constitution of that form… “the properties of the object and the 
intentions of the subject… are not only intermingled; they also constitute 
a new whole.” When the eye and the ear follow and animal in flight, it is 
impossible to say “which started first” in the exchange of stimuli and 
responses. Since all the movements of the organism are always 
conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat 
behavior as an effect of the milieu. But in the same way, since all the 
stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only 
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by its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the 
receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behaviour 
is the first cause of all the stimulations. 
Thus the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its 
proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside. Doubtless, in 
order to be able to subsist, it must encounter a certain number of physical 
and chemical agents in its surroundings. But it is the organism itself – 
according to the proper nature of its receptors, the thresholds of its nerve 
centers and the movements of the organs – which chooses the stimuli in 
the physical world to which it will be sensitive. “The environment 
(Umwelt) emerges from the world through the actualization or the being 
of the organism - [granted that] an organism can exist only if it succeeds 
in finding in the world an adequate environment.” This would be a 
keyboard which moves itself in such a way as to offer – and according to 
variable rhythms – such or such of its keys to the in itself monotonous 
action of an external hammer.79 
 
The proposition that perception consists in perceptually guided action can be most 
elegantly evidenced with reference to Held and Hein’s study of action and perception in 
kittens.80 Held and Hein raised two groups of kittens (‘A’ and ‘P’) in the dark, exposing 
them to light only in controlled conditions. The kittens in group A were allowed to 
move around normally; however each of them was harnessed to a carriage containing 
one of the group P kittens. Therefore, whilst all of the kittens, both group A and P, 
shared the same visual experience, the group P kittens were passive. Upon release after 
a few weeks of this treatment the kittens in group A behaved normally whilst the kittens 
in group P behaved as if they were blind, bumping into objects and falling off edges. 
This led Held and Hein to conclude: 
 
The results are consistent with our thesis that self-produced movement 
with its current visual feedback is necessary for the development of 
visually-guided behaviour. Equivalent, and even greatly increased 
variation in visual stimulation produced by other means is not 
sufficient.81 
 
                                                
79 [Italics added] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure Of Behaviour (A.Fisher. 
Trans.) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 13. 
80 Alan Hein, and Richard Held, ‘Movement-produced stimulation in the development 
of visually guided behavior’, Journal Of Comparative And Physiological Psychology, 
56/5 (1963), 872-876. 
81 Ibid., 175. 
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The results of this study problematise the input-output model of cognition by showing 
that visual input alone is not sufficient to correlate to an adequate behavioural output. 
There are many studies that provide further evidence to support this claim.82 Such 
evidence suggests that Varela and his colleagues are correct to state that perception is 
not a matter of representation; there is no innate map to which the individual must refer. 
Nor do external inputs specify a correlating output. Rather, perceptual content depends 
on the individual’s structure – their embodied capacity for action. Our actions produce 
meaningful perceptual content that, in turn, enable us to behave in a meaningful manner 
in the world (for example, in such a way that we are able to accurately perceive, adjust 
to and interact with objects and obstacles in the environment). 
 
Now let us consider the second principle of enactive cognition: cognitive structures 
emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually 
guided. Previously I discussed the way in which the nervous system produces patterns 
of synaptic response between neurons. Research shows that such patterns, or schemas, 
become increasingly frequent and refined according to the success of their subsequent 
behavioural outcome in respect of the autopoietic project of the living system. In this 
way the schemas attune the body to the contingencies that it encounters in the 
environment and catalyzes plans for perceptually guided action (as such, schemas 
demonstrate the nervous system’s structural adaptation or structural coupling to the 
environment). Our interaction with schemas are manifest simultaneously at both pre-
conscious and conscious levels of cognition.83  
 
A greater understanding of the formation and function of schemas reveals the 
fundamental role of embodiment (in the terms set forth by Maturana and Varela) in our 
ability to meaningfully encounter the world. In the work of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson84 we shall see the way in which embodiment is inextricably bound to high-
                                                
82 For numerous accounts in which action and perception are shown to be necessarily 
interdependent in human beings see Varela et al, Embodied, 175; Susan Hurley, 
Consciousness in Action (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Ami 
Klin et al, ‘The enactive mind, or from actions to cognition: Lessons from autism’, 
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 358/1430 (2003), 345-360. 
83 For an introduction to the many types of schema see Michael A. Arbib, ‘Schema 
Theory’, Geza.Kzoo.edu, 2003, http://geza.kzoo.edu/~erdi/cns/schema.pdf (3rd March 
2012). 
84 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and 
its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
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level concept-formation and the human being’s capacity for reason through the essential 
metaphors of the body that permeate our knowledge of the world. 
 
The primary resource in the field of cognitive development is the work of the famous 
Swiss developmental psychologist Jean Piaget. Piaget’s notion of adapted intelligence 
posits that schemas are developed and refined through the reciprocal processes of 
assimilation and accommodation. In brief, Piaget states that the individual in-gathers 
information through encounters in the world that either validates or contradicts existing 
schemas. If new experiences are consistent with known experience (for which schemas 
already exist) then it is assimilated into the existing structure by strengthening the 
patterns of synaptic response. However, if this is not the case then the existing schemas 
are modified to accommodate the new experience. Piaget consistently stated that the 
ingathering of information in experience is inextricably bound to our embodied 
interactions in the world:  
 
I think that human knowledge is essentially active. To know is to 
assimilate reality into systems of transformations. To know is to 
transform reality… To my way of thinking, knowing an object does not 
mean copying it – it means acting upon it.85  
To know an object… is to act on it so as to transform it.86  
Nothing is knowable unless the subject acts in one way or another on the 
surrounding world.87 
 
Piaget’s research was primarily concerned with cognitive development in children. He 
showed that the newborn infant recognises objects in world only in respect of its own 
activity. From these tentative interactions the infant begins to understand the 
phenomenal world with all its laws and logic. This exemplifies adapted intelligence: 
recurrent patterns of sensorimotor activity produce and strengthen patterns of 
neurological response or schemas.  
                                                
85 Jean Piaget, ‘Genetic epistemology’, Marxists.org, 1968, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/piaget.htm (5th March, 
2012) 
86 Jean Piaget, ‘The role of action in the development of thinking’ in Overton, Willis F. 
& Gallagher, Jeanette M. (eds.), Knowledge and Development (New York: Plenum, 
1977), 30. 
87 Jean Piaget, Adaptation and Intelligence: Organic Selection and Phenocopy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 43. 
  44 
 
The schemas formed during the formative years of a human life subsequently condition 
the much more highly complex schemas that develop into adulthood. Further, complex 
schemas overtly demonstrate their origins in embodied action. The research of Lakoff 
and Johnson88 provides an exceptional account of the way in which this phenomenon is 
manifest. Lakoff and Johnson posit ‘human capacities grow out of animal capacities’.89 
They turn to cognitive science to answer the question what is real and how can we know 
it? in answer to which they state: 
 
Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our 
bodies, especially our sensorimotor apparatus, which enables us to 
perceive, move, and manipulate, and the detailed structures of our brains, 
which have been shaped by both evolution and experience.90 
 
One of the most fundamental cognitive activities any organism can perform is 
categorisation. In accordance with the theory of autopoiesis Lakoff and Johnson state 
that even the amoeba, the most fundamental organism ‘categorizes the things it 
encounters into food or non-food…The amoeba cannot choose whether to categorize; it 
just does’.91 They argue that human beings interact primarily at a basic level of 
categorisation. The category chair is an example of a basic level category. It is situated 
in the middle of the category hierarchy furniture-chair-rocking chair (named by Lakoff 
and Johnson as superordinate, basic and subordinate categories respectively). Basic 
level categories have attained a ‘cognitive priority’92 over superordinate and subordinate 
categories and, as such, are the primary operational referent in our normal day-to-day 
interactions. As such, the complexity of our experience in the world is transformed into 
the more limited set of learned basic level categories. 
 
We must be careful here to distinguish Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of categorisation 
from the representationist models of idealism and realism. The individual possesses no 
innate map of the world; rather categorisation is a product of enactive cognition. Basic 
                                                
88 Lakoff and Johnson, Flesh. 
89 Ibid., 17. 
90 Ibid., 17. 
91 Ibid., 17. 
92 Ibid., 27. 
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level categories are the most inclusive level at which category members (for example, 
the chair that you are sitting on) 
 
(1) are used, or interacted with, by similar motor category members, (2) 
have similar perceived shapes and can be imaged, (3) have identifiable 
humanly meaningful attributes, (4) are categorized by young children, 
and (5) have linguistic primacy (in several senses).93 
 
This leads Varela and his colleagues to conclude, ‘The basic level of categorization, 
thus, appears to be the point at which cognition and environment become 
simultaneously enacted.’94 Lakoff and Johnson propose that there are generalised basic 
level categorisations that originate in bodily experience and our concepts of spatial-
relations that have structural elements and internal logic that we project metaphorically 
to give structure to a wide variety of cognitive domains. These kinesthetic image 
schemas include, for example, the container schemas that have the structure inside-
boundary-outside and an implicit logic that states: ‘Given two containers, A and B, and 
an object, X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B’.95 We commonly project these 
container schemas metaphorically to structure our conceptualisation of the visual field 
(things go in and out of sight), personal relationships (one gets in or out of 
relationships), emotions (one gets in a bad mood), etc. Lakoff and Johnson state: 
 
Container schemas, like other image schemas, are cross-modal. We can 
impose a conceptual container schema on a visual scene. We can impose 
a container schema on something we hear, as when we conceptually 
separate out one part of a piece of music from another. We can also 
impose container schemas on our motor movements, as when a baseball 
coach breaks down a batter’s swing into component parts and discusses 
what goes on “inside’ each part.96 
 
Other kinesthetic image schemas include the source-path-goal schemas, part-whole 
schemas, and the centre-periphery schemas, to name but a few, each with their own 
structural elements and internal logic. These schemas originate in our bodily structures 
                                                
93 Varela et al, Embodied, 177. 
94 Ibid., 177. 
95 Lakoff and Johnson, Flesh, 31. 
96 Ibid., 32. 
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and our embodied interaction with the world and provide a primary cognitive 
mechanism for understanding experience.  
 
The schemas that I have discussed so far all function at the level of consciousness, 
however, there are pre-conscious level schemas that are crucially important for our 
capacity to act in and perceive the world. At the pre-conscious level, the most 
significant instance relevant to action is that of the body schema. Body schema does not 
require conscious, reflexive access to be known, rather it is manifest as an innate sense 
of the body, and the position and of its limbs. Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole state: 
 
[A] body schema involves a system of motor capacities, abilities, and 
habits that enable movement and the maintenance of posture. The body 
schema is not a perception, a belief, or an attitude. Rather, it is a system 
of motor and postural functions that operate below the level of self-
referential intentionality, although such functions can enter into and 
support intentional activity. The preconscious, subpersonal processes 
carried out by the body-schema system are tacitly keyed into the 
environment and play a dynamic role in governing posture and 
movement. Although the body-schema system can have specific effects 
on cognitive experience… it does not have the status of a conscious 
representation or belief.97 
 
Body schema is not be confused with body image (a conscious level schema). Body 
image emerges from conscious reflexive thought and consists of mental representations, 
intentional states, and emotional attitudes toward the body that are conditioned 
culturally and socially. Body schema, on the other hand, is an emergent cognitive 
structure that provides information about body that is directly and immediately known. 
This immediate knowledge is attributed to the individual’s proprioceptive capacity, a 
mechanism that accounts for the way in which the body recedes into the background of 
experience (as was expressed previously in Leder’s account of the absent body).  
 
In his article ‘Proprioception As Basic Knowledge Of The Body’ Andy Hamilton 
provides a useful explanation of proprioception. Central to the concept is the 
supposition that proprioception exhibits the phenomenon of immunity to error through 
                                                
97 Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole, ‘Body image and body schema in a deafferented 
subject’, in Welton, Donn (ed.), Body And Flesh: A Philosophical Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), 132. 
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misidentification (IEM). As such, proprioception evinces accurate and immediate 
knowledge of the state of the body as “just known”; a knowledge that is immediately 
gained without conscious reference to schemas or sensory-action, Hamilton states: 
 
This knowledge is immediate not just in the sense that it is non-
inferential but also in the sense that the subject never has to do anything 
to acquire it. Indeed, I do not really “acquire” it at all; immediate 
knowledge is knowledge which I do not have to do anything in order to 
have; I “just know”, for instance, that my legs are crossed when they are. 
So proprioception differs both from knowledge based on bodily 
sensation, and from perception of the body by the five senses. Other 
varieties of proprioceptive knowledge such as awareness of fatigue and 
temperature must be distinguished from avowals of bodily sensation.98 
 
The proprioceptive awareness of body schema is essential to the human being’s ability 
to perceive and act in the world. This is evidenced by Gallagher and Cole’s account of 
IW, a patient who suffers from an acute sensory neuropathy in which large fibres below 
the neck have been damaged by illness: 
 
As a result IW has no proprioceptive function and no sense of touch 
below the neck. He is still capable of movement and he experiences hot, 
cold, pain, and muscle fatigue, but he has no proprioceptive sense of 
posture of limb location. Prior to the neuropathy he had normal posture 
and was capable of normal movement. At the onset of the neuropathy 
IW’s initial experience was of complete loss of control of posture and 
movement. He could not sit up or move his limbs in any controllable 
way. For the first three months, even with a visual perception of the 
location of his limbs, he could not control his movement. In the course of 
the following two years, while in a rehabilitation hospital, he gained 
sufficient motor control to feed himself, write, and walk. He went on to 
master everyday motor tasks of personal care, housekeeping and those 
movements required to work in an office setting.99 
 
What transpires to be so unique about IW’s recovery is that he has necessarily learnt to 
compensate for his lack of proprioception with his body image. In the early stages of 
rehabilitation IW must keep parts of his body in his visual field, further, he must also 
                                                
98 Andy Hamilton, ‘Proprioception As Basic Knowledge Of The Body’, 
AndyHamilton.org, 2005, 
http://www.andyhamilton.org.uk/andy_pdfs/Proprioception_as_Basic_Knowledge_of_t
he_Body.pdf (16th February, 2012), 5. 
99 Gallagher and Cole, Body Schema, 134-135. 
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conceptualise his posture and movement. Should IW have been distracted whilst 
executing a movement he would, for example, lose his balance and fall or perhaps drop 
an object that was in his grasp. IW had to concentrate on his body in order to execute 
movement. The mastery that IW gained over basic tasks during his rehabilitation led 
Cole and Gallagher to conclude: 
 
That proprioception is a major source of information for the maintenance 
of posture and the governance of movement – that is, for the normal 
functioning of the body schema – is clear from IW’s experience. But 
proprioception is not the only source. IW, as a result of extreme effort 
and hard work, recovered control over his movement and regained a 
close-to-normal life. He did not do this by recovering proprioceptive 
sense, but by rebuilding a partial body schema and by using body image 
to help control movement.100  
 
I would like now to present an example that I hope will clarify the way in which 
cognitive structures are manifest in everyday life and the codependence between 
conscious personal-level and pre-conscious sub-personal level schemas. Consider an 
adult who has never ridden a bicycle. This individual may grasp the concept of riding-a-
bike, know which way around they are supposed to sit on the saddle, to use the 
handlebars to steer, to use the brakes to slow down and the pedals to speed up; they may 
even know that they must continually shift their weight in order to remain balanced. 
Yet, even with all of this preparatory knowledge, it is fair to state that that they will 
likely fall off upon attempting to ride the bicycle for the first time. Indeed, we would 
not judge them too harshly if they should fall off numerous times before they develop 
the ability – the body schema – sufficient for bike-riding. The point here is fundamental 
to the notion of enactive cognition: in order to generate meaningful perceptions (in the 
sense that they allow for further meaningful interactions) there must be sufficient 
interaction between personal and subpersonal processes and, further, that subpersonal 
processes such as body schema require action to be sufficiently developed. The 
evidence presented here supports Varela and his colleagues’ claim that ‘perception and 
action are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition’.  
 
Further, the function of proprioception accounts for the way in which the body is 
effaced in action. Unlike patient IW in Cole and Gallagher’s study, normal motor 
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actions such as reaching for a book on a high shelf do not usually require the individual 
to be conscious of the subtle shifts in weight from left leg to right, rather this is taken 
care of by the body schema freeing the individual to consciously attend to the intended 
outcome of the action e.g. getting the book. Likewise, one’s visceral motility (the 
processes of the digestive, respiratory, cardiovascular, urogenital and endocrine 
systems) almost permanently recedes into the background during normal action and 
perception, only coming to the foreground of consciousness when one experience pain 
or discomfort. Also, the sensory surfaces necessarily recede to allow for perception, 
Leder states: 
 
Insofar as I perceive through an organ, it necessarily recedes from the 
perceptual field it discloses. I do not smell my nasal tissue, hear my ear, 
or taste my taste buds but perceive with and through such organs.101 
 
It is this effacement of organs, limbs and processes that allow the human being to 
exceed the boundary of the body. Yet our innate and persistent proprioceptive capacity 
means that we are acutely aware of our embodiment: we are situated in a body and 
‘project outward from its place of standing’. Merleau-Ponty’s sense of preparedness 
may also be attributed to proprioception; autopoiesis has shown that the body adapts to 
the environment, becoming structurally coupled through recurrent interactions that 
sustain the living systems project of self-production. As such, we feel attuned to our 
environment, proprioceptively aware of our body’s capabilities and condition at any 
given moment, capabilities that are refined through the adaptive process during which it 
has become attuned to the environment in which it exists. 
 
2.5 Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies 
 
I would now like to draw attention to Williams Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies: 
A Tool For The Analytical Dance Eye.102 Forsythe, a world-renowned dancer and 
choreographer, produced Improvisation Technologies originally as an instructional tool 
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for the dancers of the Frankfurt Ballet for whom he was choreographer from 1984 to 
2004. Improvisation Technologies is a CD-ROM that contains, amongst other things, a 
large number of exercises designed to introduce the dancers of the Frankfurt Ballet to 
Forsythe’s methods for devising new choreography. Each exercise is presented in the 
form of short instructional video. In each video Forsythe talks through the exercise 
whilst demonstrating with his body. What is most unusual about each of these short 
videos is that simple graphics are overlaid onto the film to vividly demonstrate the 
concepts in the exercise. Let us now look at one of the instructional exercises in detail. 
 
The Room Writing exercise is typical of the kind of processes Forsythe deploys to 
generate new movement in Improvisation Technologies. Here is Forsythe’s introduction 
to the exercise transcribed from the video and to which I have also notated his actions 
and the corresponding graphical representations that appear on the screen (these 
annotations appear in square brackets and are italicised): 
 
[Forsythe stands in an empty black-box space facing the camera.] 
‘In room writing you’re going to imagine a room, its architecture and its 
contents, and you’re going to analyze the architecture and the contents 
for its geometric content. In other words a doorknob is a circle. For 
example…I might describe that with two points…’ 
[Draws a perfect circle with his two elbows. This is illustrated with a 
corresponding graphic that traces the line of his elbows as they move.] 
‘...Like this.’ 
[The graphic trace disappears.] 
‘Now I have this imaginary doorknob in front of me.’ 
[Re-draws the doorknob with his elbows. Graphics create the 
corresponding trace. This time the graphic trace remains on screen.] 
‘And in room writing what we’re going to do, in one case of room 
writing, is, we’re going to take that doorknob and knock it off the door.’ 
[Reaches across his body with the right arm and grasps the imaginary 
doorknob, overhand, from which position he swipes back across his body 
with great force. The graphic trace of the doorknob is dislodged from the 
centre of the screen in tandem with the swipe of his arm and flies off 
screen.]  
‘OK? Now the purpose of doing that is simply to take me off place. So, 
I’m going to describe the doorknob’ 
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[Re-draws the doorknob with the points of his elbows. Corresponding 
graphic trace appears and remains on screen.] 
‘This time lower. And then, knock it out of place.’ 
[Repeats the right hand swipe, and this time allows his body to continue 
with the momentum so that he loses balance. The graphic trace flies off 
screen once again.] 
‘So then, maybe I have a door, yeah, so I think the door is flat, I’ll do it 
very simply, boom-boom, boom-boom.’  
[Uses the full length of his arms with hands pointing down to the floor to 
demarcate the imaginary outline of the door. A graphic trace appears 
and marks the door frame which then disappears.] 
‘The door is here. And then I say, maybe the door is there’ 
[A graphic representation of the door appears in front of him.] 
‘And then I’m gonna go…’ 
[He kneels on the floor in front of the imaginary doorframe and leans 
with force into it with the flats of his forearms, as if to slam the frame 
into the floor. The graphic frame tips with the force and lies flat on the 
floor.] 
‘…and knock the door onto the floor. And then from that point I might 
take the sides of the door…’ 
[Reaches across to one side of the door (now lying flat on the floor in 
front of him) and grasps the imaginary frame with both hands.] 
‘…and try to slide that door across the room.’ 
[Swipes both arms back across his body and across the floor, swinging 
with momentum and rolling backwards. The graphic representation of 
the doorframe flies off the floor and out of the screen.] 
 
On the one hand, Forsythe’s Room Writing video is an exceptional visualisation of the 
theory that I have presented in this chapter. We see Forsythe bring forth a meaningful 
world by projecting embodied kinesthetic image schemas into an empty space. The 
graphic traces that record Forsythe’s movements visualise the kinesthetic image schema 
associated with, for example, the doorknob. The precision with which he attends to the 
dimensions of this imaginary doorknob indicates an acute coupling to the object or, to 
put it another way, the projection of a doorknob-schema that has been highly refined by 
real-world experience. In short, the visualisation shows the manner in which the 
individual interacts with their own states (as described in my description of the nervous 
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system) and brings forth a world (as in our description of enactive cognition). This is 
not to contradict the argument thus far by stating that the individual has an innate map 
(as the representationist might argue). Rather, in bringing forth a meaningful world the 
individual develops schemas through experience.  
 
On the other hand, the Room Writing video demonstrates the powerful way in which 
cross-domain mapping allows the individual to create opportunities for meaningful 
interaction in the world. We see the projection of a doorknob-schema, an analogy of a 
real-world object that gives structure to the environment in terms that are meaningful 
for the individual. Forsythe interacts with the projected object in a manner that is not 
consistent with real-world interaction (swiping the doorknob out of the room) so that he 
may experience an unusual distribution of momentum through the body and 
configuration of the limbs “Now the purpose of doing that is simply to take me off 
place.” The Room Writing exercise demonstrates the projection of known spatial 
relations to instigate meaningful experience in the sense that it reveals new possibilities 
for movement that can be accommodated into existing body schema through repetition. 
 
Another way to articulate this process would be to say that, by projecting kinesthetic 
image schemas into the world Forsythe has instigated a domain of perceptual and 
actional fields sufficient for meaningful interaction. This process is dependent upon 
Forsythe having kinesthetic image schemas to project that are suitably formed through 
real world sensorimotor activity. By sharing this technique with his dancers Forsythe is 
showing them how to project meaningful perceptual and actional fields so that they 
discover new dynamics of the body. We can see then that manipulation of the external 
environment (in this case, through the projection of kinesthetic image schemas) may 
empower these individuals to create new ways of using their bodies. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine any other conceivable way in which these particular movements could be 
discovered. The projection of known spatial relations leads to the discovery of new 
movement that can be inculcated into the existing body schema.  
 
Additionally, it seems reasonable to state that the knowledge that is at stake in the room 
writing exercise is tacit and, furthermore, provisional to the act of moving-in-relation-
to-an-imaginary-doorknob. Such provisional knowledge is ubiquitous in everyday life, 
consider again the way in which we learn to ride a bicycle: the insurmountable 
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complexity required to communicate the information necessary to successfully ride a 
bicycle is overcome by exposing the student to the tacit experience of bike riding.  
 
Of course, there is much knowledge that is relatively easy to communicate using 
language. However, in the performing arts (and indeed many other fields of expertise 
such as, for example, sport) it seems that a significant component, if not the majority, of 
any disciplinary vocabulary consists in tacit knowledge. Forsythe’s room writing 
exercise is just one strategy for empowering individuals to gain such tacit knowledge. 
Since it has been my aim to investigate the ways in which performance technologies 
(particularly those consistent with electronic music) may be deployed to empower 
individuals as extradisciplinary performers it is necessary to pay further consideration to 
the way in which individuals may be empowered. 
 
2.6 Empowerment Networks 
 
Let us return briefly to the notion of habitus that was introduced in the preceding 
chapter. To recap, habitus is the set of dispositions inculcated in each of us from the 
conditioning that follows from our social environment. This definition seems now to be 
too narrow in respect of the theory of autopoiesis that has now been introduced. A more 
encompassing definition might read: 
 
Habitus is the domain of interactions to which each of us can attend that follows from 
our history of structural coupling to our environment. 
 
I shall qualify this definition by reviewing the primary fundamental principle that 
governs autopoietic systems: agency is life. Without agency there can be no living 
system. In his writing, Varela identifies a number of interconnected regional selves: 
 
1. biological (cellular identity) 
2. bodily (immunological identity) 
3. cognitive (behavioural identity) 
4. sociolinguistic (personal identity) 
5. collective (social identity) 
 
I have already discussed the manner in which agency emerges at the biological level 
(singularity) and cognitive level (embodiment). Now let’s briefly consider our social 
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identity. As an operationally closed system the human being is not subject to 
instrumental interaction from the environment, rather, the former becomes structurally 
coupled to those elements that are meaningful to it according to its autopoietic project. 
This is relatively easy to comprehend at the biological level as we see, for example, a 
structural congruence between the respiratory system (internal) and the atmosphere 
(external) that enables the organism to breathe. However, it is perhaps more difficult to 
grasp at higher levels of cognition. Previously we saw that the cognitive-self emerges 
from recurrent interaction with the states of the nervous system. A further claim of 
autopoiesis is, therefore, that the cognitive self can only interact with its internal states 
that are perturbed by the external environment. If that is the case, then what of our 
interactions with other individuals? Is it also the case that there are no instrumental 
social interactions? Regarding the interaction between organisms, Maturana and Varela 
state: 
 
An organism can modify the behavior of another organism in two basic 
ways: 
1) By interaction with it in a manner that directs both organisms toward 
each other in such a way that the ensuing behavior of each of them 
depends strictly on the following behavior of the other, e.g.: courtship 
and fight. A chain of interlocked behavior can thus be generated by the 
two organisms. 
2) By orienting the behavior of the other organism to some part of its 
domain of interactions different from the present interaction, but 
comparable to the orientation of that of the orienting organism. This can 
take place only if the domains of interactions of the two organisms are 
widely coincident; in this case no interlocked chain of behavior is 
elicited because the subsequent conduct of the two organisms depends on 
the outcome of independent, although parallel, interactions.103 
 
In short, interaction relies upon consensuality rather than explicit consensus among 
those involved. Behaviour is denotative of some internal neuronal state and, as such, 
organisms that share a sufficient consensual domain can either direct (as in interaction) 
or orient (as in communication) the behaviour of other organisms. The organisms do not 
select in one another some behaviour; rather, each selects behaviour that is congruent to 
                                                
103 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis, 27-28. [Italics added]. 
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the other.104 Maturana and Varela provide a concise summary of these principles as 
follows: 
 
Linguistic behaviour is orienting behavior; it orients the orientee within 
his cognitive domain to interactions that are independent of the nature of 
the orienting interactions themselves. To the extent that the part of its 
cognitive domain toward which the orientee is thus oriented is not 
genetically determined and becomes specified through interactions, one 
organism can in principle orient another to any part of its cognitive 
domain by means of arbitrary modes of conduct also specified through 
interactions. However, only if the domains of interactions of the two 
organisms are to some extent comparable, are such consensual orienting 
interactions possible and are the two organisms able to develop some 
conventional, but specific, system of communicative descriptions to 
orient each other to cooperative classes of interactions that are relevant 
for both.105 
 
Now consider the following example: if a man in the street approaches me and says 
“there are blue cats” he orients my thought to all that I know about cats, all that I know 
about the colour blue, and all that I know about the relation between cats and the colour 
blue. But I will also refer to what I know about strangers and truth. It is fair to state that 
I would not be too hesitant to disregard this statement as untrue. However, if my father 
should state that “there are blue cats” then I am more inclined to consider the validity of 
this statement given what I recall of my father and truth. My disposition to respond to 
the statement is conditioned by my history of structural coupling to the orienter (the 
stranger or my father). At no time can the statement simply be deposited in me as a 
truth. Agency is life and is the only way of being at all levels of cognition. To interact 
or communicate with another individual is to orient them to some perceptual or actional 
field within a consensual domain to which they will respond in a manner consistent with 
their history of structural coupling. If agency is life then interaction with other living 
organisms can be considered only in terms of empowerment and disempowerment. 
 
                                                
104 This is an extremely brief introduction to the notion of consensual domains of 
interaction. For a more rigorous account please see Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis, 
22-35; Mingers, Self-Producing, 77-80; and Randall Whitaker, ‘Tutorial 2: Concepts 
and constructs’, Enolagaia.com, 2001, 
http://www.enolagaia.com/Tutorial2.html#Languaging (31st March, 2012). 
105 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis, 30. 
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Bourdieu’s formulation of habitus and Elder-Vass’ ontology of dispositions are 
appealing because they accommodate the individual’s fundamental agency. To revisit 
one of Elder-Vass’ statements: 
 
Normative compliance is not physically forced compliance but voluntary 
compliance; and hence it is directly caused, not by the existence in the 
present of normative pressures from the community, but by the 
individual’s internalization of past pressures in the form of beliefs or 
dispositions.106 
 
We see that the individual opts into norm-circles and that, whilst there may be pressure 
to comply, compliance is ultimately a decision taken by the agent. However, we have 
since also seen the inextricable role that our embodiment plays in the way we 
understand and see the world, including the way in which our interactions with the 
material environment condition our behaviour. Therefore, the purpose of my new 
formulation of habitus is not to deny the original formulation but rather to enfold it in a 
more encompassing definition that takes into account agency at all levels of cognition 
and the interdependence between them. Given that much of our perception depends 
upon interaction with physical objects in the environment it is essential that we develop 
a better understanding of the role of the material in action. 
 
The role of the material environment in formation of our dispositions to act has 
traditionally been overlooked in action analysis. Henrik Bruun and Richard Langlais 
sought to address this problem in their article On The Embodied Nature Of Action. In 
this article they state that traditional action analysis has been concerned with conscious 
phenomena. This would not be problematic were it not for the fact that such analysis 
assumes too narrow a definition of consciousness, Bruun and Langlais state: 
 
A narrow understanding of consciousness is based on the idea that a state 
is conscious only if there is non-mediated consciousness about its being 
conscious. According to this view, I am conscious, for instance, that a 
particular person is sitting next to me only if I attend to his or her 
presence by thinking about it in some way. Thus, consciousness requires 
                                                
106 Elder-Vass, Causal, 125. 
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self-consciousness in the sense that we are conscious about our own 
conscious states.107 
 
They indicate that such a definition excludes, for example, the behaviour of babies and 
many animals from conscious action. The narrow definition also excludes action that is 
frequently performed without attending to what one is doing such as, for example, 
walking, driving a car, or bowing a violin. These actions would therefore be considered 
unconscious. If such actions are not personal level phenomena are they simply sub-
personal physiological processes or is there perhaps a third state in-between these levels 
of activity?  A more preferable definition of consciousness is proposed by Susan 
Hurley108 who argues that perceptions are conscious if we can act on them in an 
immediate (unforced) way, that is, if we have intentional access to them. Bruun and 
Langlais summarise this broader definition of consciousness as follows: 
 
[A]ctions are conscious, although not necessarily reflexively accessed, 
phenomena. Humans, however, are normally able to gain reflexive 
access to their action whenever needed. This is the point of the oft-
repeated claim that, despite carrying out many actions non-reflexively, 
humans are able to report what they are doing if asked… It should also 
be noted that the comprehensive notion of consciousness leads to the 
inclusion of some processes that traditionally have been seen as in 
apposition to the idea of action as a form of intentional behaviour, in the 
category of action. The act of breathing can be mentioned as an example. 
We clearly have intentional access to breathing because, reflexively or 
non-reflexively, we stop breathing when, for instance, diving into 
water.109 
 
The claim that Bruun and Langlais make is that ‘action is embodied in the sense that 
certain physiological processes are internal in relation to it, they play a constitutive role 
for its performance’.110 We have seen evidence of this throughout the discussion of 
autopoiesis (consider Held and Heins ‘kittens’ experiment, for example); indeed, it is a 
notion that is concomitant with Varela’s study of enactive cognition. If the way in 
which we make sense of the world is through embodied action, and much of this action 
involves interaction with the physical world then, as Bruun and Langlais agree, any 
                                                
107 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 40. 
108 Susan Hurley, Consciousness in Action (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
109 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 40. 
110 Ibid., 45. 
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analysis of action may benefit from considering the role of the material in behaviour. To 
further understand the way in which the material functions in action we can refer to the 
interrelated notions of external scaffolding and epistemic action.  
 
External scaffolding is a term coined by Andy Clark111 to express the manner in which 
humans employ external objects to simplify complex cognitive tasks. Clark posits a 
connectionist picture of the brain as a network of distributed parallel processing. He 
states that, whilst such networks are good at real-time motor control and pattern 
recognition tasks, their weakness is that ‘they are not intrinsically well-suited to highly 
sequential, stepwise problem-solving of the kind involved in logic and planning’112 or, 
to put it another way, ‘good at Frisbee, bad at logic’.113 These features of the brain, 
Clark suggests, force human agents to employ external devices to accomplish cognitive 
tasks. For example, for most people to calculate 3245 X 8676 they would employ paper 
and pen, or a calculator. Such external scaffolding is so crucial to the completion of the 
task that they can be considered constitutive to it. This is an example of instrumental 
utilisation of the environment to achieve particular goals. The use of external 
scaffolding, Clark claims, is both common and essential for altering the information-
processing tasks that our brains confront. 
 
Epistemic action is a notion first posited by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio114 and is 
broadly defined as follows: 
 
Epistemic actions – physical actions that make mental computation 
easier, faster, or more reliable – are external actions that an agent 
performs to change his or her own computational state.115 
 
Epistemic action is another form of external scaffolding that involves the restructuring 
of the environment to simplify complex mental tasks. For example, consider how when 
assembling a jigsaw puzzle, one groups together similar pieces. It is possible that such 
                                                
111 Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998) 
112 Ibid., 60. 
113 Ibid., 60. 
114David Kirsh, and Paul Maglio, ‘On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action’, 
Cognitive Science, 18 (1994), 513-549. 
115 Ibid., 513-514. 
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grouping may be constitutive of assembling the puzzle, at least within a narrow 
timeframe.  
 
The interrelated concepts of external scaffolding and epistemic action lead Bruun and 
Langlais to conclude: 
 
The idea of external scaffolding can help us understand the way in which 
a whole set of environmental features become parts of human agency and 
action. At the simplest level of action, external scaffolding can involve 
modification of spatial arrangements… In cases of more complex action, 
such as doing complex arithmetic operations, or performing complex 
reasoning, human agents use written numbers and public language (in 
thought and in writing) as instruments. These ‘external’ instruments can 
become so crucial for the action to be performed that they acquire a 
constitutive status.116 
 
The notion that external scaffolding can be constitutive to action is of some importance. 
It suggests that, in certain instances, having an intention to act is dependent on knowing 
that one is going to have access to sufficient resources to realise the action. For 
example, my intention to write this thesis within the allocated timeframe presupposes 
access to personal computer and desktop publishing software. Knowledge of the 
flexibility afforded by the personal computer and desktop publishing software is 
constitutive to my intention to write the thesis on time. 
 
Given that external scaffolding may have a constitutive role to certain actions it seems 
logical to consider these elements in any analysis of such actions. Bruun and Langlais 
usefully lay the foundations for such analysis by specifying the manner in which 
external scaffolding may empower or disempower humans with regard to agency. They 
begin with a definition of agency: ‘Agency designates the capacity of agents to realize 
intended states of the world’.117 They continue: 
 
Since agents have varying access to resources (practice, knowledge, 
instruments, money, contacts, status, position, etc.), they differ in their 
degree of agency in relation to various kinds of intentions. Some 
resources are contingent in relation to the action in question. This means 
                                                
116 Bruun and Langlais, Action, 44. 
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that they can help the agent to improve performance, but are not 
necessary for the action as such. Other resources have a constitutive 
function; the action cannot be performed without them.118 
 
The implication here is that we can be empowered in two ways. On the one hand, by 
gaining access to contingent resources, we can be empowered in the performance of an 
action. On the other hand, by providing access to constitutive resources, we can be 
empowered as agents, ‘in the sense of being able to perform a broader range of 
actions.’119 Likewise, by diminishing access to contingent resources, we can be 
disempowered in the performance of an action. Finally, by diminishing access to 
constitutive resources we can be disempowered as agents; the range of actions that are 
available to us is reduced. 
 
Finally, Bruun and Langlais conclude that Actor Network Theory (ANT) provides a 
suitable mode of analyses for action. ANT was developed by Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon and John Law and is a framework that analyses action in terms of networks of 
agency – empowerment networks. ANT is a suitable model for analyses as it 
accommodates the role of material in action in the terms I have now discussed. Indeed, 
the following passage found in Latour’s Reassembling The Social summarises the 
sentiments I have expressed above: 
 
In addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘backdrop for human 
action’, things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, 
suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on. ANT is not 
the empty claim that objects do things ‘instead’ of human actors: it 
simply says that no science of the social can even begin if the question of 
who and what participates in the action is not first of all thoroughly 
explored, even though it might mean letting elements in which, for lack 
of a better term, we would call non-humans.120 
 
I shall conclude this chapter with a number of examples that I will consider in terms of 
empowerment networks. Before I do so, there is one final theoretical discourse that I 
should like to introduce. The perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson’s notion of 
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affordances will serve two purposes: on the one hand it will nuance our understanding 
of the perceptual and actional fields that empower agents and, on the other hand, it will 
provide a lexicon with which to deploy in our analysis of empowerment networks. 
 
2.7 Affordances 
 
Like Maturana and Varela, James J. Gibson121 theorised a radical alternative to 
representationist theories of cognition.122 He proposed that behavioural responses to the 
environment are not dependent upon pre-formed mental structures but are rather a 
function of the individual’s ability to directly prehend meaningful attributes for action 
in the environment relative to their own capabilities and needs.  
  
Gibson’s ecological approach specifies the individual’s ability to distinguish objects 
from a background through the perception of relatively stable constants within shifting 
planes of ambient energy in the optical array. Gibson names these relatively stable 
sources of sensory input invariant variants, a term that expresses their relative stability 
amongst the continuously shifting ambience of the sensory arrays. Invariant variants 
attain meaning as a function of the individual’s duadic perceptual capacity; the 
individual at once just knows the present state of their body (I have already introduced 
this concept above as proprioception), and the body’s state relative to the environment 
(exteroception). Exteroception and proprioception are not mutually exclusive but rather 
co-dependent: it is not possible for one to occur without the other, Gibson states: 
 
[An] environment implies something that is surrounded, and therefore 
awareness of the environment implies an awareness of the body existing 
                                                
121 See James J. Gibson, ‘The theory of affordances in perceiving, acting, and knowing’ 
in Shaw, Robert and Bransford, John (eds.), Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing (New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1977), 67-82 and James J. Gibson, The 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc., 1986).   
122 I shall show in the conclusion to this outline of Gibson’s approach the manner in 
which it differs from Maturana and Varela’s. However, since these differences are not 
insurmountable with respect to purpose of my discussion I will proceed, for now, with 
Gibson’s theory. 
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in the environment. Equally, an awareness of the body entails some 
feeling of its relation to the surroundings.123 
 
Gibson’s theory emphasises the complementarity between the individual and the 
environment; the individual at once gains immediate knowledge of their present 
condition relative to their present environment, and vice versa. This brings forth a world 
of perceptual and actional fields to which the individual can attend. Gibson deploys the 
term affordances to articulate the apparent expressiveness of the environment that 
results from the emergence of such perceptual and actional fields, he states: 
 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in 
the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean 
by it something that refers both to the environment and the animal in a 
way that no existing term does.  
 
The following example illustrates Gibson’s characteristic linguistic method for 
expressing an affordance: an individual identifies an object in the environment that has 
a smooth horizontal surface. If the surface is broader than the individual’s body, and 
lower than their waist, it is “sit-on-able”. Likewise, a ball no bigger than the hand is 
“grasp-able”; a freshly picked apple is “eat-able”; and a cliff is “fall-off-able”. These 
examples also illustrate the way in which affordances are meaningful; the affordance 
“eat-able” will provide valuable nutrition, whereas the affordance “fall-off-able” will 
cause great harm to the individual (the value of an affordance may also be ambiguous or 
mis-perceived; this is a topic that will become central to our discussion further on). 
 
Gibson acknowledges that culture, experience and memory affect which affordances the 
individual is likely to perceive in the environment. For this reason it is apparent to me 
that his theory aligns with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. The individual’s normalised 
dispositions to act determine which affordances they will perceive and subsequently 
attend to. For example, a dancer will attend to those affordances in the environment that 
                                                
123 James J. Gibson, [Unpublished] ‘On the Difference Between Perception and 
Proprioception’, Trinity College, 1968, 
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/ecopsyc/perils/folder4/difference.html (18th March, 
2012). 
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facilitate kinetic action whereas a musician will attend to those that afford sonic action. 
However, it is important to recognise that whilst inculcated dispositions determine the 
individual’s behaviour they do not specify the affordances that are available in the 
environment to be perceived. For example, whilst the dancer may only prehend those 
affordances that enable kinetic action, many (if not all) of the affordances that enable 
sonic action are still available to be perceived (although they are likely to be 
overlooked). The group of affordances to which the individual attends constitutes their 
niche in the environment, Gibson states: 
 
Environmental scientists, ecologists, make use of the concept of a niche. 
A given species of animal is said to utilize a certain niche in the 
environment. It is not the same as the habitat of the species, that is, 
where it lives, but rather how it lives.124 
 
Whilst there are strong resonances between affordances and Maturana and Varela’s 
theory of cognition, there are also notable differences. On the one hand, Gibson 
postulates an objective world that contains suitable information to specify the 
environment. The individual picks-up on the information that is consistent with their 
capabilities and needs – perception, for Gibson, is direct detection. This is not consistent 
with Maturana and Varela’s approach that shows meaning in the environment is enacted 
according to the capabilities and needs of the organism. On the other hand, both 
approaches deny the representationist view of perception in favour of the idea that 
perception is perceptually guided action. Therefore, whilst the origins of perceived 
meaning in the environment is a contentious issue, the notion of emergent perceptual 
and actional fields relative to the condition of the individual is consistent. The 
resonances between the two approaches seem to me sufficient to encompass Gibson’s 
theory into the theoretical discourse that I am presently constructing. Whilst I subscribe 
to the enactive approach I also believe Gibson’s method for articulating the perceptual 
and actional fields available to the individual to be consistent with this approach and a 
useful mechanism with which to express the opportunities for action afforded by the 
environment. 
 
The Gibsonian concept of affordances has gained prominence in fields of research 
concerned with designing interaction, most notably in human user interface design. 
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Both Donald Norman and William Gaver advocate the application of Gibson’s theory in 
the design of everyday objects.125 Whilst Norman is widely credited as being the first to 
introduce the concept of affordances to the design community, Gaver has usefully 
embellished Gibson’s theory to further unpack the way in which new behavioural 
possibilities arise through exploration: 
 
The notion of affordances may be extended to explicitly include 
exploration. For instance, [a] pivoting door handle… may appear to 
afford grasping, but passive observation will probably not indicate the 
affordance of turning it or using it to open the door. However, once 
grasped, a random or exploratory press downwards will convey tactile 
information revealing the affordance of turning the handle. When the 
handle is fully turned, the new configuration is one from which pulling is 
natural. The results of a pull will indicate whether the door affords 
opening or not.126 
 
This example illustrates Gaver’s notion of sequential affordances. Gaver introduces a 
second useful concept, that of the nested affordance: 
 
… a handle alone only appears to afford pulling. A door alone may 
suggest an affordance for manipulation due to its partial separation from 
the wall, but not what sort of manipulation will be effective. Only by 
seeing the affordance of pulling the handle as nested within the 
affordance of pulling the door can opening the door be a perceptible 
affordance.127 
 
These related concepts illustrate the way in which opportunities for behaviour emerge in 
the environment both in time (sequential affordances) and in space (nested affordances). 
The individual who attends to an affordance in the environment inevitably uncovers 
additional behavioural possibilities – behaviour affords behaviour. The individual, 
therefore, is engaged in a constant negotiation of the affordances in the environment and 
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discriminates between them, attending to those that are most valuable according to their 
present needs and capabilities. 
 
Andrea Scarantino, in her article ‘Affordances Explained’, presents yet another 
particularly useful nuance on affordances, she states:  
 
The trademark feature of affordances is that their manifestation is always 
constituted by an event in which the affordance-bearer X and the 
organism O are both involved. If we look at Gibson’s examples of 
affordances, we notice manifestations such as climbing, catching, getting 
under, eating, mailing a letter, but also such as bumping into, getting 
burned by, falling off, being eaten by. Whereas events in the first list 
constitute things organisms do, events in the second list constitute things 
that happen to them.  
The distinction is in my view important enough to distinguish between 
two classes of affordances, namely goal-affordances (their manifestation 
is a doing) and happening-affordances (their manifestation is a 
happening).128 
 
Scarantino furthers the complementary notions of goal and happening affordances by 
introducing an additional lower-level description according to their degree of reliability: 
 
I distinguish between surefire-affordances, i.e. affordances such that the 
manifestation follows the triggering circumstances with certainty, and 
probabilistic-affordances, i.e. affordances such that the manifestation 
follows the triggering circumstances with some positive probability p 
less than 1. Sit-ability is now for me a candidate surefire goal-affordance, 
and catch-ability and ride-ability are now for me probabilistic goal 
affordances of different degrees of reliability. Notice that the 
surefire/probabilistic distinction applies to both goal-affordances and 
happening-affordances. Many of the latter seem in fact to be of a 
probabilistic variety (e.g. the brink of a cliff possess the probabilistic 
affordance of fall-off-ability).129 
 
It seems to me that the concept of affordances, nuanced by Gaver and Scarantino, 
generates a substantial lexicon with which to express the perceptual and actional fields 
that constitute an empowerment network. It is a lexicon that captures the inextricable 
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relationship between the capabilities and needs of the agent relative to the environment. 
As such, affordances are a useful and powerful augmentation to the theoretical 
discourse that I have presented thus far. I shall now provide a series of examples in 
which I will attempt to consider a variety of scenarios in terms of the theoretical 
discourse that I have constructed. As it is one of the aims of my research to understand 
the way in which performance technologies can be deployed to empower individuals as 
extradisciplinary performers, my examples primarily consider scenarios in which the 
physical environment is manipulated in some way. The final example will consider site-
sufficient extradisciplinary performance as an empowerment network. 
 
2.8 Three Examples of Empowerment Networks 
2.8.1  Playgrounds and Climbing Frames 
A playground is a site in which the normative rules and regulations that govern 
everyday life are relaxed. Children are free to run, jump, and shout with reckless 
abandon. As such, the playground overtly demonstrates the antistructural phenomena 
we associate with liminoid sites (note, liminoid sites are not astructural spaces without 
rules; a parent would still likely discipline their child if the latter should swear at or hit 
another, for example). This liminoid site allows the child to explore the possibilities of 
imagination, language, movement, etc.– indeed, to experience all the benefits implicit in 
play. The climbing frame sits within this liminoid play-space. It is an object with no 
pregiven rules for interaction. It is an object that affords climbing, swinging, hanging, 
revolving, tapping, etc. This is a site rich with affordances, both in the socio-cultural 
and physical domain. The child is free to project concepts and ideas into the space and 
onto the climbing frame. In role-play the child can imagine a prison, a wigwam, a 
castle, a lion filled cage, a rocket, etc., projecting their own rules into the site and their 
own spatial relations onto the climbing frame. 
 
This is, of course, a site that empowers the child in many different ways. The re-
imagining of social rules affords new encounters that reveal the complexity of, for 
example, a trip to the moon, keeping lions, defending castles, etc. The thresholds of 
social dynamics are re-enacted and tested, the child discovers what it means to lead and 
to follow, to make friends, to have a family. Likewise, the ambiguity of the climbing 
frame with its myriad affordances reveals new bodily configurations, new thresholds of 
movement, strength, flexibility, and momentum otherwise unavailable in the ‘real’, non-
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liminoid, world. The playground is a site that affords the interrogation and vast 
expansion of schemas through the provision of a multitude of ambiguous, sequential, 
nested and happening affordances. 
 
Adults, too, have their playgrounds… 
 
2.8.2  Parkour and Free Running 
Parkour is a physical discipline that focuses on efficient movement around obstacles in 
the urban environment. The parkour practitioner, or traceur (feminine, traceuse) (a term 
derived from the French meaning trace, or trail, as in “he escaped without a trace”) must 
find the swiftest route from A to B by vaulting, climbing, rolling, sliding, and swinging 
over and around obstacles encountered en route such as benches, bollards, stairs, and 
gaps between the roofs of buildings.  
 
The traceur/traceuse enacts a degree of perceptual flexibility by setting aside basic-level 
categorisations in favour of super-ordinate geometric and spatial categorisations. For 
example, the basic-level categorisation bench is set aside in favour of the super-ordinate 
categorisation of the same object that specifies it as a flat, solid surface at knee-height. 
Such conceptual shifts reconfigure the affordances that the object presents relative to 
the individual. As a bench the object affords sitting, however, when the same object is 
re-conceptualised as a flat solid surface it affords rolling-over, leaping-on, sliding-
across, etc. Setting aside the socially prescribed rules that govern the normalised modes 
of interaction with everyday objects enacts this conceptual shift. To participate in 
parkour is to set-aside or reconfigure the rules that prescribe the normative use of 
objects in the environment. To put it another way, to participate in parkour is to forge a 
liminoid fault line through the urban environment. 
 
Such perceptual flexibility potentialises multiple happening and goal-affordances in the 
environment that are encountered for the first time through exploration and 
experimentation. The traceur/traceuse is empowered with respect to their ability to 
negotiate any obstacle in the environment and to respond spontaneously to the 
happening-affordances that they may encounter (for example, a rooftop may appear 
solid yet may crumble underfoot). The traceur/traceuse encounters new configurations 
of the body, its momentum and shifts of balance, and develops sufficient body schema 
(through practice and repetition) to respond with great fluidity to such occurrences. 
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Parkour is now commonly employed to train military personnel all over the world, 
evidence of its capacity to empower individuals to negotiate any terrain with ease. 
 
A related activity is free running. Free running encompasses the practice of parkour but 
does away with the rule to “get from A to B”. The emphasis, therefore, is on creativity 
rather than efficiency. As such, free running shares much of the qualities that are 
present in William Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies. In Improvisation 
Technologies the dancer is required to imagine a physical environment, in free running 
the traceur/traceuse re-imagines an existing environment. Both are mechanisms that 
function to expose the individual to new configurations of the body.  
 
2.8.3  Site-Sufficient Improvisation: The Cinder Path 
In the introduction to this thesis I provided a first-person account of theybreakinpieces’ 
performance on the Cinder Path. I would now like to consider this performance in terms 
of affordances and empowerment networks. 
 
I see many similarities between parkour, free running, and the improvisation on the 
Cinder Path. As in Parkour, a score was deployed so that the participants would journey 
from A-to-B. However, the score deployed on the Cinder Path did not specify to do so 
“as swiftly and efficiently as possible” and so it afforded the performers moments in 
which to dwell, to gather themselves, or to revisit some incidental sonic/kinetic 
behaviour or event that they may have stumbled upon (in this respect, the performance 
reflects the creative impetus of free running). In a manner akin to that of the 
traceur/traceuse, the participants re-imagined the rules that govern normative day-to-day 
use of the path: whilst they still used it to get from A-to-B this was no longer the 
priority, rather, this normal use of the path was subjugated to creative exploration. 
Consequently, this simple modification of normative rules enabled the performers to 
interact with the site in a manner most unusual, enacting a milieu of otherwise 
concealed kinetic and soniferous affordances. For example, the surfaces of the walls and 
gravel floor now afforded launching, leaning, kicking, scraping, rubbing, tapping, 
rolling, pressing, sliding, rustling, skidding, and jumping, to name but a few. These 
goal-affordances constitute a provisional vocabulary with which the performers 
improvised with one another, creating momentary kinetic and sonic exchanges, 
structuring the environment in response to one another. The site was also rich with 
happening-affordances, the surfaces, shifting under hand and foot, made the body slip, 
  69 
tumble, and fall, movement was abruptly curtailed, and skin was scratched, poked, 
rubbed, and covered in dirt and grime. This was experienced as resistance, provoking 
behaviour, flinches in pain that would carry the body into new movement and resonate 
throughout the group who acted together. 
 
It is fair to state that the resistance experienced on-site disrupted movement and in 
doing so revealed new articulations of the body that would otherwise have remained 
unknown. This extended beyond our own performance vocabularies by revealing new, 
more aggressive and disruptive ways of interacting with one another. This new quality 
of movement and interaction would, indeed, be carried forwards into future 
performances, our interactions together, and our individual practices. 
 
Additionally, the performers – exploring together – engaged in a number of cross-modal 
interactions. Kinetic behaviour created sonic events and vice versa, each behaviour 
resonating through the group – some performers responding to motion and some to the 
sonic events. Such cross-modal interactions potentialise associations between gestures 
and sound so that one might move to generate an audible response to something that 
was heard. Further, the performers would orientate each other to possibilities for 
producing movement and sound so that techniques emerged, new provisional 
knowledge that could be revisited and explored. In short, the site-sufficient strategy re-
animated the Cinder Path, revealing new affordances and a wealth of emergent 
provisional knowledge that was enacted and exchanged through collaborative 
interaction. As such, the site-sufficient strategy empowers individuals to interrogate 
their disciplinary vocabulary, discover new actions, and exchange knowledge with other 
individuals through the act of performing-together. 
 
2.9 Closing Remarks 
In this chapter I have introduced the notion that living systems are defined in terms of 
agency. We have seen that the individual is fundamentally embodied and this specifies 
the manner in which they project forth into the world. This embodiment fundamentally 
affects the way in which we perceive, understand and act - by enacting a meaningful 
world through interactions with the environment. Further, we have seen that this 
embodiment is overlooked in traditional action-analysis. To truly understand habitus - 
our inculcated dispositions to act in particular ways - we must take into account both the 
socio-cultural and material environment. 
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I subsequently introduced the interrelated notions of external scaffolding, epistemic 
action and empowerment networks, and augmented these ideas with the Gibsonian 
concept of affordances. These concepts provide a greater understanding of the way in 
which human beings interact with the material environment and, further, establish a 
vocabulary with which to describe the perceptual and actional fields that are present to 
us in the world. 
 
By looking at some examples we have revealed various ways in which the environment 
can be manipulated to afford opportunities for behaviour. The theoretical lens that I 
have now established helps to answer the question “why site-sufficiency?” by revealing 
and articulating the mechanisms that make extradisciplinary interactions possible. 
 
In the following chapter I will introduce the practical research from which this theory 
has emerged. I shall, wherever possible, apply the theoretical lens that has now been 
established in my reflections upon these practical projects. 
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Chapter 3. Reel Experiments, Terrain and SynSite 
 
In this chapter I shall provide an overview of the practical research from out of which 
the preceding theoretical discourse emerged. We shall see a progression from solo 
electronic music making to the construction of technologically mediated sensing-
systems that are designed to empower the individual as an extradisciplinary performer. 
These systems function as metaphors of operationally closed autopoietic organisms but 
also, and more importantly, demonstrate the same liminoid antistructural phenomena 
that make site-sufficiency suitable for interrogating habitus. As such, we shall see the 
way in which performance technologies present unique possibilities for creating 
dynamic and complex empowerment networks. 
 
3.1 Reel Experiments 
 
The early stages of practical research marked a return to the electronic music making 
practice that had become marginalised through my interdisciplinary work with 
theybreakinpieces. During this early period I produced software instruments 
(applications authored in the Max/MSP programming environment) and used these in 
conjunction with re-appropriated analogue audio technologies to explore various 
performance ecologies130. The software instruments developed at this time include: a 
granular synthesis application that allowed for the generation of synthesised grain-
clouds with multiple filter, pitch, waveform, duration and amplitude parameters and 
envelopes; and a modular application for live sampling that incorporated an audio-
routing matrix so that sampled audio could be routed to various effects modules 
(including reverb, delay, limiter, band pass filter, and a module that reproduced short 
slices of the sampled audio at programmable rates). I also experimented with a variety 
of external hardware controllers, using them to interface with these applications. These 
controllers included a Behringer FCB101 MDI foot controller, Evolution UC33 MIDI 
controller, and a Saitek Dual Analogue Stick games controller.  Additionally, the re-
                                                
130 I borrow the term performance ecology from John Bowers, who states: ‘our ‘object 
of design’ is not a single piece of technology – neither an instrument, nor a particular 
piece of software. Rather, to exhibit multiple forms of interactivity, we must deal with 
an assembly of devices in a performance ecology.’ In: John Bowers, ‘Improvising 
machines: Ethnographically informed design for improvised electro-acoustic music’, 
Ariada.uea.ac.uk, 2002, http://www.ariada.uea.ac.uk/ariadatexts/ariada4/bowers-
improvising_machines.pdf (31st March 2012), 59. 
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appropriated audio technologies employed included AM/FM radios, miscellaneous 
cassette recorders, dictation machines, a Casio keyboard, a vintage drum synthesiser, 
and reel-to-reel tape decks. I deployed these instruments in multiple combinations and 
configurations. These ecologies were pressed into the service of various modes of solo 
and collaborative performance including ‘jam sessions’, workshops, and public 
concerts. This period of activity revealed the technical knowledge, instrumentation, and 
modes of interaction through which my electronic music performance practice is 
defined. I proceeded to survey this disciplinary vocabulary and identify those elements 
that could potentially contribute to the syncretism between electronic music and 
extradisciplinary modes of performance.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Reel-to-reel tabletop performance ecology. 
 
One of these experimental performance ecologies revealed interactions that indicated 
potential for further investigation. This ecology consisted in a pair of Akai 4000D reel-
to-reel tape decks and the granular synthesis software application running on a laptop 
computer (Figure 3.1). Each reel-to-reel tape deck was configured to play audio from a 
short loop of audiotape that extended outward, around a microphone stand and back to 
the machine. Audio routed to each tape deck could thus be recorded to its respective 
tape loop (approximately fifteen seconds of audio could be recorded to each of the two 
tape loops). The audio from the granular synthesis application could be routed to each 
tape deck individually or to both simultaneously via a mixing desk. Additionally, the 
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audio output from each tape deck could either be routed back to its own input to create 
feedback effects or passed to the input of the neighboring tape deck where it could be 
recorded onto the respective tape loop. A demonstration of this performance ecology 
can be seen in the film Reel Experiments Sonic Improvisation [RE1], included in the 
accompanying DVD documentation. 
 
This tabletop performance ecology generates affordances for action consistent with the 
supervisory interactions described by John Bowers in his Masters thesis Improvising 
Machines: 
 
Writers on complex systems like power plants or those in industrial 
process control often speak of supervisory interaction. Through 
operations at a control room, one might supervise a complex process but 
it may have its own complex physics or chemistry (in the case of power 
generation) which one cannot hope to manipulate in detail. In musical 
cases, a notion of supervisory interaction might capture cases where a 
complex algorithmic system is overseen in the production of real-time 
musical material with, perhaps, the algorithm’s parameters being set but 
its internal operation being autonomous.131 
 
Once audio has been recorded to a tape loop one can engage in supervisory interactions 
such as, for example, starting and stopping playback using the tape deck’s transport 
controls; moving the body of the tape deck to alter the tension of the tape loop, thus 
affecting the playback speed of the audio [RE1, 05m22s – 05m56s]; or simply adjusting 
the levels of the audio mix as the tape loops on each deck phase with one another.  
 
Additionally, this tabletop ecology generates affordances consistent with instrumental 
interactions.132 By grasping the audiotape one can manipulate the sound output directly 
and expressively [RE1, 02m30s – 03m03s]. Possibilities for manipulation include, for 
example, variable pitch and amplitude effects such as vibrato and tremolo; stuttering 
effects, caused by rapidly pinching and releasing the audiotape; and temporal effects 
caused by drawing the audiotape back and forth across the playhead of the tape deck (an 
effect equivalent to that of the ‘scratching’ technique commonly used by turntablists). In 
this way the audiotape functions as a direct interface between the performer and the 
sonic material. The performer’s actions upon the tape are immediately transposed as 
                                                
131 John Bowers, Improvising Machines, 59. 
132 Ibid., 59. 
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sonic events, instantiating a coherent causal one-to-one relationship between gesture 
and sound.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Solo movement experiments with the reel-to-reel tape recorder. 
 
The physicality necessarily exerted upon the audiotape to create these sonic effects was 
of particular interest during the initial experiments. It struck me that the reel-to-reel tape 
recorder might generate suitable affordances to accommodate a more comprehensive 
movement vocabulary. I subsequently conducted further experiments using a single 
reel-to-reel tape deck upon which was loaded an audiotape containing pre-recorded 
material, as can be seen in the film Reel Experiments Solo and Collaborative 
Investigation [RE2]. I discovered that I could pull great lengths of tape out, away from 
the deck without disrupting its motion across the playhead. This allowed me to move 
within the audiotape, manipulating its motion across the playhead and, thus, 
manipulating the audio output (Figure 3.2). In this way I was able to use my whole body 
to control the sound output bringing the entirety of my movement vocabulary into play. 
This system, which I shall henceforth refer to as the Reel Experiments system, invoked 
a complex dynamic between the performer, sound, and movement. Each of these 
elements was held together, connected, by the motion and physicality of the tape. 
 
The Reel Experiments system generates adequate surefire and probabilistic goal 
affordances to be useful in performance. The audiotape is grasp-able and, as such, 
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affords manipulation over the temporal characteristics of the sound affecting the pitch, 
amplitude and duration of sonic events (including the ability to silence the output by 
holding the tape still). Additionally, once a significant length of audiotape has been 
pulled outward from the tape deck one can attend to affordances that facilitate 
movement utilising the whole body whilst still manipulating the sonic output [RE2, 
00m12s – 00m46s]. However, as we shall now see, this movement is not 
unencumbered. 
 
The audiotape rotates anti-clockwise, outward from the tape deck into the performance 
space and back across the playhead. Whilst subtle, the rotation of the audiotape creates 
a resistance that is sufficiently substantial to act upon the body. One can move against 
this force, creating a tension that pulls the body, or submit to its provocation to turn in 
sympathy with the motion of the audiotape. The resistant force placed upon the body as 
it touches the audiotape exposes the performer to a multitude of contingent events, 
happening-affordances that turn, pivot, pull, and push the body, dislodging it from its 
place of standing and creating dis-equilibrium that provokes compensatory movement.  
 
The physical resistance also reveals the fragility of the system. Once the audiotape is set 
in motion its rotation must be sustained. If one should grasp the tape, preventing its 
motion for any length of time (in excess of a few seconds), the motor on the tape deck 
itself is liable to ‘burn out’ rendering the whole system defunct. Additionally, if one 
allows the audiotape to drop below the base of the tape deck it will no longer run 
smoothly over the playhead but instead becomes entangled in the transport mechanism 
of the machine133. Therefore whilst the system affords a milieu of kinetic and sonic 
actions, including a resistance that provokes interaction, it is also fail-able. This 
probabilistic happening-affordance consequently implicates the performer in an 
obligatory mode of supervisory interaction, that is to say that, whilst one attends to 
kinetic and sonic affordances, one always has to attend to the maintenance of the 
system.  
 
Therefore, whilst the performer inhabits the audiotape environment they are implicated 
in a constitutive role within it. The performer is connected to the audiotape that is 
                                                
133 This may be overcome by using heavy-based stands around which the tape can run 
(as can be seen in the film Reel Experiments Solo and Collaborative Investigation 
[RE2]); the use of such objects will be discussed later. 
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driven by the tape deck. So long as this is sustained there will be audio output. 
However, should the performer fail to attend to the obligatory supervisory affordances 
then the transport mechanism fails, the rotation of the audiotape ceases, the audio output 
falls silent and there is no longer any resistance acting upon the performer who is left 
cohabiting a space with passive, non-functional objects.  
 
Of course, any movement against the audiotape affects the sonic output. The shifting 
sonorities of the sonic environment also provoke movement. The performer is, 
therefore, connected physically to a resistant material and inhabits the sonic 
environment. This places the performer in an environment rich with happening and 
goal-affordances. Whilst the performer may consciously attend to many affordances in 
the act of improvisation, often these intentions will result in unforeseen outcomes. 
Behaviour resonates through the environment and manifests multi-modal consequences; 
movement triggers sonic events and physical re-combinations of the space. Intentions 
are not met with the correlating intended outcome, creating a cognitive dissonance that 
demands an intuitive response.  
 
Amidst this milieu of shifting perceptual and actional fields the performer may be said 
to enact meaning in the environment through the intuitive cross-modal associations that 
they make. Acting intuitively through their embodied movement vocabulary, the 
performer becomes aware of the general multi-modal dynamic shifts that their 
behaviour instigates. Movement is no longer a simple shift of the body but instigates a 
resonance through the entirety of the environment to which they are connected. 
Embodied movement is thus interrogated, sometimes resulting in a known outcome yet 
often subject to unforeseen consequences. These shifts, across a spectrum of clarity and 
cognitive dissonance, expose the performer to contingent events that may reveal 
possibilities for action, new ways to contribute to the milieu. 
 
In some sense the Reel Experiments system is analogous to the operationally closed 
autopoietic system discussed in the preceding chapter. All elements are connected – 
sound, audiotape, and performer are entwined and working together to maintain the 
organisation - and yet the boundary of the system changes dimensions and contorts 
according to the way in which the performer behaves. These contortions are acceptable 
whilst the system’s organisational integrity remains intact otherwise the audiotape 
becomes entangled and the whole unity ceases to be. 
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There are strong resonances between the Reel Experiments system and 
theybreakinpieces’ site-sufficient strategy for performance. These strategies instantiate a 
liminoid site in which the relationship between the performer and the environment is 
intensified. Site-sufficiency instantiates antistructural, liminoid phenomena once the 
performers commit to specific form elements (for example, rules, scores, objectives) so 
that their behaviour is conditioned by the resistance – the happening-affordances – that 
emerge from the environment that they inhabit, the actions of the other individuals, and 
their disposition to discover new modes of behaviour. Likewise, the Reel Experiments 
system demonstrates antistructural, liminoid phenomena; however, it differs from site-
sufficiency because it is instantiated by implicating the performer in obligatory 
interactions so that they themselves become a constituent element of the environment 
(i.e. if they cease to behave, the system ceases to exist). In doing so the performer is 
exposed to a constant array of happening-affordances to which they must respond. Site-
sufficiency and the Reel Experiments system both instantiate sites that the individual 
may inhabit. These sites are rich with affordances, some of which act upon the 
individual by resisting or provoking behaviour. Consequently I argue that these sites 
manifest the antistructural phenomena that potentialise the reconfiguration of habitual 
behaviour. It is this theoretical premise upon which I invited the dancer and aerial 
specialist Mona McCarthy to further investigate the potential of the Reel Experiments 
system. 
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Figure 3.3 Collaborative experiments with the reel-to-reel tape recorder. 
 
The subsequent period of collaborative experimentation illuminated many new 
possibilities, both in terms of the additional affordances for kinetic and sonic interaction 
that were discovered, and the numerous ideas regarding the possible applications of the 
Reel Experiments system in performance (for example, kinetic sculptures, installations, 
and durational performances determined by the degradation of the audiotape or the 
sonic material over time) [RE2, 02m54s – 04m27s]. The film Reel Experiments: Solo 
and Collaborative Investigation [RE2, 01m00s - 05m19s] provides a succinct overview 
of this period of experimentation and so it is not necessary to dwell upon it here. 
However, I would like to foreground two significant and inter-related insights that 
emerged from these experiments.  
 
First, the Reel Experiments system provokes modes of collaborative interaction that are 
common within site-sufficient performance. The notion that behaviour affords 
behaviour is brought to the foreground as the audiotape connects the individuals 
physically to one-another in such a way as their actions may be felt through contact with 
the material [RE2, 02m16s – 02m55s]. An additional connection is also made through 
the audio output as actions are immediately transposed into sonic gestures. This is akin 
to the sound of the gravel on the Cinder Path that unified the performers through an 
audible rhythm that permeated the group’s acting-together [RE2, 04m27s – 04m54s].  
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Further, the boundaries and dimensions of the physical performance space can be 
dynamically altered, re-aligned and re-animated by using the audiotape to ‘draw’ lines 
in space. The effect of such spatial reconfigurations is very much akin to the form 
elements (i.e. score) deployed in site-sufficient work that instantiate a shifting 
environment, re-animating the space so that its properties shift dynamically. Adapting to 
these spatial reconfigurations is something of an impossible task and is consequently the 
catalyst for many collisions, both between individuals and the material boundaries of 
the audiotape [RE2, 01m01s - 01m44s]. These collisions create resistant forces upon the 
body and abrupt distortions and morphologies in the sonic output, all of which disrupt 
interactions and create moments of tension to be negotiated. It is these co-operative and 
co-determined negotiations of the system’s spatial and sonic configuration together with 
its dynamic re-animation that so closely align the Reel Experiments system with site-
sufficiency.  
 
Second, when multiple individuals collaboratively interact with the Reel Experiments 
system the obligation to maintain the transport of the audiotape is shared. Whilst one 
individual attends to the fail-ability of the system the other may move freely within the 
performance space [RE2, 04m58s – 05m19s]. This touches upon the notion of 
expressive latitude, a term introduced in the field of Human Computer Interaction by 
John Bowers and Sten-Olof Hellström134 that refers to gestures not directly sensed by an 
interface. In the book Performing Mixed Reality, Steve Benford and Gabriella 
Giannachi outline expressive latitude as follows: 
 
Having a region for making gestures that do not make input… enables 
performers to temporarily disengage from the interface in order to rest or 
reposition themselves before subsequent reengagement. It may also 
support the handing over of an interface from one person to another 
without causing unwanted input while not properly connected to 
either.135 
 
                                                
134 John Bowers and Sten-Olof Hellstrsöm, ‘Simple interfaces to complex sound in 
improvised music’. Proceedings of CHI 2000, Extended Abstracts (The Hague: ACM 
Press, 2000), 125-126. 
135 Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi, Performing Mixed Reality (London: The 
MIT Press, 2011), 157. 
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By introducing loop points (stands around which the audiotape can placed to sustain 
enough tension to maintain its transport) to the performance space one is able to reduce 
the fragility of the system (i.e. decreasing the probability of the fail-ability of the 
system) [RE2, 01m45s – 02m16s]. Subsequently, this increases the expressive latitude 
that the Reel Experiments system affords. Of course, the introduction of such loop 
points also introduces new affordances to the system, particularly, we found, with 
regard to those that afford control over sonic events because the loop points increase the 
number of areas of tension, making these areas particularly sensitive to movement 
[RE2, 04m28s – 04m51s]. The loop points also enable the tape to be momentarily 
maintained at different heights, an occurrence that allows for (and provokes) movement 
at different levels (e.g. floor work and vertical stretches). 
 
The management of expressive latitude became one of the central concerns of our 
experiments as we continued to explore the range of possibilities for performance that 
the system afforded. Whilst multiple loop-points afforded an increase in the range of 
expressive latitude there was still a significant amount of the movement vocabulary that 
was suspended because it could not be realised without disrupting the transport of the 
audiotape and subsequently causing a catastrophic failure of the system. Most notably, 
the system did not allow for adequate movement at the extremities of the vertical range 
- floor-work and reaches upward. Whilst the system exposed the performer to 
contingent events too much specialist knowledge was suspended in its present state. 
Therefore, whilst the Reel Experiments system was rich with affordances it was clearly 
an inadequate empowerment network with respect to extradisciplinary performance. 
One solution that we explored in order to improve the system was to create a frame 
upon which performers could attach pulleys and over which the audiotape could be 
placed so that its transport would continue unhindered. This frame was referred to as 
The Cube and allowed for a much greater range of movement to be performed(Figure 
3.4) [RE2, 05m19s – 07m02s].  
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Figure 3.4 Experiments with The Cube. 
 
The Cube presents an opportunity to re-balance the roles, resistances, and relational-
dynamics that had been present in the original Reel Experiments system – in short, to 
refine the empowerment network. The frame enables the performers to free themselves, 
to some extent, of the obligation to maintain the system by hooking the audiotape to a 
pulley so that it is self-sustaining. In this way each performer can move free of the tape 
or with a section of the tape yet know that it is adequately supported to maintain the 
integrity of the system. As such, The Cube facilitates a much greater degree of 
expressive latitude. The Cube also affords the full kinespheric range of movement to be 
exploited (one can execute movement at the extremes of the vertical and horizontal axis 
without the tape becoming entangled). The Cube, however, is still not an ideal system, 
the flimsy design (admittedly the original prototype was made of plumbing materials), 
in particular the temperamental hooks and pulleys, mean that the structure is liable to 
contort and destabilise. When this occurs the audiotape inevitably becomes entangled 
ending improvisations all too abruptly.  
 
Ultimately Mona and I did not feel that the time and cost involved in refining The Cube 
would be justified, however it had provided valuable insights regarding the elements 
that needed to be taken into consideration when designing a performance system for 
cross-disciplinary work. In these early practical experiments we saw for the first time 
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the way in which performance technologies, specifically those associated with my 
electronic music making practice, could be reconciled with site-sufficient performance. 
 
In summary, the Reel Experiments system and site-sufficiency both instantiate similar 
affordances, yet, where the latter is instantiated through the deployment of, and 
commitment to, form elements that re-animate a site, the former is mechanically 
determined. What is of most notable significance here is that the Reel Experiments 
system presents an opportunity to create many sites for exploration within a single 
space, indeed, within a single performance, whereas, as has been discussed previously, 
theybreakinpieces’ site-sufficient strategy is dependent upon finding new locations in 
which to perform. The technologically mediated site facilitates site-responsive practice 
in a portable and accessible format. Most significantly, the Reel Experiments system 
illustrates how performance technologies may be deployed to create a bespoke site in 
which affordances – both sonic and kinetic - may be authored according to the pre-
determined requirements of the artist. Ultimately one may state that the Reel 
Experiments system is an effective analogue of site-sufficient performance.  
 
These insights subsequently propelled my practical research in two interrelated 
directions. I shall now introduce the first of these trajectories, Terrain, a cross-
disciplinary performance outcome (of which there are multiple instances) in which the 
Reel Experiments system is deployed and developed in such a way as to instantiate 
suitable affordances and expressive latitude for an ensemble cast.  
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3.2 Terrain 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Terrain at The Cluny. Chemaine Cook (left), Nicholas Williams (Centre) 
and Wendy Erikson (Right). 
 
An opportunity had arisen to present an experimental performance at The Cluny, 
Newcastle. This was an opportunity to investigate the Reel Experiments system with a 
small ensemble cast of performers consisting in Chemaine Cook (a dance and theatre 
practitioner who also improvised dialogue), Wendy Erikson (a dancer), Mona and 
myself. A short extract of this performance can be seen in the film Terrain Performance 
Extracts [T1, 0m16s – 03m37s]. 
 
The original concept for the performance was to divide the venue’s large performance 
space into three sub-terrains (Figure 3.5). Each performer was assigned to one of these 
sub-terrains. The three neighbouring sub-terrains, viewed in their totality, defined the 
overall performance space. A score specified that the performers should first attempt to 
define their terrain through exploration of its boundaries (real or imagined) and then 
explore the ways in which they could cross those boundaries. The boundary crossings 
could be physical incursions into neighboring terrains or realised through interactions 
with other performers, for example, by mimicking the actions of a neighbor so that 
gestures or sonic events resonated throughout the performance space. 
 
In the first performance at The Cluny the three sub-terrains were assigned as follows: 
Chemaine inhabited the first, and shared this territory with a single microphone on a 
stand. As such, she could move freely and improvise text into the microphone. The 
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signal from the microphone was routed to a mixing desk located in the second territory 
[T1, 00m28s – 00m57s]. 
 
I occupied the second territory, crouched on the floor in the centre of the performance 
space. From this position I controlled all of the audio technologies including two reel-
to-reel tape decks and a mixing desk. The first tape deck was loaded with a reel of 
audiotape containing found-material (in this instance, a recording or popular music from 
the 1970’s and 1980’s). The audio from this tape deck was routed to the mixing desk. 
The second tape deck received audio from the mixing desk and was therefore used to 
sample the signal coming from either Chemaine's microphone or the first reel-to-reel 
tape deck (or both simultaneously). This configuration afforded many ways for 
manipulating the audio output: I could mix the audio output from the mixing desk 
(mixing between the output of the first tape deck and Chemaine’s microphone), or, I 
could play the second tape, improvising with the sampled audio in a manner similar to a 
turntablist (just I had done in my initial period of practical research) [T1, 01m35s – 
02m36s]. 
 
Mona and Wendy occupied the third territory. This territory neighbored the second, on 
the opposite side of the performance space to the first. The third territory was the largest 
of the three, allowing its inhabitants to move freely. It was decided that Mona and 
Wendy should pull the audiotape outward from the first reel-to-reel tape deck (situated 
in the second, central territory) in the manner of the Reel Experiments system. 
Therefore, Wendy and Mona were subject to all the relational dynamics, resistances, 
and affordances that the Reel Experiments system initiated. As such, they were required 
to collaborate so that the integrity of the system was maintained whilst simultaneously 
manipulating the audio on the tape and redefining the space by drawing new boundaries 
(just as Mona and I had done in our early experiments) [T1, 02m42s – 03m37s]. 
 
As intended, the first performance of Terrain saw the performers making connections 
across space in numerous ways. Wendy and Mona, following an initial period of play 
within their territory, began redefining the space using the audiotape as a physical 
barrier with which to herd the audience whilst creating lines that extended to the other 
territories. For example, they managed to draw the audiotape upwards from their own 
territory to Chemaine, situated on a raised platform, all the while affecting the pre-
recorded audio as they moved. Chemaine, located by the microphone throughout the 
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entire performance, called across the space, vocalizing text rich with provocations to re-
act in between gestures and repetitive movement cycles. Located in the centre of the 
milieu and crouched amongst the audio equipment, I fervently gathered and 
manipulated the incoming sonic material, occasionally silencing both channels coming 
from the outside territories, choosing to improvise with that which I had managed to 
capture on the second reel-to-reel tape deck and sometimes allowing the audio from 
outside to flow through untouched. In this way I was able to induce silence, or offer 
provocations across the territories with moments of improvised sound. 
 
Throughout the performance Mona and Wendy used the audiotape to redefine the 
boundary of the third territory in a manner such that the individual territories could no 
longer be distinguished. Chemaine remained in the first territory yet communicated 
across its boundary with her voice, feeding the audio output and calling to Mona and 
Wendy. I remained crouched in the centre of the space and busied myself with the 
sound output, sometimes allowing audio-signals to pass un-hindered to the speakers 
and, at other times, improvising with the second reel-to-reel tape deck. I would 
improvise either in response to a particular performer (e.g. accompanying Chemaine's 
movement and vocalisations) or simply to embellish the existing audio output. 
 
Whilst the subsequent performance was relatively successful, it was agreed that there 
was potential for improvement in a number of respects: first, it was felt by Mona and 
Wendy that the fragility of the reel experiments system was such that it demanded too 
much of the obligatory supervisory interaction. This was prohibitive of their 
collaboration together in terms of their ability to duet as movement practitioners. 
Second, the found sounds on the audiotape of the first reel-to-reel tape deck seemed at 
odds with the rest of the performance content. These sounds were alien to the 
performance environment that otherwise comprised original content. Third, Chemaine 
had felt that she had only been able to contribute to the performance in a superficial 
manner; once she had spoken she had little control over the manipulation of the sound 
of her voice before it was output through the PA, this created a sense of disconnection 
that needed to be addressed. 
 
Therefore, the task that we faced at this time was to reconsider the opportunities for 
action that Terrain afforded. The environment had been too prohibitive for the 
performers to improvise in a manner that was productive. That is to say that, rather than 
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being empowered as performers to find opportunities and explore new creative actions, 
the individuals found the environment to be overwhelmingly restrictive and, ultimately, 
disempowering. Terrain, as a strategy for performance, had to be refined as an 
empowerment network in terms of the affordances that it made available to the 
individual performers. 
 
If we were all to feel connected in a manner that our actions resonated through the rest 
of the group then it seemed logical to consider the performance space as one single 
territory (as opposed to three distinctly separate territories). The performers could then 
act together to sustain, redefine and manipulate this single territory. In this way we 
would improvise together with the intention of co-originating a dynamic and evolving 
environment. Mona and I had identified this potential during our early experiments with 
the Reel Experiments system. We had discovered that the audio output and the activity 
of both performers were inextricably connected and created a single, dynamic 
environment in which the performers had to negotiate their role. Therefore, we 
proceeded to experiment as a group of four, exploring the Reel Experiments system as a 
single environment once again. We held a number of workshops, the focus of which 
was to identify the affordances available to each performer and, more importantly, the 
affordances that were missing that might allow us to exercise a sufficient portion of our 
performance vocabularies so that we were each able to challenge one another whilst 
being challenged ourselves to reveal new possibilities for action. Consequently, we 
began to modify the system and introduce affordances that were otherwise unavailable. 
 
Some of these modifications were less dramatic than others. For example, Wendy and 
Mona's concern that the obligation to supervise the maintenance of the system was too 
restrictive was relatively easy to resolve. We introduced a stable loop-point (a speaker 
stand with a heavy base) to the performance space so that the performers could choose 
to loop the tape around it, thus adding extra stability to the system and allowing the 
performers to move more freely (although this did not remove the responsibility to 
maintain the integrity of the system altogether).  
 
Further, we all spent time improvising with the Reel Experiments system so that we 
became more attuned to the way in which we could shift our responsibilities between 
performing with and maintaining the system. In this way we developed a group-
sensitivity to each other's actions with respect to the stability of the system. I suggest 
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that our ability as a group to exchange roles can be attributed to our sensitisation to the 
behaviours and desires of one another, thus, any cue to either take up the role of 
maintainer or move into the role of performer was tacitly felt and never spoken or 
instructed. Likewise, our ability to orientate one another to each role was refined, 
becoming implicit in our gestures and behaviour. For example, one might sense that a 
dancer’s solo was 'winding down' and this present an opportunity to provoke an 
exchange of roles. Such sensitivity demands experience of what a performer 'winding 
down' looks like and this will, of course, be different for each performer. In contrast, 
such sensitivity also allowed for moments in which one performer could choose to 
disrupt a performer or force them to assume a role. 
 
A more dramatic modification to the system was the way in which the audio 
technologies were reconfigured. At this time I had presented the outcomes of my early 
experiments with the Reel Experiments system at a workshop in Newcastle University. 
Kirk Woolford had seen this presentation and, during a conversation afterwards in 
which I discussed the improvements to be made to Terrain, he had suggested I explore 
the possibility of using the audio output of the reel-to-reel tape deck as a control 
mechanism for audio software. I experimented with this idea and eventually authored an 
application in Max/MSP for use in Terrain.  
 
The application was a simple auto-sampler. The auto-sampler monitored an incoming 
audio signal (from Chemaine’s microphone). Subsequently the audio buffer would 
contain snippets of Chemaine’s voice in such a manner that there were no silences 
between fragments of her words. When the buffer was full it contained a stream of 
vocal fragments and rapidly spoken words. Playback of this content was controlled by a 
signal coming from an audiotape loaded onto the first reel-to-reel tape deck. This 
audiotape had a 2000Hz sine wave recorded onto it. When Mona and Wendy interacted 
with the audiotape it caused fluctuations in the pitch of the sine wave. The auto-sampler 
monitored these fluctuations and used them to specify the playback speed of the audio 
buffer’s content. 
 
The performers interacting with the audiotape could now control the playback of 
Chemaine’s text, bringing it to silence by preventing the motion of the audiotape across 
the playhead of the tape deck, or changing its pitch by slowing or speeding up the 
motion of the audiotape. This system also allowed Chemaine to constantly update or 
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overwrite content in the audio-buffer simply by speaking into the microphone at 
appropriate amplitude. 
 
This simple auto-sampler was significant in moving toward a single collaboratively 
authored terrain. There was no longer any need for found or prerecorded sounds as 
Chemaine had the facility to generate all of the source material for the performance 
herself. Further, the system overcame her feeling of disconnect as her vocal 
performance was now a integral part of the system. Likewise, by performing with the 
audiotape one felt as though one was performing with Chemaine rather than some 
arbitrary sonic material. 
 
This configuration of Terrain was presented twice, at Platform 00000008 (Star and 
Shadow Cinema, Newcastle, (12th December 2008)) [T1, 03m38s – 06m04s] and Public 
Announcement 2009 at Dance City, Newcastle (30th January 2009) [T1, 06m05s – 
08m41s]. Once again these performances revealed numerous ways in which we could 
improve the system. Most notably these performances allowed us to refine the function 
of the auto-sampling software. For example, at the start of the performance at Dance 
City, the audio buffer was empty and Chemaine was required to speak at relatively a 
high volume in order to fill it up. This was contrary to how she actually began the 
performances; whispering and only occasionally reaching the correct amplitude to 
trigger the auto-sampler’s record function. Therefore, when she stopped improvising 
text a few minutes into the performance, she had expected to hear her voice being 
manipulated by Mona and Wendy, however, the buffer was empty and so there was 
only silence. Then followed an act of overcompensation as she yelled and droned into 
the microphone, filling the audio-buffer in one or two breaths with mono-dynamic 
content that was then reproduced numerous times as Mona and Wendy improvised with 
the audiotape. 
 
Again, these observations subsequently led to small but not insignificant modifications 
to the system. I worked closely with Chemaine to calibrate the auto-sampler in such a 
way that she could be assured that it was recording her at all times. This was achieved 
by creating a mechanism in the software that would dynamically measure the amplitude 
of her voice and adjust the recording threshold to just-below-her-present-volume. In this 
way the auto-sampler auto-calibrated according to the dynamics of Chemaine’s voice. 
This minor mechanism meant that the auto-sampler would record fragments of her 
  89 
voice regardless of how loudly or quietly she spoke. I also created a large presentation 
window in the auto-sampler that displayed the content of the audio buffer in real-time. 
This afforded visual feedback for Chemaine so that she could see the waveform of her 
voice as it was recorded (Figure 3.6). This simple feedback mechanism gave her a much 
greater understanding of the way in which the software worked and her relationship to 
it. The overall improvements to the auto-sampler meant that Chemaine fully grasped the 
system and could interact with it with great control. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6 Large presentation window in the auto-sampler application. 
 
One might argue that this is a good example of the way in which minor modifications to 
the environment can have a very empowering effect. The visual feedback provided by 
the audio buffer display is an example in which external scaffolding functions to 
improve Chemaine’s capacity to interact with the software. In doing so this minor 
change also empowers her as an agent by reducing the amount of attention that she must 
give to the state of the system. This frees Chemaine to attend to her actions with respect 
to the group rather than worrying about the auto-sampler. 
 
In addition to the modifications to the auto-sampler I replaced the second reel-to-reel 
tape deck with the music improvisation software that I had developed during the initial 
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period of practical research. This allowed me to utilise more of my performance 
vocabulary as a musician to embellish the soundscape.  
 
The final modification to Terrain was to amend the score. The lighting arrangement at 
Dance City had foregrounded a physical separation between the performers that was 
counter to our intention of co-authoring a single terrain. As such, we decided that each 
member of the cast should be free to interact with the Reel Experiments system, 
improvise text at the microphone and use the performance software at will. Each 
member of the ensemble had experience in improvised movement, music and text so it 
was a decision that enabled each performer to utilise a much broader range of their 
performance vocabulary.  
 
This final configuration of Terrain was never presented in public. However, it was a 
successful experiment that achieved the co-authored terrain that we had been striving 
for. The piece was rich with affordances for each performer and the Reel Experiments 
system bound all of our interactions in such a way that the ensemble was implicated in a 
constant negotiation with one another. The sonic environment, now more complex, 
offered many more provocations for reaction. As the definitive version of the piece, this 
configuration of Terrain is presented as a primary output in the film Terrain Final 
Configuration [T2].  
 
To summarise my practical research so far, the Reel Experiments system was a fruitful 
first step toward reconciling extradisciplinary performance with my electronic music 
practice. The reel-to-reel tape deck provided a rich milieu of affordances both for the 
dancer and the musician. Additionally, the audiotape could be deployed in such a way 
as to instantiate a self-contained, synthetic environment. The audiotape was both fragile 
and resistant. The fragility obliged the performers to work collaboratively and negotiate 
their roles within the system. Subsequently, the performers acted as one unit, 
performing together yet always ensuring the integrity of the system was maintained. 
The resistance generated by the audiotape as it rotated around the space created a 
physical force against the body, a happening-affordance that provoked and interrupted 
movement. Additionally, the performers would pull lengths of audiotape against one 
another, constraining movement and restricting limbs. The space would contort, its 
dimensions expanding and contracting with lines of audiotape marking these new 
boundaries. The effect resonated with my experiences of site-sufficient performance in 
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which a score could re-animate the surfaces of a site. Such dynamic reconfigurations of 
form pose a challenge to the individual, affordances rapidly appear and disappear, one 
must either speedily adjust to these new opportunities or commit to an action and 
prepare for collision. These disruptions create moments of crisis in which the habitual 
behaviour of the dancer enters a moment charged with potential, a moment in which the 
next fall of a foot or shift in weight may reveal a new encounter.  
 
All the time the performer’s actions are affecting sound. And, all the time the 
performers are responding to sound. Manipulations of pitch, silence, and timbre grow in 
association with movement. A cross-modal mapping occurs, a tacit knowledge of the 
way in which to control sound through my movement. No explanation is required, only 
movement with the tape, and a vocabulary emerges with which to manipulate the 
audible environment, bringing it to the body so that it is felt to move with the limbs. 
 
The environment that we created using the Reel Experiments system is rich with 
potential. It reveals a multi-modal array of affordances sufficient for numerous 
individuals to explore the environment on their own terms. A provisional knowledge 
emerges amongst the group - knowledge of the system, its state, and the affect that one 
can have at any given moment. However, we had reached the limits of the Reel 
Experiments system. We had begun to master it, it was becoming predictable, 
affordances were becoming familiar and we were discovering our way of working 
within it. The challenge was dissipating as the antistructural succumbed to structuration 
once again. Just as theybreakinpieces moved from site to site in order to exploit 
unfamiliar happening-affordances so too were we ready for a new environment. 
However, this mechanical environment had offered valuable insights into the way in 
which technology might create a synthetic environment that empowered individuals as 
extradisciplinary performers. I began to consider the way in which these relationships 
might be instantiated in a system that continually reconfigured to present a shifting 
environment, one that could be revisited time and time again yet always presents a new 
array of affordances. 
 
3.3 SynSite 
 
Having realised Reel Experiments and Terrain, Mona and I were keen to pursue the 
notion of a synthesised environment in which all elements were connected and co-
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dependent. Reel Experiments, The Cube and Terrain had shown that there was potential 
to create such an environment yet each system was limited in its affordances. The Cube 
had foregrounded the possibility to create an environment that facilitated full range of 
kinespheric movement and had the capacity to be reconfigured in real-time. The Cube, 
however, would take a significant investment of time and money to produce a useable 
model. It seemed to be the logical next step to investigate the possibility of creating a 
synthesised environment in the digital domain that may afford reconfiguration ad 
infinitum. If such a synthesis was possible then performance technology could be said to 
provide an entirely unique opportunity with regard to site-sufficient performance.  
 
Given that I would clearly need to acquire new skills to complete this task, Mona and I 
decided to produce the project on a smaller scale. We would work together, I would 
assume the role of engineer and she would perform. We would work closely on the 
development of the piece, exchanging observations and critically reflecting on our 
progress. It was clear that, in the first instance, we would have to use motion capture 
technology to realise any kind of digitally synthesised environment. I shall present the 
development of SynSite in three phases.  
 
3.3.1  Phase 1: Motion Tracking and the Trigger-Regions Experiment 
Mona and I had first to decide which technology we would use to track her motion. We 
had two resources at our disposal, the Vicon Motion Tracking System installed in 
Newcastle University's Culture Lab, and Isadora, an object oriented programming 
environment designed specifically for the manipulation of A/V media and motion 
capture in performance. 
 
The Vicon system is traditionally used to record capture data that will then be played 
back, manipulated, or analyzed. However, I was fortunate to have participated in the 
Creator motion capture workshop at Cambridge University during which time a small 
group of computer scientists had created a library for Max/MSP that allowed the Vicon 
capture data to be accessed in real-time. This created the possibility that the system 
could be used in live performance. 
 
The Vicon system captures motion data at an extremely high resolution. The space 
within which the system will 'see' markers is specified according to the position of eight 
individual infrared cameras that designate the capture environment. Each stream of data 
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gives the coordinates of individual reflective markers in three-dimensional space. The 
reflective markers are attached to the subject that is to be monitored. The Vicon system 
has the capacity to simultaneously monitor a large number of the reflective markers and 
so an individual's joints, hands, and even individual fingers can be monitored with great 
accuracy creating a high-resolution 3D representation of the body in motion. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Blob tracking in Isadora. 
 
Isadora, on the other hand, requires a digital video camera to send a live feed to the 
application. Once the footage is being received one can adjust its properties, for 
example, by adjusting contrast, brightness and saturation, flipping, and inverting the 
image so that the subject to be tracked stands out against the background. Once the 
image has been optimised for tracking the signal is routed to the Eyes++ object. Eyes++ 
identifies a prescribed number of objects in the image. Upon identifying the object 
Eyes++ creates a rectangular wire frame or blob around it (this method of tracking is 
commonly called blob tracking (Figure 3.6)). The blob demarcates the extreme edges of 
the detected object and dynamically adjusts as the object moves, keeping the object 
bounded. Once the blob is instantiated Eyes++ generates numerous streams of capture 
data representing the relative position of its sides, centre, and the weighting of the 
object within the blob (i.e. where there is more of the object according to the 
distribution of white and black areas within the bounds of the blob). Because Isadora 
uses a digital video camera it has the capacity to create only two-dimensional motion 
data. 
 
Both of these systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The high resolution of 
the Vicon system was attractive, producing exceptionally accurate data of small 
portions of the body. Isadora, on the other hand, created motion data for a blob, an 
approximation of the subject, making detailed tracking of finger movements and such 
subtleties (initially) difficult. However, whilst the incredible accuracy of the Vicon 
system was appealing there were numerous significant reasons not to use it: first, the 
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technology was conspicuous, the motion tracking cameras and the computer work 
station were necessarily prominent and the performer, whose motion is being tracked, 
has to wear numerous reflective markers all over their body. These markers are 
restrictive because they demand an adjustmentent of the fundamental movements of the 
body. The markers also look rather ridiculous (admittedly the Vicon system is designed 
for recording motion tracking information and so it is not normally deployed in live 
performance, therefore the markers normally do not need to be hidden from view). 
Second, the motion tracking system is not at all portable. Any performance we created 
with the Vicon system at Culture Lab would have to be presented at Culture Lab or an 
institution with the same technology in a similar, if not identical configuration. This was 
highly restrictive as it was our intention to create a piece for public and academic 
presentation. Third, the system was unstable and frequently needed recalibration 
including the cameras that needed to be regularly re-aligned (the Vicon system was in 
use regularly in various configurations by other people). Finally, the Vicon system is 
extremely expensive and so there would be little chance of being able to continue our 
work with it beyond the duration of my PhD.  
 
The Isadora tracking system had a lower resolution and could not track depth (it was 
two dimensional). However, the system was portable (as the only technology required 
was a laptop and a digital camera) and reliable (compared with the rampant 
idiosyncrasies of the Vicon system). Whilst Isadora didn't produce nearly as much 
usable data as the Vicon system it still created a significant amount of which we had 
only explored a small fraction. Finally, the Isadora system was reasonably affordable (a 
few hundred pounds compared with the multiple-thousand pound Vicon system). 
 
Ultimately, the portability and affordability of the Isadora system was chosen for the 
project as this provided the best opportunity to continue our work over a longer-term 
period and to reach a broader audience. Later on we shall see how the lower resolution 
was, to a large extent, overcome by discoveries we made regarding the mapping of 
movement into data. 
 
Trigger-Regions 
 
In the first instance we set up a camera facing stage front. The camera relayed a live 
feed showing the entire breadth of the stage. The image was routed to Isadora, 
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optimised for capture, and a blob was created. The motion tracking data generated by 
the blob was converted to MIDI note on/off messages. These messages were sent via 
MIDI to an Elektron Machinedrum, a powerful hardware drum synthesiser. The breadth 
of the image from the camera was divided into sixteen regions and each corresponded 
with a single sound on the Machinedrum. Whenever the blob's centre point (i.e. Mona's 
centre point) crossed into a new region the corresponding sound was triggered. This 
early experiment can be seen in the film SynSite Trigger-Regions Experiment [SS1]. 
 
We had created a very simple, two-dimensional interactive environment. The sounds 
were essentially fixed in space and Mona could interact with them in only one way, by 
moving to or through their location so that they would be triggered. The environment 
within which the performer moved was fixed, as if it were a static, objective external 
world. The objects that inhabited the environment (the sixteen individual sound events) 
could not be moved or manipulated by Mona, they could only be 'discovered' and re-
visited. We hadn't created an environment so much as a passive instrument that the 
performer could play. 
 
As such, this early trigger-region system afforded instrumental interactions only. The 
system also afforded a high degree of expressive latitude because, once Mona had 
entered a region and triggered a sound, she could move freely without having any affect 
on the system until she entered a neighboring region. This was the expected outcome 
from our initial experiment, the primary purpose of which was simply to get a feel for 
the reliability and limitations of Isadora as a motion tracking system. This early 
experiment did, however, provide a useful point of departure for further developments.  
 
The first point of note was that the expressive latitude afforded by the system was far 
too great. The performer was in complete control of the system that offered little in the 
way of happening-affordances and thus lacked any kind of contingency. As such, the 
system was easy to master and offered no interrogation of the performer’s habitual 
patterns of behaviour. 
 
Second, it was clear that we wanted the performer's movement to be monitored in 
greater detail. That is to say that, too much of the performer’s movement had no effect 
on the system. The system was not capable of monitoring depth and so the performer’s 
spatial dynamics (the paths along which she traversed the stage; back and forth, side to 
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side, and vertically) were only partially recognised. If we were to create any meaningful 
sense that the performer inhabited an environment then she had to feel much more 
intricately coupled to it.  
 
Third, the sounds from the Machinedrum were predictable and static, lacking any 
notable spectral, timbral, spatial, or rhythmic morphogenesis. As such, the sonic 
environment offered minimal provocations to interact with or respond to and was of 
little interest either to the observer or the performer. Clearly this would have limited use 
in performance. 
 
In order to develop a new system that addressed these points of interest we devised a 
working strategy that would become the staple method for the rest of our research and 
development process. In the final moments of our session with this early system we 
recorded a number of short films, each of Mona improvising with a different movement 
vocabulary and specified in terms of dynamics rather than specific gestures, such as, for 
example, 'subtle bobbing', 'fast sharp transitions', 'slow gliding'.  The emphasis here was 
not on recording a specific gestural vocabulary or choreographed sequence; rather it 
was our intention to accommodate those general movement dynamics that Mona often 
realised in improvisation. This enabled me to work with Mona's movement vocabulary 
in her absence whilst building new software systems and experimenting with 
relationships between the motion data and the sonic environment. 
 
3.3.2  Phase 2: Procedural Audio, Spatialisation and the Locator 
It was clear that in order for the performer to inhabit the environment we would have to 
rethink both the way in which sonic events were instantiated and their subsequent 
behaviour. We needed to find an alternative to the trigger-regions method that we had 
already explored. Trigger-regions created a static environment but we were interested in 
creating a space that demonstrated the same malleability that the audiotape had afforded 
in both the Reel Experiments system and The Cube, a space the dimensions of which 
could be manipulated by the performer. This catalyzed a fundamental change to the way 
in which I conceptualised the relationship between the performer and the sonic events. I 
began considering the way in which sonic events could be bound not to locations in 
space but instead to the performer’s body.  
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To achieve this new relationship would require a powerful and flexible method of 
sonification. A sample-based system would be too rigid. The only way samples could 
be sufficiently malleable would be to create an enormous array containing multiple 
variants of each sound and then create a gestural recognition system that would provide 
sufficient analysis of movement so that samples could be selected according to 
particular gestures. This would not be possible given the low-resolution blob tracking 
method of Isadora that had already shown itself to be limited with regard to monitoring 
the intricacies of a single gesture. Given the limited data that Isadora generated it 
seemed a more suitable solution could be found by using procedural audio.  
 
Procedural audio is a technique deployed commonly in the development of computer 
games. By deploying a simple and efficient synthesis engine, games developers are able 
to create sound effects and musical scores that reflect the player’s progress and actions 
in the game. For example, when a player shoots a gun in a tunnel the parameters of the 
synthesis engine apply the correct filter settings so that the gunshot reverberates as if in 
a tunnel. If the player should then leave the tunnel and fire the gun in an open field the 
filter parameters adjust accordingly to provide the correct reverberation once again. 
This method allows for the intricacies of a player’s posture and location relative to 
objects to be reflected in the sound (for example, a gunshot close to a wall will sound 
different to a gunshot a few steps back). This is an extremely elegant and 
computationally efficient method for sonification as all of the sounds required in a game 
can be created using only a small array of synthesisers as long as their parameters are 
sufficiently versatile. This is by far preferable to a sample-based method in which 
hundreds of individual samples of gunshots, footsteps, breath, etc., are stored in 
memory and recalled according to in-game events. It seemed that procedural audio was 
a proven method for creating powerful and versatile audio engines that could be 
deployed in interactive environments and so I explored this possibility. 
 
It was also clear at this time that in order to give the dancer a sense that she was 
interacting with the sonic environment the sonic events should move in relation to her. 
Such a relationship would require use of spatialisation techniques. Therefore, my 
experiments at this time focused on two areas (1) creating a procedurally controlled 
synthesis engine to produce sounds that could reflect inferences drawn from the 
dancer’s movement and (2) the effects of spatialisation relative to the dancer’s location. 
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I used Supercollider to conduct my first experiments. Supercollider is a powerful 
application that is capable of instantiating hundreds of user-defined synthesisers to 
create complex tapestries of sound. Never having used the programme before, I found it 
to be very accessible and relatively easy to grasp. Whilst researching psychoacoustics 
and theories of spatialisation (during which time I had to re-acquaint myself with 
trigonometry by doing exercises on the BBC's GCSE mathematics website!) I created a 
number of patches in Supercollider that would pan sound with varying degrees of 
Doppler and filtering effects. Whilst these experiments were fruitful (indeed, 
trigonometric functions and Doppler would feature in future versions of the systems) I 
found granular synthesis in Pure Data to be more productive. 
 
In short, granular synthesis is a method in which small fragments of a pre-loaded audio 
sample are played back in rapid succession to create streams or clouds of sound that can 
vary drastically in density and texture. In addition to the different source samples one 
may use other powerful variables including grain duration (usually ranging from 10 to 
100ms), density, playback speed (each individual grain can be reproduced at different 
speeds), panning (each grain can have its own trajectory in the stereo field), and grain 
source (each grain may originate from any point in the source sample).  By combining 
multiple streams or clouds a single sample can produce an almost infinite timbral and 
textural palette.  
 
Following a period of experimentation, I authored a grain-cloud generator in Pure Data. 
This application created two grain-clouds from a variety of source samples and could 
therefore produce an enormous range of sonic events. The application had numerous 
variable parameters that were randomly specified once an event had been triggered. The 
grain-cloud generator was created in such a way that the two clouds would originate 
with great density from the same location in the stereo field and then move in opposite 
directions as their respective densities decreased with the individual duration of grains 
increasing to give the effect of a dense granular ball that splits and softens into a 
slippery texture before finally fading away. Happy that this application afforded great 
potential I turned my attention to the way in which the dancer might interact with it. 
 
How best to draw upon the dancer’s behaviour? The trigger-regions had only limited 
use and so it was necessary to find a new way of initiating sonic events. Isadora 
provided speed data for the subject being tracked and with minimal manipulation this 
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could be used to indicate whether the dancer was still or moving. I created a mechanism 
in the granular synthesis application that monitored both the dancer's location in space 
(on a horizontal axis) and speed. This allowed the dancer’s location to be identified and 
her level of activity registered as either on (moving, a speed greater than 0) or off 
(stillness, a speed of 0). This mechanism determined that when the dancer moved, a 
granular event would be initiated at the equivalent position in the stereo field. The way 
in which the randomisation of parameters was programmed meant that this grain-cloud 
would split into two streams and move away from the dancer before disappearing. 
Whenever the dancer moved, a new granular event was created. Each granular event 
was distinct due to the randomisation of parameters that occurred at its initiation. This 
experiment can be seen in the film SynSite Grain-Clouds Experiment [SS2]. 
 
In practice this granular system was relatively successful. It was clear to the observer 
that sounds emerged from the dancer’s action and, further, that the relation between the 
dancer’s location on the stage and the granular clouds could be clearly understood. 
Additionally, the trajectory of the grain-clouds afforded the dancer opportunities for 
more complex interactions; she could choose to follow the path of one of the clouds, to 
move in opposition to it, or to remain still. Further, the duration of the grain-clouds 
exceeded that of each movement and so the dancer could instantiate a temporary audio 
environment that she could either allow to develop and reach its silent conclusion or 
reinvigorate by moving once again to create additional clouds. 
 
Thus we had achieved something of a paradigm shift. We had replaced a static external 
environment with a dynamic and somewhat unpredictable milieu that originated from 
the dancer’s movement. Once instantiated this environment offered further 
opportunities for interaction. We had thus edged a little closer to our goal of an 
interactive environment that was co-determined by and bound to the activity of the 
dancer. 
 
During our initial experiments with the granular system it was clear that as the sonic 
environment became increasingly dense it also became more difficult to decipher the 
relationship between the sound and the dancer. We decided to create an additional 
sound that would remain tightly bound to the dancer’s location at all times. This locator 
sound would move with the dancer and allow both her and the observer to correlate the 
movement with at least one element in the soundscape. 
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In the first instance the locator was created using an additional FM synthesis engine 
within the grain-cloud patch. This synthesis engine monitored both Mona's position 
(along the horizontal axis) and her activity (using the speed data, as above). When 
Mona stood still on the stage the locator sound would 'find' her location and create a 
regular pulse on the spot where she stood. When she moved (instantiating a granular 
event) the locator would become agitated and shift around her position, pulsing with 
irregularity until she was still when, again, it would find her and settle on the spot. In 
this way the locator came to the fore during moments of stillness and receded to the 
background when sound events were triggered, making way for the grain-clouds. This 
locator experiment can be seen in the film SynSite Grain-Clouds Experiment [SS2]. 
 
This simple device produced great clarity for both the observer and the performer. The 
locator created a sonic anchor that specified the relationship between performer and 
sensing-system from which the relationship of the other, more chaotic, granular 
elements could be deciphered. For the first time we began to consider the different 
functions that elements of the performance would need to have so that it presented a 
suitable challenge for the performer and yet was cohesive to the observer. 
 
Challenging The Performer 
 
The granular system had revealed the potential to create a complex soundscape that 
originates from the movement of the dancer. Additionally, the introduction of the 
locator provided the dancer with feedback as to the state of the system at any given time 
and also functioned to clarify the relationship between the performer and the system for 
the observer. However, the relationship between the system and the performer was 
singular – the dancer triggered a sonic event each time she moved - and this did not yet 
generate the resistance that had proven productive in site-work and the Reel 
Experiments system. Site-sufficiency exposed the performer to contingent events - 
happening-affordances - by re-animating the environment so that the body was situated 
in unfamiliar territory. The fragility of the Reel Experiments system obliged the 
performer to attend to the audiotape that, in turn, provoked movement through its 
physical resistance against the body. Likewise, The Cube generated physical resistance 
but allowed for a greater degree of expressive latitude by affording the performers the 
opportunity to suspend their attention to the fragility of the system momentarily. We 
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would draw upon these experiences and consider the ways in which we might author 
resistance into a system using the audio technologies. Therefore there were two possible 
areas in which we could introduce resistance (1) in the mapping between movement and 
sound events and (2) in the morphologies and content of the sound events themselves. 
 
1) Mapping resistance: Physical Modelling 
 
The first step was to consider the way in which more complex data might be generated 
from movement. It seemed that an additional layer of mapping might occur between the 
initial tracking data that represented the properties of the blob (speed, size, etc.) and its 
control over the synthesis engine. This re-mapping would be used to produce a more 
complex array of data that could subsequently be mapped onto a more complex 
synthesis engine. This additional layer would subsequently imbue the system with a 
behaviour that would exceed the dancer’s control. Following experiments with 
behavioural algorithms that mimicked the flocking and swarming of birds (using the 
Boids object library for Max/MSP)136 I found the most elegant solution in physical 
modeling systems. 
 
Physical modeling seemed to offer a variety of elegant solutions for adding additional 
layers of behaviour through the remapping of data. Using the Mass Spring Damper 
(MSD) object library for Max/MSP137 we experimented with numerous different 
physical models that the dancer could interact with. For example, we created a virtual 
mesh that covered the entire capture area like a net. The net consisted in several parallel 
rows each containing numerous springs that connected one mass to the next. The weight 
of each mass, elasticity of the springs and dampening effect could all be adjusted to give 
an extremely variable virtual mesh with which to interact. The motion data was mapped 
to the virtual mesh so that the dancer could move through it, causing each mass to move 
depending on how fast the dancer was travelling. In this way disturbances would ripple 
through the mesh. It seemed that we could create nests of sound so that when a mass 
was agitated sound would spring forth from its respective location in the stereo field. 
This experiment can be seen in the film SynSite Mesh Demonstration [SS3]. 
                                                
136 The Boids object library was created by Eric Singer, Jach, André Sier and Wesley 
Smith. The library can be downloaded from http://www.s373.net/code/ 
137 The MSD object library by Nicoas Montegermont can be downloaded from 
http://grrrr.org/ext/beta/macos/max/ 
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The mesh instantiated momentum in a manner that gave a sense that the dancer’s 
movements would create a rippling effect through the whole environment. This was 
much more akin to the effect we had been seeking, but was still a relatively stable 
environment that could be mastered easily by the dancer. However, we found that by 
reducing the virtual mesh down to just two individual masses with a single spring 
between them we created a swing-ball type effect. By locking one mass to the dancer's 
position in space (the equivalent of the centre of the blob in Isadora) we found that the 
second mass would swing and orbit this position depending on how taut the virtual 
spring was and the strength of its dampening effect. This allowed the dancer to work 
closely with a single sound source that always moved in relation to her, although this 
would not always behave in predictable ways (for example, sometimes the mass would 
be too heavy to move and sometimes it would move well in excess of the dancer's 
trajectory). This experiment can be seen in the film SynSite Swing-Ball Demonstration 
[SS4]. 
 
2) Sonic Morphologies 
 
Granular synthesis had been a fruitful method for sonification but further experiments 
with Frequency Modulation (FM) synthesis proved to be more computationally efficient 
and allowed for powerful sonic manipulation with only few parameters. Having worked 
with granular synthesis many times in the past I was keen to explore the sonic 
possibilities of this alternative method. 
 
I built a relatively simple FM synthesis engine (based upon a model in the book 
Designing Sound by Andy Farnell138). I had crafted a number of presets for this engine 
that produced textures and rhythms that I thought might be either evocative or 
provocative of movement. However, it was an incidental moment when I was playfully 
scrolling between presets to test the stability of the engine that I discovered the unusual 
and wonderfully rich sonic events that occurred between presets as the automated 
parameters shifted from one setting to another. These contortions gave a sense of 
transformation that was consistent with an organic environment, one that had its own 
life and behaviour, in a sense, its own singularity. 
                                                
138 Andy Farnell, Designing Sound (London: Applied Scientific Press, 2008), 276. 
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A second development at this time concerned the locator sound. Previously the locator 
was generated by an FM synthesiser and had created a regular rhythm (beeping) when 
the dancer was still. This dissipated when the dancer moved and turned into a texture 
that receded into the background when the dancer moved again. However, the primary 
function of the locator was to anchor in the space and reinforce the relationship between 
the performer and the environment (e.g. some kind of indication that this was not 
arbitrary movement in an arbitrary sonic environment). Therefore, I re-created the 
locator engine using white noise as a source material. This white noise was filtered 
according to the dancer’s movement so that it created a wind effect. At a very low 
amplitude this new locator augmented the movement and showed a close relation 
between the dancer and the audio environment. This version of the locator engine can 
be seen in the film SynSite Locator Sound Demonstration [SS5]. 
 
Movement Affordances: Eyes++ From Above 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Motion tracking the dancer from above. 
 
The next significant development that we made was with regard to the affordances for 
movement that the system generated. All our experiments up to this time had used a 
camera facing stage front. This meant that the dancer’s movements toward stage front 
or back were not tracked. Instead the camera tracked movements along the horizontal 
(stage left/right) and vertical (jumping, crouching, etc.) axis. It occurred to us at this 
time that if we suspended the camera above centre stage facing downward then we 
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could achieve a number of things. First of all, it would allow us to create an installation 
style environment where the audience could view the piece from anywhere around the 
perimeter of the performance space. This resonated with our conceptualisation of the 
system as a self-contained environment that the audience would observe from the 
outside. It also concealed the tracking equipment in the rafters so that the audience 
would have to decipher the relations based upon what they saw and not what equipment 
they could see. Second, the tracking system could now monitor the dancer's trajectories 
across the whole of the performance space (Figure 3.7). This increased the sensitivity of 
the system by reducing the amount of movement that could not be detected. Third, this 
configuration would allow us to use a quadrophonic speaker setup so that the audience 
and performance space could be fully engulfed by the sound. Also the quadrophonic 
speaker arrangement would lend itself particularly well to the three dimensional 
movement of the MSD physical modeling system so that sound could now pan and 
traverse the space with the same freedom as the dancer. 
 
Gesture vs Dynamics: Motion Tracking the Dancer’s Experience 
By placing the digital video camera above the stage we had gained tracking data for the 
dancer’s trajectories across the space yet, in doing so, we had sacrificed the tracking of 
height so that jumps, stretches, crouches, and moments when Mona executed floor-work 
were no longer reflected in the tracking data. However, following further experiments 
with the tracking data we discovered that by monitoring fluctuations in the blob’s total 
area the system could identify with much greater accuracy small gestures and micro-
movements. Whilst the system was incapable of creating detailed models of exact limb 
positions it could now indicate activity no matter how small the movement, in this way 
the movement of individual fingers, hands and feet, turns of the head, even breath 
would indicate activity and be tracked by the system.  
 
This development revealed a new approach for tracking motion. Rather than attempting 
to capture the detail of individual gestures we would monitor the overall dynamics of 
movement with great precision. This approach not only overcame the limitations of the 
Isadora blob tracking system but allowed us to address another of our observations: 
Mona’s experience of moving was consistently different to the system’s observations of 
her movement. For example, Mona's experience of being still was different to the 
absolute stillness detected by the system; following a period of intense movement, 
Mona would pause, the system would indicate that she had reached stillness yet Mona 
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would report that she felt still only after a few seconds. Therefore, the absolute stillness 
reported by the system did not correlate to the relative experience of stillness reported 
by Mona’s. This unforeseen sense of movement as an internal force or momentum may 
be attributed to what Erin Manning has called, preacceleration: 
 
Preacceleration refers to the virtual force of movement’s taking form. It 
is the feeling of movement’s in-gathering, a welling that propels the 
directionality of how movement moves. In dance, this is felt as the 
virtual momentum of a movement’s taking form before we actually 
move. Important: the pulsion toward directionality activates the force of 
movement in its incipiency. It does not necessarily foretell where a 
movement will go.139 
 
Mona's sense of stillness would vary depending on conditions such as how tired she was 
or what time of day she was improvising. I therefore created a calibration mechanism 
that generated a buzzing sound whenever it detected stillness. This mechanism had a 
variable threshold so that its tolerance of small movements could be increased or 
decreased. The calibration process would therefore be a trial and error process in which 
Mona would improvise and a buzzer would sound each time the system sensed that she 
was still. Often Mona would feel that she was still after the buzzer sounded so I would 
increase the threshold of the system’s stillness indicator. In this way we could home in 
on Mona's relative sense of stillness, eventually arriving at an appropriate threshold 
suitable for the subsequent performance. 
 
At this stage of development the system still only reported a binary level of activity 
(stillness/motion) and the position of Mona in space. The next task was to manipulate 
the data in such a way that it reported the dynamics of movement. That is to say that we 
wanted the data to reflect the general dynamic curve of the improvised performance. 
Just as the sensation of stillness is highly subjective so too are the overall dynamics of 
improvised movement. For example, if the dancer engages in a period of rapid 
movement then even a slight decrease in tempo feels like a dramatic slowing even 
though she may still be moving rapidly in absolute terms. I needed to build a 
mechanism that sensed the overall dynamic of each improvisation and reported the 
details of activity relative to this global dynamic. The solution to this problem was to 
                                                
139 Erin Manning, Relationscapes (London: The MIT Press, 2009), 6. 
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give the system a pulse, a mechanism that allowed the dancer to energise or de-energise 
its overall dynamics. In short, I created a heart for the system and this marked the third 
and final phase of development. 
 
3.3.3  Phase 3: The Heart 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Screenshot of the Max/MSP patch created for SynSite. The bar on the right 
hand side shows the state of the system’s ‘heart’. 
 
The heart had global control over numerous system parameters including the physical 
modelling system (e.g. the elasticity of the springs, the weight of the mass, and the 
dampening effect on the springs), the FM synthesis engine (rate of preset scroll, rate of 
rhythmic mechanisms internal to specific presets and the duration of sonic events), and 
control over the parameters of a high pass filter and reverberation unit that the signal 
from the FM synthesis engine was passed through. 
 
By employing the mathematic formula for standard deviation I was able not only to 
record the average speed of the fluctuations in Mona’s movement but also to indicate 
the degree of variation between fast and slow transitions. This stream of data 
accumulated in real time so that the heart acted like a fuel tank, filling with activity and 
emptying with relative inactivity (Figure 3.8). The overall pulse of the system was 
determined by how full the heart was at any given moment. This created an accurate 
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correlation between Mona’s experience of movement, particularly in terms of periods of 
intensity, and the system’s heart rate. 
 
A particularly powerful property of the heart was its resistance: Mona had to sustain or 
increase her dynamics in order to sustain or increase the heart rate. Therefore, whilst she 
could control the heart rate she had to work hard to maintain this control. This resistant 
function of the heart can be seen in the film SynSite Heart Demonstration [SS6].For 
example, at the start of the performance the heart rate was 0, the system was not yet 
energised. Therefore the physical model responded stiffly to movement data, mirroring 
Mona's movement step for step. In this state the FM synthesiser produced abrupt 
textures that existed for the duration of a movement phrase only and was not affected by 
the high pass filter. However, as the dancer increased and sustained her dynamics the 
heart rate began to increase. As it did so the physical model would behave more 
erratically, the FM synthesiser produced increasingly dense textural bursts that would 
exceed the duration of the movement phrases and this was filtered as it faded away so 
that a slippery texture shifted around the space and the dancer.  
 
The effect was such that once the heart became energised the system developed an 
obstinate behaviour. This behaviour manifested erratic sonic and spatial events that 
were only partially under the control of the performer. Here was a form of resistance 
different to that created by the physical motion of the audiotape in the Reel Experiments 
system yet equally as provocative. The dancer had to continually re-negotiate her role 
within the system, exploring the changing relationships between her movement, the 
sound, and spatialisation as the performance evolved. The precariousness of this 
changing relationship generated conflict between the dancer’s intention and the 
outcome of her behaviour. Much like Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies, this 
created a virtual space in which the dancer was continually thrown off balance, habitual 
behaviour once again entered an antistructural margin in which to be reconfigured and 
interrogated. The dancer could momentarily regulate the heart rate by sustaining her 
present movement dynamic (within an allowable range) so that she could carve out a 
space in which to explore newly discovered movement or relationships between her and 
the system. This allowed her to manipulate the degree of expressive latitude in real-time 
although this was always susceptible to subversion if she failed to attend to the heart 
rate for too long. 
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The heart mechanism also presented the possibility to have the environment change 
state so that once the heart rate increased beyond specific thresholds the whole system 
would reconfigure its parameters to begin a different movement. This created the 
possibility for procedural composition, a way of progressing through a compositional 
structure not in terms of duration but instead by acting in the space. This development 
enabled us to author two separate movements in the performance (although any number 
of movements could be controlled in this way). Each movement was defined in terms of 
a set of parameters controlling the various elements of the system (the physical 
modeling system, the FM synthesis engine, and the locator sound). In the final version 
of SynSite the system transitioned from the first to the second movement once Mona 
had increased the heart rate to 51% of its capacity. 
 
This development marked the final configuration of SynSite. The camera placed over 
the stage tracked Mona's movement as she traversed the performance space. The system 
accurately tracked her activity and distinguished between motion and stillness. The 
locator augmented Mona’s motion with quick sharp movements generating prominent 
swooshes, whilst short gentle movements created just a hint of a breeze. The FM 
synthesiser sonified the environment and this was tethered to Mona’s body by way of a 
virtual spring that spatialised the sound around the quadrophonic speaker setup. All of 
the parameters that controlled these mechanisms were determined according to the heart 
rate. This heart rate created an environment with an obstinate behaviour, resisting the 
performer so that she may once again interrogate entrenched embodied behaviour. This 
version of SynSite can be seen in the film SynSite Final Configuration [SS7]. 
 
3.4 Closing Remarks 
 
3.4.1  Practice As Metaphor, Theory In Practice 
It is possible to consider each of the projects that I have presented here as a metaphor of 
autopoiesis. For example, in each of the projects – Reel Experiments, Terrain and 
SynSite – we see the simulation of an operationally closed system. In both Reel 
Experiments and Terrain the system boundaries are defined with a physical line of 
audiotape, a membrane that demonstrates structural plasticity yet encloses the 
performers who worked together to sustain its essential organisation. In SynSite there is 
no such material membrane, instead a theatrically lit space within a larger black box 
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environment defines the system boundary. The audience surrounding the space quickly 
learns that this is a sensing area within which the dancer negotiates her role whilst 
sustaining the equilibrium of the system’s constitutive parts. In each case the audience 
looks in as an outsider, observing the complexity of a self-sustaining operationally 
closed dynamic system. The individual components of these systems appear to operate 
together, finding meaningful ways to sustain the organisation, collaborating to create a 
shifting unity and, in doing so, animating the system so that it evolves in form, 
dynamics, and soundscape. 
 
A metaphorical reading such as this is somewhat superficial. However, it is useful for 
indicating the manner in which the theoretical discourse emerged from the practical 
investigation. This investigation began with a period of experimentation that focused on 
the creation of unique performance ecologies - configurations of instruments - and yet 
quickly progressed to the creation of closed systems that performers could inhabit. In 
practice I can attribute this paradigm shift to the resonances between the closed systems 
and my experiences of site-sufficiency, but it also demanded that I consider the 
dynamics of such systems. In doing so, this shift in my practice revealed a theoretical 
discourse that comprehensively articulated the mechanisms that I was observing and 
experiencing first hand as my practical research developed: limen and antistructure, 
embodiment, individual agency, enactive cognition, orienting behaviour, proprioception 
and cross-modality. Further, the evidence supporting this theoretical discourse is 
comprehensive and compelling. And here, I propose, is the essential point: these 
mechanisms are at play in these performances. 
 
The performers – autopoietic living systems - enacted meaning in their environment 
according to their individual capabilities and needs. Even a brief look at the video 
documentation will reveal performers finding a place in ever changing environments, 
discovering meaningful ways to interact and re-act. No instructions to act are spoken, no 
gestures are made to indicate where one should go or what one should do, rather, these 
individuals find their own way and orientate one another using the weight and 
momentum of their bodies, the material boundaries of the environment and the sonic 
events that they produce. Provisional vocabularies emerge in which cross-modal 
associations are made and behaviours are discovered through interaction and collision. 
We can see performers empowered and disempowered, tied up in tape by others or by 
their own misjudged manoeuvres. In SynSite we see Mona become lost amidst a 
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swirling squall of noise. Hierarchies come and go, roles shift from person to person; the 
environment is momentarily mastered only to overwhelm the individual once again. 
These performances are rich with happening-affordances and contingent events. The 
projects presented here are not metaphors or high-concept works of art; they are 
empowerment networks within which embodied agents act together. 
 
On its own the evidence that underpins the theoretical discourse is not sufficient to 
allow me to make such claims. Indeed, ultimately it is the integrity and sincerity with 
which the performers commit to the act that enables collaborative extradisciplinary 
exchange. To clarify this I find it useful to align the practice of extradisciplinarity – a 
goal-oriented activity - with the formulation of game playing posited by Bernard Suits 
in The Grasshopper: 
 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs… using 
only means permitted by rules… where the rules prohibit use of more 
efficient in favour of less efficient means… and where the rules are 
accepted just because they make possible such activity… I also offer the 
following simpler and, so to speak, more portable version of the above: 
playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles.140 
 
Suits summarises the essential attitude necessary to realise such goal-oriented games 
and, in doing so, also reveals the attitudes that may invalidate such activities: 
 
[I]t may be said that triflers recognize rules but not goals, cheats 
recognize goals but not rules, players recognize both rules and goals, and 
spoilsports recognize neither rules nor goals[.]141 
 
In extradisciplinary performance it is essential that each participant recognise both the 
rules and goals of the game. In doing so, they recognise their responsibility not only to 
seek out meaningful interactions in the environment but to also share this provisional 
knowledge with others. It is their responsibility to be players, adopting a lusory attitude, 
‘The acceptance of constitutive rules just so the activity made possible by such 
                                                
140 Suits, Bernard, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: University Of 
Toronto Press, 1978), 41. 
141 Ibid., 47. 
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acceptance can occur’.142 It should be evident that I have every faith in my collaborators 
as players of the game. 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge that I now face as a practitioner moving forward is to 
convey the authenticity of the performance to my audience in a manner that supersedes 
metaphorical readings and notions of motion capture performance, sensing-systems, re-
appropriated technologies, site-sufficiency and extradisciplinarity so that my work can 
offer the viewer a moment to consider our very way of being, as living embodied agents 
enacting meaning in the world. 
 
There is one final notable relationship between the theoretical discourse and practical 
research: the interrelated notions of empowerment networks, external scaffolding, 
empirical action and affordances generate a lexicon with which to discuss the 
construction of collaborative environments, a vocabulary that has since proved to be 
exceptionally functional in practice. This vocabulary helps to clarify ideas exchanged 
between artists from disparate disciplines, whether by discussing individual affordances 
or reflecting upon feedback from collaborators in terms of empowerment networks. 
Throughout my description of the practical research above we see a constant negotiation 
of affordances in the manipulation of objects, software, and rules that proceed from 
discussions between collaborators. This is a theoretical discourse with a functional role 
to play in practice. The precision and efficiency afforded by this theoretical discourse 
improves the exchange of knowledge between collaborators in the process of creation. 
 
3.4.2  Electronic Music and Extradisciplinary Performance 
At this stage it is appropriate that I should address the question from which this research 
project departed; What knowledge can I draw from the vernacular of contemporary 
electronic music, and how can I apply this knowledge within the context of cross-
disciplinary performance practice? What new creative possibilities arise out of this 
activity? 
 
It should be evident from the research that I have presented here that this project was 
never intended as a musicological study of electronic music. Such projects are 
numerous and the history and evolution of electronic music is well documented and 
                                                
142 Ibid., 40. 
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comprehensive. Therefore, in the earliest stages of this research project I chose instead 
to engage in an intensive period of practice, exploring all the avenues in which I 
perform electronic music. This period included facilitating interdisciplinary 
improvisation workshops (at Northumbria University), improvised electronic music 
performances in various duets and trios with my colleagues at the university, interactive 
installations and network performances with theybreakinpieces, a devised 
interdisciplinary performance for the theatre with The FATHoM Project, performances 
of electronic dance music at club nights, and participation in numerous workshops. One 
could easily be overwhelmed by the milieu of techniques, technologies, venues, scores, 
musicians, and contexts that constitute such a practice. However, the invariant amongst 
all of these variables is the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the practitioners. The 
vernacular of electronic music of which I am a participant is one driven forth by the 
invention and re-appropriation of technologies old and new. This is a technologically 
mediated vernacular in which the tools of the trade evolve rapidly from one 
performance to the next (indeed, in a collaboration with Will Schrimshaw our preferred 
method of working was to create instruments on-the-fly during rehearsals, developing 
them throughout day-long sessions in which it was never quite clear whether we were 
performing together or modifying our instruments; this proved to be an extremely 
productive and creative mode of collaborative practice). Subsequently it was clear from 
the outset that I could have pursued numerous trajectories in order to address my 
research question. Therefore I simplified the task by choosing a single object for 
investigation – a reel-to-reel tape deck – an instrument ubiquitous throughout my 
performance practice. If this path had not proven to be fruitful I would have abandoned 
it but, of course, that was not the case. 
 
As a theoretical discourse emerged and illuminated the mechanisms at play in site-
sufficiency, the practical research gained momentum through the possibilities afforded 
by the technologies to be pressed into the service of empowerment networks suitable for 
extradisciplinary performance. The most notable possibility afforded by the technology 
was to instantiate resistant environments, sites in which the artist must negotiate a 
balance between performing and maintaining the system whilst being subjected to 
forces that disrupt and intervene in their actions. This alone is not particularly unique; 
indeed we see such resistant phenomena in prepared instruments, site-sufficiency, and 
all manner of performance strategies (scores, one-off collaborations, Boal’s Theatre Of 
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The Oppressed, Parkour, to name but a few). However, once these principles are applied 
in the digital domain they reveal a myriad of creative possibilities. 
 
SynSite deployed resistance, not through physical means, but instead through the 
obstinate behaviour of the interactive environment. The morphology and spatialisation 
of sonic events, remapping of behaviour onto dynamic physical models, and procedural 
composition all manifest a complex milieu of real and imagined resistance. I have only 
begun to scratch the surface of the infinite different ways in which these techniques may 
be executed. SynSite, for example, used procedural composition to transition between 
two movements (two different system states) however, this technique could be used to 
create a network of movements that dynamically evolves throughout, generating a 
performance that may pursue infinite possible trajectories in response to the artist’s 
action. Likewise, the input and output of the system may accommodate numerous 
disciplines, for example, musicians could provide input to affect video, lighting, film, 
web-based applications, and even physical machines. I feel that the principles and 
techniques that I have developed and deployed in this practical research project not only 
instantiate an infinitely variable site-sufficient environment but also constitutes a 
portable tool-kit that has an extensive range of applications elsewhere. It is my intention 
to investigate these possibilities over the coming years. 
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Conclusion 
 
The point of departure for this research project was the need to reconcile a disparity 
between electronic music and site-sufficient extradisciplinary performance practice. The 
project proceeded from this point of departure in two parallel trajectories. On the one 
hand I engaged in a period of playful experimentation during which time I refined 
technical skills, developed instruments and explored numerous performance ecologies. 
These were deployed in a variety of performance contexts including gigs, 
collaborations, workshops and installations and yet, whilst I had felt that this was 
suitable preparation for what was to come, the true purpose of this experimentation with 
respect to my research project remained elusive. On the other hand I began to unpack 
the mechanisms at play in site-sufficient extradisciplinary performance. This consisted 
in tentative excursions into pedagogical theory, psychoanalysis, sociology, 
anthropology, cognitive science and historic accounts of improvisation, postmodern 
performance, electronic music, and digital media in the arts. As this trajectory 
developed a theoretical discourse emerged that began to resonate strongly with my past 
experience of site-sufficient extradisciplinary performance and observations I was 
making in the practical research. 
 
In Bourdieu’s notion of habitus I had found, for the first time, an articulation of that 
which is the subject of extradisciplinary performance, those entrenched dispositions 
inculcated in the individual that constrain action to habitual behaviour. Elder-Vass 
augmented Bourdieu’s theory by revealing the socio-cultural mechanisms – norm 
circles – that produce such normative behavioural practices. Subsequently Turner’s 
anthropological study of liminality revealed the mechanisms that arise in everyday life 
that have the capacity to interrogate these normative practices. These liminoid sites 
demonstrate antistructural phenomena, spaces in which behaviour has no direct affect 
on the real world and yet may generate knowledge to be carried forth into quotidian life. 
Whilst performance strategies such as site-sufficiency, prepared instruments, and 
improvisation clearly demonstrate liminoid aesthetics, this association alone was not 
adequate to account for the manner in which embodied behaviour such as playing an 
instrument or dancing is interrogated through such strategies. To gain a more 
comprehensive understanding required a closer examination of individual agency, an 
investigation that would reveal the fundamental embodied nature of our being in the 
world. 
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Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis revealed biological agency as the essential 
characteristic of living systems and, further, showed the manner in which consciousness 
arises from this fundamental level of cognition. Further, Varela and his colleagues 
showed that, as an operationally closed yet interactionally open system, the individual 
enacts meaning in the environment. Cole and Gallagher’s study of proprioception 
revealed the manner in which the body recedes into the background yet Lakoff and 
Johnson show that this absent body permeates experience by projecting the known onto 
the unknown through cross-modal and metaphorical mapping. Subsequently, this 
discourse brought to the foreground the essential role of the body in cognition. This was 
further understood by introducing the interrelated concepts of external scaffolding and 
epistemic action, showing the way in which we manipulate the environment to simplify 
complex cognitive tasks. This also revealed the ways in which the environment, both 
socio-cultural and physical, can be manipulated to empower and disempower the 
individual as an agent. Finally, the notion of empowerment networks and Gibson’s 
theory of affordances provided a vocabulary with which to articulate the opportunities 
for action available to the individual according to their capabilities and needs relative to 
the environment. 
 
The assembly of this theoretical discourse was inextricably bound to the development of 
my practical research. This practice progressed from experiments with performance 
ecologies to the creation of closed self-organising systems, synthesised environments, 
and finally empowerment networks. Each of these perceptual shifts propelled the 
theoretical discourse forth which, in turn, informed the subsequent stage of practical 
development.  
 
The practice, consisting in the vocabularies of music and motion technology, sound and 
movement, frequently provided a means of understanding, interrogating and 
reconfiguring the theoretical discourse. The performance systems presented living 
analogies of the discourse, animating the theory and enabling the first-hand observation 
and experience of ideas. As my understanding of embodiment, enaction and affordances 
deepened I became increasingly interested in technologically mediated environments 
and their affect on the behavior of individuals and less concerned with the production 
and preparation of artworks for public performance. As such, the function of public 
performance during this project changed as the research progressed.  
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During Reel Experiments I felt no need to share my work in public and was instead 
concerned with exploring the creative possibilities of multiple performance ecologies. 
The discovery of an ecology that shared many qualities with site-specific performance 
led to Terrain, the first public output of my research. By presenting Terrain to the 
public we (Chemaine, Wendy, Mona and I) sought to overcome our mastery of the Reel 
Experiments system by setting it amidst an audience and, in doing so, revealed new 
affordances and creative possibilities (a strategy shared with theybreakinpieces who had 
moved from one location to the next so that encounters with contingent events could be 
optimised). The presence of an audience potentialised unforeseen events such as, for 
example, the audiotape snapping during contact with a heavy handed individual, or the 
incidental sampling of sounds that originate from the audience and then become 
amplified and reproduced throughout a performance. These public presentations took 
place during scratch nights (events in which works-in-progress and experimental works 
are shown to an audience), platforms (sharing the bill with numerous other works that 
are often representative of a broad spectrum of disciplinary vocabularies), and sharings. 
Such events imply that the work on show is in development – in a state of flux - and so 
feedback, critical response and suggestions are encouraged and to be directed to the 
author (who is usually present). Performances at these nights are often followed by a 
discussion during which the audience can offer their thoughts. Very little context was 
offered to audiences prior to performances of Terrain. I did not inform the audience that 
it was a research output or part of a research project. Written credits for the piece stated 
each performer’s name alongside a vague description of their role within the piece. This 
allowed us to discover what the audience observed when considering Terrain and the 
Reel Experiments system as an independent artwork. As such, feedback from these 
performances provided an opportunity to hear what others had seen in our work when 
the technicalities and theory was not known. Feedback from these events contributed to 
understanding, for example, the degree to which the relations and interactions between 
performers and the technology were observed and understood.  
 
During the later stages of practical research – SynSite – insights of this nature were 
secondary to my investigation of empowerment networks and the affects on 
participant’s actions and behaviour. To gain feedback and further insight from 
audiences with regard to these primary concerns Mona and I offered workshops to 
provide a much greater understanding of the work, its development and theoretical 
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foundations. During a workshop we would, for example, demonstrate the principles of 
affordances through discussion and then allow participants to interact with the Reel 
Experiments system. In these workshops we were able to observe the way in which 
individuals with a limited knowledge of the system may learn and interact with the 
technologies. Audience members, having now interacted with the system, could discuss 
their experiences and suggest further reading (whether of texts or performances) that 
may contribute to the project’s trajectory.  Feedback from these sessions also revealed 
the way in which the systems affected participants’ actions and behavior. In addition, 
these workshops were an opportunity for participants to collide my research with their 
own practice and discover the ways in which the theories, technologies and systems 
may inform their own work. 
 
It is possible that one may view the performances of Terrain and Synsite as metaphors 
of the theoretical discourse, however, whilst being a perfectly valid reading, it is 
important to recognise that this would be reductive. These performances are liminoid 
sites in which antistructural phenomena may be attributed to the resistant capacity of the 
performance systems. These are sites in which the performer utilises external 
scaffolding – the audiotape in motion, the bodies of other performers, sonic events and 
their spatialisation – not to simplify complex cognitive tasks but, instead, to encounter 
and negotiate contingent events. As such, these sites empower the individual as an 
extradisciplinary performer so that they might interrogate entrenched, embodied 
behaviours and exchange this knowledge with collaborators in the act of performance. 
 
This body of work is a comprehensive record of an extradisciplinary exercise that has 
had significant implications for my practice. I have drawn from numerous disciplines to 
assemble a theoretical discourse that both enriches and validates the notion of 
extradisciplinarity. This theoretical discourse is now interwoven in my practice and 
provides a vocabulary with which to articulate, discuss and reflect upon the systems and 
performances that I create. Furthermore, this practical research project has allowed me 
to develop extensive technical skills and techniques with respect to motion capture, 
interactivity, procedural audio and procedural composition so that I may now develop 
ever more complex, efficient, and effective performance systems to empower 
individuals as extradisciplinary performers.  
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Whilst it is clear that this project has had significant impact on my own practice, it is 
my hope that the theoretical discourse and, indeed, my approach to interactive 
environments will be of use to artists working in similar fields. Just as the theory of 
affordances has been widely adopted in the design community, I believe that its 
presentation here alongside the interrelated ideas of external scaffolding, epistemic 
action and empowerment networks will prove to be insightful and useful in practice to 
anyone concerned with the creation of collaborative interdisciplinary environments. I 
have presented a comprehensive account of the theories of embodied cognition that 
underpin these ideas as evidence of their validity.  
 
This project has revealed one possible way in which I might reconcile electronic music 
and site-sufficient extradisciplinary performance. However, in doing so it has revealed 
much broader and more significant questions regarding, for example, the nature of free 
will, resistance, and pedagogy. Whilst I am satisfied with the outcome of this project I 
am both overwhelmed and invigorated by these questions that will undoubtedly further 
my practical research over the coming years. 
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